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INTRODUCTION 
 
Semiotics of culture recognizes the analogous structure and function of the human 
intellect, text and culture (Lotman 1991) as well as the isomorphism of the cultural 
system and individual genetic memory (Lotman 1990). Both of the latter are formed 
and shaped by their respective symbols that play the part of mediator between spheres 
of semiosis. This affords the presumption that dream would have played a significant 
part in the phylogenesis of anthropo-semiotic modelling and by extension in cultural 
evolution. This thesis revolves around the phenomenon and ambit of consciousness in 
the light of dreams in order to dissertate their role in propagating consciousness 
compos mentis and what has followed. 
 The thesis consists of four parts. Firstly, a metatheoretical framework of 
consciousness and its symbolologic function will be sketched out to be used as the 
basis for a theoretical model of semeioneiron1 in order to encompass symbol in two 
semiosic spheres. Secondly, the elementary semiotic mechanisms and organizing 
principles of the generative trajectory of dream-formation will be outlined in 
accordance with the semiotic square. Thirdly, a hypothetical dream-syntagm will be 
treated as a finalized text in and as a result of autocommunication to show the 
inescapability of narrativizing, i.e. structuring and organizing the random produce of 
passive consciousness. Fourthly, on the basis of cultural typology supplemented by 
the framework of types of traditional thinking and cultural traditions, the analogous 
structure and function between dream as symbol of consciousness and symbol in the 
cultural system will be made evident. 
 Lastly, I intend to venture forth a proposition that symbols in culture abide to 
the same principles as symbols with regard to consciousness as exemplified by 
dreams and are nothing more than spatio-temporal extensions of consciousness itself 
                                                
1 from Greek sēmeion ‘sign’ (from sēma ‘mark’) + oneiros ‘dream’ 
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which thus possesses an independent, ever-developing existence in which the human 
mind may be just a periodic stage. 
 
 
0.1. Hats off to the Psychoanalytic ring 
Dreams and dreaming are supposedly intuitively familiar phenomena to the majority 
of people as well as the notion that these dimensions are separate. Generally, we do 
not dream awake nor are we awake in our dreams in such a manner that the dreamer 
would be aware of his or her individual existence in the sense that “I” as such is 
indistinguishable from the surroundings – “I” is its surroundings and vice versa. 
Hence, any separation of significant elements from insignificant ones that would 
facilitate semiotic recognition is excluded during a dream, it occurs only upon awake. 
 Due to the eternal presence of dreaming in humans – regardless when the two 
spheres were recognized as distinct – dreams have always aroused interest in the 
dreamer and in several cases in more ancient times, in society as a whole; 
interpretations or rather, repercussions of dreams are abound in world history, in 
myths and religions as well in the arts and science. Alas, the question as to how or 
why we dream is still in want of satisfactory explanation. As a sidenote, this thesis 
does not contend for an exhaustive explanation of dreams but only strives to 
supplement some aspects left out by previous authors. 
 In addition to the study of dreams and their meaning in ancient times, the more 
recent study can be traced to have its beginning or rather re-surgence in the works of 
Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) and especially his Die Traumdeutung (1900) (The 
Intepretation of Dreams (1965)) in which he offered a fairly wholesome picture of the 
human psyche for his time. Claiming to have solved the puzzle of dreams and their 
effect on the mind, in his theory he brought about the idea that natural phenomena 
may be treated as compositions of/in consciousness, characteristic to human nature; 
with which the task of transforming the sub-conscious2 into consciousness is evoked 
and by this taking the human into a new state of conscious experience. In general 
terms the “Freudian psychoanalytical model is constructed as a chain at one end of 
which are subconscious libidinal notions and at the other the verbal testimony of the 
                                                
2  Note that in this section the terms sub-conscious and unconscious are used interchangeably 
depending on the author in question and his/her choice of word. 
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patient” (Lotman 1976: 301). Between the extreme points of this chain, there is a 
sequence of different sign substitutions, symbolic equivalents and transformations. 
 The major flaw with this was of course that upon the transformation it became 
obvious that sub-conscious is that which “was” before becoming conscious and it is 
only in this sense that the distinction or comparison between sub-conscious and 
conscious is at all possible. The sub-conscious has meaning only insofar as it is itself 
a specific element of previous, unacknowledged consciousness; ‘previous’ being used 
here in a tentative manner because some things can be positioned on the temporal 
axis, some things on the spatial axis – in this sense it would be just as right to call 
sub-conscious not ‘previous’ but ‘becoming’ as well. It is the process of 
(psycho)analysis that separates the sub-conscious from the conscious to make the 
analytic understanding of consciousness more substantial. 
 But the problematic character of the (psycho)analytic comprehension of 
consciousness became evident exactly by the bringing about of the notion ‘sub-
conscious’ which culminated in the ‘homologous’ understanding of consciousness. 
The Freudian interpretation of sub-conscious is utterly rational, a masked 
consciousness belonging to the expression plane alone; “it does not differ in content 
from the categories of texts of consciousness, merely masking them in other symbols 
of the expression plane […] and is totally translatable into the language of 
consciousness” (Ibid. 304). Sub-consciousness was like consciousness, only unknown 
of; later on, it became to be seen as being structured like a language (cf. Lacan 1998). 
By and in language, which is a semio-linguistic modelling system, the whatever that 
is possible to be discussed and thought of must be facilitated therein according to the 
rules of said language. As is known, semiotics of culture tends to view cultural 
phenomena as (results of) secondary modelling systems; the primary one for the 
human subject being natural language and thus, it is no surprise that the sub-conscious 
and not only the sub-conscious is seen to be structured like a language because the 
Freudian sub-conscious is “constructed by the investigator’s metamodels and, 
naturally, is translated into them” (Lotman 1976: 304 [emphasis original]). 
 As the Wittgensteinian saying goes, whereof one cannot speak, thereof one 
must be silent. That is, comprehending consciousness as something onto which 
nothing would be conjoined from beyond the subject-object relations in/of 
consciousness became renounced partially due to the subjecting of all aspects of 
consciousness to straightforward rationalism afforded by language and the models it 
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facilitates. The Freudian “psychoanalyst deciphers dreams, unintentional utterances, 
and other involuntary texts; and he finds, upon substitution of a system of symbols, a 
content adequately expressible in the terms of the language of consciousness” (Ibid.). 
It may be noted that the act of thought is in itself paradoxical. In order to know 
something, we need to know what we want to know and factually to know we need to 
know how can we know and why it needs to be known; but to know why we need to 
know we need to know what we want to know and so forth indefinitely. 
 On what comes to dreams in Freud’s theory (1965) which laid a firm basis for 
then-future elaborations of psychological, semiotic and other theories of dreaming, 
the major contributions lie in his concept of dreamwork (Traumarbeit) whence four 
basic mechanisms are recognized: 
 
 i) Condensation (Verdichtung) or over-determination, the  process by which 
 latent meanings are condensed into one as manifest elements of the dream 
 narrative; 
 ii) Displacement (Verschiebung), according to which the most significant 
 latent meanings present themselves as unimportant or senseless in the dream; 
 iii) Considerations of representability (Rücksicht auf Darstellbarkeit), or the 
 way abstract, latent ideas are transformed into dramatic and concrete scenes, 
 and; 
 iv) Secondary revision (sekundäre Bearbeitung), the replacing of true 
 connections between latent dream-thoughts by false connections on the 
 manifest level. 
 (Freud 1965: 381–651) 
 
From thereon dreams have been viewed and interpreted in accordance with the above 
mechanisms, each theoretician naturally effected by his or her own distinct point of 
view on their respective fields of study; most notable for us are Carl Jung (1875–
1961), Jacques Lacan (1901–1981) and Julia Kristeva (1941–). 
 Though allegedly Jung’s theories have somewhat lost their academic 
relevance they deserve to be mentioned here on what comes to generalizations. Jung 
is most notably known for his archetypes which are defined as developed elements of 
the collective unconscious. The collective unconscious is “the deepest layer of psyche 
that is one and the same in all of us” (Jung 1968: 74). As all bodies are similar to one 
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another with only slight differences in blood and tone, then accordingly all psyches 
are similar with only slight differences. “The deepest collective level is a whole that 
cannot be segmented” (Ibid.). Starting from this level, all individual psyches are 
constructed (or rather, from all individual psyches it is possible to venture to this 
level) beginning from the ectopsychical sphere (perceptions, thoughts, feelings, 
intuition) and the endopsychical sphere (memory, subjective components of functions, 
affections, invasions). The endopsychical sphere constitutes for Jung the individual 
unconscious, a part of the psyche “consisting of such material that might as well be 
placed in consciousness” (Ibid. 77) – unlike his predecessor’s. 
 The archetypes, that belong to the unconscious include (but are not restricted 
to) recurrent images and motifs to be found in myths and religions, dreams and art as 
well as by examining a person’s behaviour that is supposedly effected by these 
archetypes; the more noteworthy ones would be figures: the Mother, the Father, the 
Trickster, the Child, etc.; events: Birth, Death, Separation from the parents, etc. and, 
motifs: the Flood or Deluge, the Apocalypse, the Creation etc. transformations of all 
of which are to be found in nigh all cultures one way or the other. Accordingly, the 
number of such archetypes is indefinite though some are more prominent than the 
others, for example the Shadow that represents the individual unconscious as a whole 
– the dark side of human being – and the aforementioned Mother and Father 
(perchance in the guise of the Wise Old Man). The Self for Jung is the sum total of 
psychic phenomena in (an individual) human. Also, Jung’s theory introduces the 
concepts of Anima (the contrasexual, i.e. feminine part in the male psyche) and 
Animus (the contrasexual, i.e. masculine part in the female psyche). 
 Drawing from Aristotle’s classification of the elements of the dramatic plot, 
dreams for Jung consist of the Exposition phase – the whereabouts, set and setting, 
actors and actants and sometimes time of the dream – the initial situation though it is 
at times quite difficult to pinpoint the beginning of a dream. Exposition is followed by 
Development as the dream’s plot thickens, situations becoming more complex; this 
then leads to Culmination (peripeteia) when something decisive happens or some 
essential change takes place. “The final phase is the Solution or Result (lysis), which 
shows the final situation; this phase is sometimes lacking” (Jung 1974: 81). 
Technically, Culmination can also manifest as a new Exposition provided it is the 
same dream. 
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 On what comes to the effects of dreams, for Jung, “natural transformation 
processes announce themselves mainly in dreams” (Jung 1972: 76) that is, provided 
that one is subjected to personal growth or withering it is – according to Jung – often 
times announced in dreams to the person for example by ways of inner 
transformation(s) and/or as rebirth into another being or it may also be casually 
announced to one. “This “other being” is the other person in ourselves – that larger 
and greater personality maturing within us, whom we have already met as the inner 
friend of the soul” (Ibid.). It must be noted that for Jung, the impressiveness of 
dreams does not guarantee or entail that they would be somehow more significant 
and/or transformative than regular, dull dreams (and by extension, it should not matter 
either whether the more transformative dreams are remembered or not). That is, “the 
most beautiful and impressive dreams often have no lasting or transformative effect 
on the dreamer […] these more aesthetic forms of experience must be carefully 
distinguished from those which indubitably involve a change of one’s nature” (Ibid. 
60). 
 Not delving that much deeper into Jungian analytic psychology, it pays to 
mention one last thing with regard to the problematics of consciousness and sub-, or 
unconscious and the possibilities to discuss them which already models the whatever 
from therein onto the plane of language – the issue already presented. For Jung the 
great plane upon which the “unconscious life of the psyche is constructed is so 
inaccessible to our understanding that we can never know what evil may not be 
necessary in order to produce good by enantiodromia, and what good may very 
possibly lead to evil” (Ibid. 111). Again, whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must 
be silent, regardless that also this thesis falls prey to the same dilemma as its 
predecessors. 
 As consciousness in general along with the whole of the universe, all 
theoretical stabs at it and its aspects are in constant change of becoming something 
else than they were becoming. Basing his claim on Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist 
anthropology as well as Saussure’s linguistic theory, Jacques Lacan distanced himself 
from the Freudian view of the sub-conscious by arguing that “the unconscious is 
structured like a language” (Lacan 1998: 20). That is, based on the socio-linguistic 
and symbolic order of the surrounding culture one is born into, then in accordance 
with structuralism and “linguistics, whose model is the combinatory operation, 
functioning spontaneously, of itself, in a presubjective way – it is this linguistic 
 11 
structure that gives its status to the unconscious” (Ibid. 20–21). By the same token, 
Lacan became convinced that there indeed was something definable and objectifiable 
underneath the unconscious that woud be accessible to the ample analyst. 
 Consequently, while Freud’s sub-conscious was more or less exactly like 
consciousness albeit a masked one which has no order or structure before being 
hoisted to consciousness i.e. the sub-conscious was “that which is excluded from 
language” (Homer 2005: 12), Lacan nudged the comprehension of the term towards a 
more decipherable terminology. However, this should not be taken so that the 
Lacanian unconscious would be simply constructed as Volapük or Esperanto, or 
unraveled like an actual natural language. An opposite example would be between the 
major differences between the grammatical rules that govern speech and language, 
and the ones governing society and culture; the organizing principles in both are 
similar due to their common origin and yet vastly different. 
 Lacan’s unconscious, as opposed to Freud’s, is based on a gap, which in its 
turn is “the revelation that at the level of the unconscious there is something at all 
points homologous with what occurs at the level of the subject” (Lacan 1998: 24) by 
way of dreams, lapsus and the like that intrude the conscious subject and its doings. 
That is, impediment and failure, a split creates the gap and “what is produced in this 
gap is presented as the discovery” (Ibid.). This gap then renders the unconscious pre-
ontological by way of discontinuity and the unconscious presents itself, manifesting 
as vacillation, as the gap within the symbolic chain. Interestingly, when the subject of 
unconscious manifests itself in such a fashion, Lacan also argued “that it thinks before 
it attains certainty” (Ibid. 36) and after having attained this certainty, the whatever 
flowed from the unconscious disappears to where it came from. Or, as will be 
explicated, the structure of consciousness abstracted from a state of consciousness 
dissolves into it. 
 Without that much specificity here, Lacan divides the realms of subjects into 
three: the imaginary; the symbolic, and the real. Because our interest is not bent 
towards the development of subjects and egos therein, a superficial account of these 
must suffice. The imaginary comes to be by way of the mirror stage, i.e. an 
individual’s capability to distinguish in itself between subject and ego as well as 
between itself and others. “In other words, for a person to identify themselves as an 
autonomous coherent self they must first distinguish themselves from others and from 
their social environment” (Homer 2015: 21). The mirror stage is named such because 
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it presupposes the subject identify its reflection in the mirror as an independent being 
in the world – the acknowledgment of Dasein by and in the flesh if one pleases. The 
imaginary in general terms is “the realm of the ego, a pre-linguistic realm of sense-
perception, identification and an illusory sense of unity” (Ibid. 31). In passing it may 
be noted that this – along the rest of psychoanalytic theory – gave basis for Kristeva’s 
definition of the semiotic chora explicated below. 
 As was mentioned, Lacan drew quite heavily from Lévi-Strauss and Saussure. 
In addition to his claims concerning the unconscious being structured like a language, 
he also found significant “the way in which women [among other things] were 
transformed into signs and operated within a system of symbolic exchange” (Ibid. 35) 
constituting the symbolic function intruding into all facets of (social) life if by no 
other means then by way of the symbolic order which defines and delimits our 
universe – language. If the ego is an imaginary function founded on one’s body, the 
“subject, on the other hand, is constituted in the symbolic order and is determined by 
language” (Ibid. 45). “I” is “I” only because it is afforded by language. 
 The real is that which escapes from the imaginary as well as symbolization but 
it nevertheless exists and supports our everyday reality, which in its turn yields from 
the social order and symbolic reality. “The real is the unknown that exists at the limit 
of this socio-symbolic universe and is in constant tension with it” (Ibid. 81). By the 
real is not meant the physical reality but rather a trauma of sorts; the real does not 
exist in that sense but serves as a basis for this or that function. This is closely related 
to repetition of the real as trauma in several ways; the real “is that which always 
comes back to the same place – to the place where the subject in so far as he thinks, 
where the res cogitans, does not meet it” (Lacan 1998: 49). Pre-linguistic and based 
on trauma, the real is a void, it is “that which resists symbolization; it is the traumatic 
kernel at the core of subjectivity and the symbolic order” (Homer 2015: 94). It may be 
noted already here that some aspects of Lacan’s real are curiously reminiscent of the 
concept of symbol of consciousness used in this thesis albeit the present author finds 
the latter much more comprehensible. 
 Dreams for Lacan are partially what constitute the all-human phenomenon of 
doubt by way of “an obvious gap between what was experienced and what was 
recounted” (Lacan 1998: 35). This doubt yields its essence from the unconscious that 
in its turn “is the unknown that lies beyond doubt” (Homer 2015: 67) and thus, 
logically, doubt does not exist within the dream itself due to the lack of meta-
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awarenes, i.e. awareness of being aware as will be pointed to later on. The dream is 
real. This is quite essential to notice because this thesis is not concerned with the 
specificities of dream-formation or dreamwork nor is it absolutely of any concern 
how this or that dream could or should be interpreted. 
 With regard to dream-analysis, for Lacan there is always an impenetrable core 
sprouting from the (trauma of) the real and may manifest in dream. It is “what Freud 
calls the navel – the navel of the dreams […] to designate their ultimately unknown 
centre” (Lacan 1998: 23). This navel originates, or rather is “that gap of which I have 
already spoken” (Ibid.) – the gap being the unconscious as already mentioned. For 
Freud, dreams are often seen as outcomes of repressed emotions or as fulfilments of 
wishes whereas for Lacan they may also be viewed as manifestations of the 
“repressed element as the representative of the representation, or das Ding (the 
Thing)” (Homer 2015: 84) expressable only in dreams (and escaping symbolization 
upon awakening). However, for practical reasons we will not indulge ourselves 
further in the psychoanalytic approach proper but essay towards a slightly different 
approach albeit the navel of the dreams has an eerie echo of similarity with the 
concept of nucleus used in the present thesis as did Lacan’s real and the symbol of 
consciousness along with the pre-thinking thought. 
 Dreams for Kristeva, who approaches psychoanalysis from her widely specific 
point of view of production as (one) core aspect of semiotics, the dreamwork 
“becomes a theoretical concept that triggers off a new research, one that touches on 
pre-representative production, and the development of ‘thinking’ before thought” 
(Kristeva 1996a: 84). For Kristeva, psychoanalytic theories brought about the 
possibility to construct a semiotics of production that enables the study of ‘the other 
scene’ where human desires become enacted before they become products (in the 
Marxian sense), language or communication. 
 Semiotics of production emphasizes the dynamics of production itself instead 
of the final product (as opposed to Marxist theories). As a theory of discourse, 
semiotics of production is simultaneously a theory of itself and “it consequently 
rebels against representation even as it uses representative models, and overthrows the 
very formalization that gives it substance with an unstable theory of the 
unrepresentable and the unmeasurable” (Ibid. 85). That is, semiotics strives to 
represent that which by definition can not be represented and “consequently, one talks 
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of the unobserved object” (Ibid.) which in the psychoanalytic tradition belongs to the 
domain of the sub-conscious (or unconscious). 
 Discussing Freud’s dreamwork and the way dreams come about in that given 
frame, Kristeva notes the essential aspect of transposition, or “the signifying process’ 
ability to pass from one sign-system to another” (Kristeva 1996b: 112) which then 
leads to production (of dreams) by way of exchanging and permutating the respective 
sign systems’ elements; the elements consisting of certain measures of 
representability, which for Kristeva is “the specific articulation of the semiotic and the 
thetic for a sign-system” (Ibid.). Consequently, transposition takes place in a state of 
sleep in which the conditions for dreaming are present and it plays an essential role in 
so far as “it implies the abandonment of a former sign-system, the passage to a second 
via an instinctual intermediary common to the two systems and the articulation of the 
new system with its new representability” (Ibid.). 
 The major lack in the usefulness of transposition for us is that the sign-systems 
are seen somehow as being separate whereas nothing in consciousness is ever 
separate; even the sub-conscious (or unconscious) is within the sphere of 
consciousness just as much as everything else one is not aware of. Transposition does 
not take into consideration the all-penetrating analogy and isomorphism of structure 
and function between the human intellect and culture. That is, we are concerned of the 
most elementary part(s) as the smallest common denominator between ourselves and 
culture; dream in the former, symbol in the latter. It is the concept of symbols as sign-
like formations possibly serving as the basis for sign-ness we are interested of, not 
that much of the production – not to mention interpretation or meaning – of dreams 
albeit a frame for generation will be offered. 
 Partially on the same page with Kristeva, we abandon transposition echoing 
intersemiotic translation, for that would require we know what is the sign-system of 
dreams. No one knows. To an extent psychoanalysis has offered explanations but 
since it is not the field of interest of the present author (who admittedly is not that 
well educated in said field either), we mainly exclude this tradition, throw the hat into 
the ring and resort to a different strategy. However, Kristeva’s distinction between the 
semiotic and the symbolic as well as the concept of the semiotic chora will be 
adopted and heavily abused as operational terms. 
 Our approach is from a slightly different angle, it is more mechanistic by 
production and although the concept of ‘individual’ or ‘subject’ must be used to 
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discuss dreaming, the final outcome stretches from the individual level to the level of 
culture by way of showing the similitude of symbol in the cultural system and dream. 
That said, it would certainly do no harm to the reader to hold one under consciousness 
when the other is discussed. In this sense, this thesis has nothing to do with dreams, at 
least what comes to their (psychoanalytic) interpretation. Dreams are taken as a 
mechanism founded upon us that has the function to mould the individual and by 
extension and analogy, ‘dreams’ of culture manifested as symbols mould their system. 
 
0.2. Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology 
Though its exact mode of being is still open to debate (cf. Bayne et al. 2009) 
consciousness is nevertheless defined as “the state of being aware of and responsive 
to one’s surroundings; a person’s awareness or perception of something; the fact of 
awareness by the mind of itself and the world” (ODE sub consciousness). Here the 
latter half of the first sentence applies to nigh all animate beings individually and in a 
sense to all organic matter; the second applies to persons, people. It is otherwise a 
nigh analogous definition except for the human or anthroposemiotic qualifier which 
then leads to the third argument and by that distances from the organic/material 
receiver or perceiver. It no longer concerns perceptions acquired by the senses and 
only slightly – if necessary – the becoming aware of something through them. It is 
concerned only of itself by way of ‘mind’, awareness of being aware. What interests 
us is consciousness as oner, as a factual existant (?) regardless of its ambit or mode, 
that has its ways of going about; especially in people according to themselves, 
provided the third sentence be stressed. 
 This paper does not concern itself with the neurological aspect of 
consciousness; after all, all brains are as different as people in whom they are so what 
for example neurophenomenology gives us is generalizations, models derived from 
the variance found within the physical world or individual aspects of the workings of 
the brain. Granted, all (human) brains work neurologically in the same fashion but 
this does not entail that all the bearers of these brains would work or behave, act, 
think etc. in the same fashion. Even if we were to define all the semiotic (or any 
other) models, mechanisms and functions of human action and thought, there would 
still be plenty of room for individual variance – otherwise it would be a case of 
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mental simulacra which would nullify the necessity and indeed possibility for 
communication between individuals. Two or more things that are and know the exact 
same have no ambiguity in between them. 
 Nevertheless, a few words with regard to consciousness or mind therein are in 
order. Traditionally, in philosophy of mind, there are two kinds of problems with 
regard to consciousness, the simple ones and the more hard one. The former are 
many, concerning issues such as how does the brain handle the information it receives 
from its surroundings, how is this information integrated in the brain, what are the 
mechanisms upon which the inner ‘reports’ of one’s situation become known, how are 
we able to access this information and how we use it to orientate our behaviour and 
all other things. These more simple problems are explainable to an extent by 
conventional science(s) by merely describing the mechanism that a given function 
fulfills. 
 In philosophy of mind, functional reduction is a fairly clear-cut method in 
which one defines the reducible quality (or quale) functionally and then finds out 
what mechanism exactly fulfills this role. For example: 
Let M be the reducible quality. 
Firstly, M is functionalized, that is, M is defined functionally – to have M is a 
function for fulfilling a certain (causal) role C; 
Secondly, what realizes M is asserted, that is finding out what are the properties that 
fulfill the (causal) role C; 
Thirdly, a theory is created that would explain how what realizes M fulfills the 
(causal) role C. 
However, the question whether properties of mind can be functionalized remains. 
This may be the case with regard to intentional properties but not when it comes to 
qualia, quales cannot be functionalized because they can vary without entailing 
functional differences (cf. Kim 2005) 
 The hard problem of consciousness still remains – why does the fulfilling of 
functions entail a subjective experience which is something more than all the 
functions related to consciousness. Functionalism then explains “how information is 
distinguished, integrated and expressed but not how it is experienced” (Chalmers 
1999: 1414). Technically then, a solution for the hard problem should offer an 
understanding of the relationship between physical processes and consciousness, i.e. 
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explain how and why the physical processes are related to (states of) consciousness. 
Two main approaches to this problem are the reductionist and non-reductionist. 
 In the former only physical principles are used and consciousness is not held 
to be a primitive (also the materialistic or physicalist understanding treats 
consciousness as a physical process) whereas in the latter consciousness is 
incorporated as a fundamental part in the explanation. 
 According to Chalmers (2003), answers to epistemic arguments with regard to 
both reductionism (or physical-materialism) and non-reductionism may be divided 
into three types each; of which will be given here a short overview: 
 A-type materialism denies that consciousness poses a hard problem and can be 
completely explained by way of solving all simple, i.e. functional problems. By this, 
all and any epistemic breaches between the physical and phenomenal truths are 
denied (cf. eliminativism, analytical functionalism, logical behaviorism); 
 B-type materialism recognizes a breach between the physical and phenomenal 
but denies that this would entail an ontological breach, phenomenal states are 
identical with physical states but this identity is not the outcome of conceptional 
analysis but is discovered empirically – consciousness differs from the concepts of 
physicalism and functionallity but it is empirically possible to show that they point to 
the same thing (cf. aposterior materialism); 
 C-type materialism recognizes an epistemic breach between the physical and 
phenomenal in hope that it may be breached [sic] in principle. This type is unstable in 
that inasmuch the describing structure does not encompass consciousness, a new 
physics should be created that consists of more than just structure and dynamics. By 
this, consciousness as such should be brought into physics, transforming the C-type 
materialism into D-type dualism or F-type monism; 
 D-type dualism or interactionism, according to which physical states 
propagate states of consciousness and vice versa. This is in harmony with substance 
dualism, property dualism and emergentism, no physical experiment has as of yet 
revealed a basis that would be purely of the mind albeit it hasn’t been excluded either. 
Physics may be complemented by adding mental forces into the fundamental forces 
(cf. interactive dualism); 
 E-type dualism or epiphenomalism, according to which phenomenal properties 
differ from physical properties and do not effect the physical, the physical world is 
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closed but defines phenomenal facts. This also is in harmony with substance dualism, 
property dualism and emergentism; 
 F-type monism argues that consciousness is formed by the inner qualities of 
fundamental physical entities rather than their relational or dispositional properties. 
These properties are phenomenal and thus the basis of physical reality are 
(proto)phenomenal properties (cf. pan-psychism). 
 Provided that consciousness is not reducible to anything physical, then it must 
be something independent in the world. After all the physical facts have been fixed, 
the truth with regard to consciousness also needs to be fixed. There are mainly two 
ways to go about it: either consciousness itself is a fundamental trait of the world like 
time-space and mass or, consciousness itself is not fundamental but is conditioned by 
some more primitive, fundamental trait(s) that in themselves are not conditioned by 
physical facts. Such trait(s) may be said to be protophenomenal properties and by the 
same token, protophenomenal properties are fundamental properties. In this sense, 
though steering clear from any and all philosophy, the theme of this paper is more 
bent towards the non-reductionist view. 
Also not the concern of this paper and yet requiring mention, another wide 
field studying consciousness is phenomenology. Phenomenology is a systematic term 
introduced in to the field of science by Hegel (1807) in his book Phänomenologie des 
Geistes (Phenomenology of Mind first published in English in 1910), and it has come 
to be both a school of thought and a scientific discipline that studies phenomena as 
distinct from the nature of being. A general outline of consciousness in 
phenomenolgy: “In a broadest sense, the expression consciousness comprehends (but 
then indeed less suitably) all mental processes” (Husserl 1983: 64). Consciousness is 
a trait often enough accredited to the Ego, the actual human Being or “I”, a real object 
existent in-the-world (In-der-welt-sein). In a sense, all there is – objects physical, 
mental or transcendental – would not exist without the experiencing subject or, more 
precisely, the Ego as an individual consciousness susceptible to be subjected to a 
systematic, eidetic analysis in order to effect “the insight that consciousness has, in 
itself, a being of its own which in its own absolute essence, is not touched by the 
phenomenological exclusion” (Ibid. 65). It is the human ‘consciousness as such’ 
which is the primary concern of phenomenology although “there are, after all, brute 
animal Ego-subjects” (Ibid. 72). 
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Before jumping to transcendental conclusions, we note that all mental 
processes should be considered “in the entire fullness of the concreteness within 
which they present themselves in their concrete context – the stream of mental 
processes – and which, by virtue of their own essence, they combine to make up” 
(Ibid. 69). In order for this stream to become, perception – being basic and primary 
with regard to cognition and action – is required. Husserl distinguishes between three 
ways of intending an object or state of affairs: 
 
 i) signitive, i.e. linguistic acts which intend the object via a contingent 
 representation; 
 ii) imaginative (pictorial), i.e. acts which intend the object via a 
 representation, and; 
 iii) perceptual i.e. intention which presents us with the object itself in its 
 physical presence. 
 (Gallagher, Zahavi 2012: 100) 
 
The objects intended to are not to be confused with the mental processes of 
consciousness “which are consciousness of those objects” (Husserl 1983: 71). But to 
perceive requires that that, which is to be perceived have meaning, have concept – 
have noesis. “Fulfilling their intentional function of sense-bestowal, noeses constitute 
consciousness-objectivities” (Špet 1991: 103). What characterizes consciousness 
when consciousness – precisely by the fact that it is consciousness – points to 
something of which it is the consciousness; or in other words, what Husserl calls the 
noetic moment or sense-bestowal, “a stratum by which precisely the concrete 
intentive mental processes arises from the sensuos, which has in itself nothing 
pertaining to intentionality” (Husserl 1983: 203). Not delving deeper into the 
ambiguities of ‘consciousness-objectivities’, it will suffice here to say that as 
perceptions forming a part of the mental process, these objectivities like all sides of 
any mental processes one turns to are perceivable to the reflecting Ego due to the 
mode of being of the mental process itself and as such, the mental process does not 
‘appear’ from ‘somewhere’ but is always ‘ready’ to be perceived. Thought in advance 
of its certainty in a sense. 
 It is safe to say that everything perceived is constituted and is in a relation to 
consciousness; consciousness itself contributes to the process of constitution thus 
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allowing the manifestation or appearance of objects and their signification to appear 
and present themselves in consciousness as what they are – or rather how they appear 
to be – as correlates of experience, emphasizing the first-person perspective’s intrigue 
to phenomenology, driven by queries pertaining to the transcendental philosophic. 
Due to the structure of consciousness in phenomenology, objects are constituted the 
way they are and in order to alleviate the phenomenologist’s transcendental 
philosophic concerns, phenomenology “makes use of a distinction between the 
subject conceived as an object within the world and the subject conceived as a subject 
for the world, i.e. considered as a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of 
possibility for cognition and meaning” (Gallagher, Zahavi 2012: 26). 
Phenomenology, then, concentrates on the study of consciousness as well as 
the study of objects of direct experience. By means of reductive operations, the final 
object of phenomenology – consciousness – becomes ‘pure’, transcendental 
consciousness and it leaves the ‘being of its own’ of consciousness as “the 
“phenomenological residuum”” (Husserl 1983: 65) – the field and region of 
phenomenology proper. It is useful to note, that Husserl uses the term 
‘phenomenological reduction’ in two senses. When referring to “excluding” and 
“parenthesizing” (the transcendental epoché), the plural form ‘reductions’ is used, 
whereas the singular ‘reduction’ is used when referring to them in their collective 
unity. 
Though an intriguing field in where to get transcended and reduced, at present 
we cast aside phenomenology; were we to include the field it would cause a 
phenomenal dent to the framework by way of complicating the issue of consciousness 
as an operational term (explicated below) which, as such, is still undefined both in the 
philosophy of mind and phenomenology. Thus, seeing that neither field has offered a 
satisfactory explanation for and of (and in) consciousness, both will be excluded and a 
different approach – which does not contend for an explanation either but is used as 
purely operational to suit the needs of the present author – is presented. 
This exclusion is done in a most intentional way. By intentionally directing 
our mental state towards a different approach than the ones above, we note in passing 
that “not all our mental states are […] directed or Intentional” (Searle 1979: 74). 
Interestingly enough, regardless of one’s knowledge and beliefs which by no means 
need not (ever) be acknowledged, it may also be noted that “not all of our Intentional 
states are even conscious states” (Ibid.). For Searle, there is a strong connection, an 
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analogy to be found and used in theory between “Intentional states [that] represent 
objects and states of affairs in exactly the same sense that speech acts represent 
objects and states of affairs” (Ibid. 80). Though it must be noted that Intentionality 
(Searle capitalizes the word Intentionality in order to distinguish it from its ordinary 
usage) is not essentially linguistic, but is treated in this way by Searle only 
heuristically. 
Intentionality in a very broad sense is the directedness of our mental states; 
alas, in the present thesis we are not very concerned of this but will reserve the right 
to use the term if or when required. What concerns us – in a sense – is the what that 
brings about this or that directability of mental states within consciousness. Having 
noted that Intentional states are analogous to speech acts, need not be acknowledged 
and that “every Intentional state consists of a representative content in a certain 
psychological mode” (Searle 1979: 74.) we may also note that in our framework for 
consciousness, not that much (or at all) notice is paid to language but to symbols; in 
our consciousness, the content(s) need not necessarily be representative, or to say the 
least, they are not called forth or abstracted by something that would be representative 
or representable by way of signs or words. Although, taking into consideration that 
the ontological aspect with regard to the problems of Intentional states are irrelevant 
on what comes to the logical properties of these states – thus making all mental states 
reducible to or to be seen as Intentional – “it doesn’t matter how an Intentional state is 
realized, as long as the realization is a realization of its Intentionallity” (Ibid. 81). 
That is, by excluding the ontological requirement for explaining intentions and 
Intentionality, the mental states that need not be acknowledged; we free ourselves 
from a dent similar that would have been caused by phenomenology or philosophy of 
mind or psychoanalysis proper. Though as mentioned, the present author intends to – 
if necessary – make use of the thoughts and terms provided in all of the above fields. 
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1. METATHEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
A thing and a non-thing among things and non-things, consciousness can not be said 
to be static. As a thing (and non-thing) it is as are all other known or unknown of 
things: “everything is always becoming something other than what it was becoming” 
(merrell 2013: 273). That is, nothing is what it was or will have been but becomes 
something else than it was becoming. In spite of that, we may render the concept of 
consciousness operational by giving it a metatheoretical form along with some 
functions by which we exclude intentionality and agency as well as philosophy and 
phenomenology, none of which play an important part in this thesis. The proverbial 
instability of consciousness becoming on what comes to some of the changes in 
experiencing the state of consciousness are intuitively familiar to all humans; even a 
stable mood muses and oscillates. In general, different states of consciousness cover a 
wide variety of “naturally occurring states, such as deep sleep and dreaming, 
pathological states such as mania or coma, and states induced by drugs, hypnosis, 
meditation and other mental practices” (Bayne et al. 2009: 26). In addition to 
consciousness awake, it is the naturally occurring states that interest us, especially 
dreaming asleep. Before discussing dreams however, we need a suitable context for 
them. Or rather, we need a ‘somewhere’ they can be positioned, regardless that they 
are not physical in their being and moreover, are not reducible to the workings of the 
brain, at least what comes to experiencing them. 
 Consciousness in semiotics has been claimed to be a very simple thing when 
studied as general as possible and by this avoiding to err ‘mind’ or mentation and 
intentionality as consciousness. It is important to “take care not to make the blunder 
of supposing that Self-consciousness is meant, and it will be seen that consciousness 
is nothing but Feeling, in general, – not feeling in the German sense, but more 
generally, the immediate element of experience generalized to its utmost” (CP 7.365). 
Feeling, generalized or not, is on the other hand equal to First, which is “that whose 
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being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind anything” (CP 
1.356). In short, consciousness is. 
 Consciousness – regardless of its ‘true’ mode of being – requires a theoretical 
framework to be rendered operational. This frame is drawn from the metatheory of 
consciousness as presented by Mamardašvili and Pjatigorski (2011). Within a 
metatheoretical framework, consciousness can be brought about as a certain measure, 
a dimension of sorts in which objects and occurrences of the world are described. 
Similarly, as the objects and occurrences of the world may be positioned as existing 
and concretized in space and time; and as spatio-temporal being in a certain way 
qualifies things and occurrences, so does the measure/dimension of our awareness set 
some delimitations to the objects and occurrences relationally positioned by us in 
consciousness. It may be argued that wherever there is consciousness, there is 
memory whereas the opposite is not (necessarily) true. 
 Consciousness is not a psychological process in the strict, physiological sense 
of the term albeit – and this is pays to keep in mind – all psychological processes may 
be described in the objective schema as well as in the schema of consciousness. This 
is enabled by the fact (presumption, really) that consciousness is not a psycho-
physiological process but a plane of sorts upon which all concrete psycho-
physiological processes are synthesized which leads them to no more being identical 
with themselves but belonging to consciousness. Take for example memory. In case 
of recall, the remembered fact is a fact of consciousness because the acknowledging 
subject is able to explicate the fact of remembering; the factual occurrence of an event 
(what is remembered), the fact of memorizing and the fact of remembering // the fact 
of remembering and the fact of recall // all belong to the psychological/physiological 
mechanism of memory. But when they present themselves on the plane of their 
correlation in a unified flux, they can no longer be viewed solely objectively. 
 That is, taken individually, memorization and remembering have happened 
objectively in the scientific sense, but their correlate is to a ‘something,’ in which 
there is no distinction between ‘how’ and ‘what’ and the ‘something’ functions as a 
certain integral whole of ‘awareness.’ It is ‘aware’ insofar that something that occurs 
within it is not only a fact but is also acknowledged by us. 
 It must be stressed that in this paper, the possibility for the description of 
consciousness is presumed outside any exact placement, without any endownment of 
subjectivity or objectivity because both subject and object of consciousness present 
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themselves – whether we wish them to or not – as an actual state of affairs organized 
in a given fashion with regard to consciousness. The given metatheoretical framework 
is of a symbolic character; its symbolic nature is stressed by way of emphasizing the 
characteristics that are revealed in consciousness, which have already been 
empirically revealed – the characteristics of (an) object. 
 The characteristics/attributes of the object do not submit to a determinist 
analysis and simultaneously slip away from all semiotic analyses that are based on the 
claim that there exists a signifier as an actually extractable element and that there 
exist a signified as the former’s denotation. The concept of the sphere of 
consciousness (and its constituents) taken in use here ‘symbolize’ the circumstance 
that in the given research there is no signifier, no signified nor that which/whom 
signifies (signifiee?). We have only an intuitive experience of semiotizing in which 
the three elements exist but they are impossible to be met as distinct in time and 
space; it may be presumed that there is a continuous bond between signifier and 
signified but they are inseparable from one another. If the psychoanalytic dream has a 
navel, then an inner umbilical cord is tantamount to the sign. 
 In what follows, it must be stressed time and again that consciousness as such 
is left undefined in a sense. That is, the ambit of consciousness (the sphere of 
consciousness) is not by default restricted solely to the human being. This on the basis 
that there exists at least three classes of intellectual objects: “natural human 
consciousness (in the sense of an individual human consciousness), text […] and 
culture as a collective intellect. These objects are analogous by structure as well as by 
their functional principle” (Lotman 1991: 401 [my translation]). 
 
1.1. Sphere, state, and structures of consciousness 
Here is presented – in paraphrasing – a framework of consciousness and its essential 
factors drawn from the metatheory of consciousness. In essence, consciousness is a 
whole consisting of three areas as defined by Mamardašvili and Pjatigorski (2011): 
  
 I. The sphere of consciousness 
 II. The state(s) of consciousness 
 III. The structure(s) of consciousness 
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All and each consciousness is pragmatically situated in the sphere of consciousness in 
a manner they can be situated at and it is not possible for consciousness to be situated 
elsewhere – there is no consciousness beyond the sphere of consciousness. The sphere 
of consciousness in itself does not possess a spatial nor a temporal definition and each 
consciousness is situated in its own situation; the location of which is not static as is 
not consciousness itself. The sphere of consciousness is not endowed with any 
localization nor is it concretized in any fashion – henceforth the states and structures 
will be viewed as localized and fixed in the sphere of consciousness. Factually by 
this, the concept of the sphere of consciousness is of a symbolic nature whereas the 
concepts of state and structure of consciousness are interpretations of this 
symbolically articulated existant. The state of consciousness will be seen as an 
interpreted and concretized being of the sphere of consciousness, as its localization or 
occupation – or even its entrapment. 
 Mainly, states of consciousness are in themselves empty. Not as the opposition 
of form and content, a state of consciousness is not the antithesis of content in relation 
to it. “The states of consciousness can in no case be thought of as forms in which 
consciousness could be realized as content” (Mamardašvili, Pjatigorski 2011: 583). In 
principle, a state of consciousness may be induced by any phenomenon, occurrence or 
circumstance that engages an individual psyche with the content of consciousness; 
however, when this engagement has occurred, the factor that induced it loses its own 
content – metaphorically, the content dissolves into the state of consciousness. 
Susceptible to alterations, it is the state(s) of consciousness in which there is a 
correspondence for each notional construct with the subject’s given psychic state – a 
structure of consciousness. 
 State of consciousness is whence a structure of consciousness is abstracted 
from; structures of consciousness are as a rule non-individual. The structure is 
situated in the state of consciousness and it facilitates or is itself a suitable content or 
fact of consciousness upon which one may reflect. Structure of consciousness can be 
defined as both content and form. In relation to the state of consciousness, the 
structure of consciousness is or facilitates a content that is abstracted from the state – 
provided there is something that does not exist without being in relation to an 
                                                
3 All direct quotations of Mamardašvili and Pjatigorski are my translations. 
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individual consciousness, say for example a thought or an idea. Accordingly, due to 
the known rule of complementarity in observation, to experience a fact or content of 
consciousness simultaneously as a structure is impossible. “This is why we cannot 
say, that where there is a fact, there is a structure of consciousness, a structured fact of 
consciousness, because we are unable to attribute the interpretation of being 
structured upon every fact of consciousness” (Mamardašvili, Pjatigorski: 2011: 68-
69). As a metatheory of consciousness, it must be presumed that the contents of 
consciousness can present itself as a structure. 
 In short, a state of consciousness is required for a structure of consciousness, 
which itself can become present as content or it can facilitate a content; a structure of 
consciousness is abstracted from a state of consciousness albeit both structure(s) and 
state(s) can be said to exist independent from each other. Structures of consciousness 
are spatio-temporally scattered, a characteristic without which they could not be said 
to exist. From the point of view of the sphere of consciousness, a structure of 
consciousness is the constant location of the place of consciousness that bears content 
which is revealed in relation with the state of consciousness. Consciousness, when 
realized in a state of consciousness that affords the abstraction of a structure of 
consciousness which in its turn is a spatial situation in relation to itself bearing the 
content fact or material – the spatial spread of the material of consciousness as such 
regardless whether it is physical or not – brings about the notion that structure of 
consciousness is itself a space in relation to itself. One such structure would be “the 
structure of the “I” [that] is one of the basic indices of culture” (Lotman 2009: 147) 
 This in the sense that regardless all “I’s” are individual (you, me and even 
them), the notion of “I” – whether psychologically, linguistically or philosophically – 
is non-individual. Each acknowledged “I” may also be said to (be able to) exist in the 
sphere of consciousness and provided they are, they also oscillate between the two 
main states of consciousness: awake and asleep. Also, for each it is impossible to be 
located anywhere else – provided we exclude the odd chances of out-of-body 
experiences induced by either meditation or certain drugs; in either case, it is usually 
appreciated by the given individual that the “I” returns to where it left. 
 What comes to the definition of consciousness as generalized Feeling / First, 
the sphere of consciousness as a term may be likened to it. States of consciousness 
come and go and from them suitable structures are abstracted not always willingly, 
not always by volition; this applies to both. Though blatantly obvious, one has (some) 
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control over the comings and goings of these states and structures by way of thought 
and/or substance. However, the two fairly distinct and general categories of 
unavoidable states – awake and asleep – are familiar to all; the former being where 
and when “I” exists on a day-to-day basis in familiar reality, the latter a torpid 
psycho-physiological state during which “I” at times ends up in a different reality – 
dream. The dream is as real as reality as will be shown and depending on its manifest 
form, it is what defines the dream “I” to an extent – different reality generates 
different “I” with specific existential relations in said reality albeit meta-awareness is 
not present. 
 Excluding individuals, it may be stated that both awake mentation and asleep 
dreaming exist within the sphere of consciousness as two distinguishable states from 
and in which structures of consciousness as conglomerates of form and content 
abstract themselves. It is also useful to note the awake or asleep are in no way static 
states – the state of consciousness may change when awake and by extension (or the 
other way around) also asleep. The situation may be compared with the relation of 
hypernym (for example ‘color’) and hyponyms (‘red, yellow, blue’ etc.). In the light 
of Feeling, acknowledged mentation, mind, thought and intention as well as 
(remembered) dreams are already a Third – it is only their potentiality to become 
realized in order to become known that may be collocated with the sphere of 
consciousness. All the rest that follows, regardless of the state, are structures of 
consciousness carrying or being a content, the detailed analysis of which may be done 
according to a science of choice; here the semiotic and symbolology. 
 Though intentionality was excluded above, it must be noted that henceforth 
we allow ourselves to distinguish between active consciousness and passive 
consciousness – respectively, states of awake and asleep of which only the former 
may be said to facilitate intentionality.  All individuals, in addition to naturally and/or 
artificially oscillating between states of consciousness are subject to their 
surroundings and what is therein, for example symbols and especially symbols of 
consciousness. 
 
 
 28 
1.2. The dual singularity of Symbol 
According to Mamardašvili and Pjatigorski, consciousness is a symbolic apparatus. 
To avoid further terminological confusion, it must be noted and stressed that symbol 
for Mamardašvili an Pjatigorski is not the same as symbol in the Peircean sense. The 
symbol, for Peirce, is a triadic sign, it is a function of the object relation whereas for 
Mamardašvili and Pjatigorski symbols are not signs in the true sense of the word. For 
them, symbols are an independent category existing outside of signs that can be 
comprehended (or pseudocomprehended) but which can not be epistemically 
understood. A distinction is made between two general categories of signs and/or 
sign-relations: “if a sign is something that is always positioned on the level of 
functioning dualisms – “sign – meaning”, “subject – object”, then symbols are certain 
sign-like formations” (Mamardašvili, Pjatigorski 2011: 57) 
 Symbols are sign-like in that they may use material supports similar to the 
ones signs make use of such as words, or materially organized situations 
(communication, communicable forms such as gestures, spatial figures, sound waves 
etc.) that we abstractly presume to be or take as bearers of information and use as 
material or textual signs. “Symbols in their turn are not the meanings of things and 
occurrences, of material structures, but meanings of the premisses of consciousness, 
of outcomes of consciousness” (Ibid.) By this, symbols can present themselves as 
immediate ‘meanings’ of consciousness as well as denote something similar to things 
(via signs) that circuitously represent consciousness. In this sense symbols relate to 
comprehension and that is why when operating with symbol as sign, it does not 
necessitate the reconstruction of its denotation but the reconstruction of the subjective 
situation where both denotation and sign are generated; that is, the situation of 
comprehending4. 
 Point being that nowadays symbols are as a rule taken in the framework of 
logical (or pseudological) knowledge; we perceive and receive them critically as signs 
by way of anamneses, diagnoses and other pragmatically necessary processes and 
presume that they exist only in order to expand our understanding of ourselves (that 
is, of culture), of our psyches, behaviors and prognoses of tendencies. All symbols are 
‘meaningfied’ in the sense that they latch onto our automatic regime that operates 
                                                
4 There is a very faint echo here of the dualist distinction Kant makes between the two cognitive 
faculties – ‘understanding’ (Verstand) or concepts, thought and discursivity, and ‘sensibility’ 
(Sinnlichkeit) or intuitions/non-conceptual cognition, sense perception and mental images. 
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with signs; a system where they do not belong to by their very nature. They are de-
symbolized within our sign-systems, i.e. they lose their own immediate content (with 
regard to consciousness) and “transform into signs of “don’t know what” because as 
symbols they had their orientation, but we transform them into signs in our 
positive/positivist understanding” (Ibid. 59). 
 This premiss lessens the necessity to pay that much notice to linguistic factors, 
although parts such as narrativity must at points be brought up. This is because 
dreams, when pushed away from sleep, become nigh wholly linguistic, provided that 
one reflects on them in words of thought. Also, language is the primary modelling 
system5 of human beings. That is, provided we not take into account Sebeok’s claim 
that language “is phylogenetically as well as ontogenetically secondary to the non-
verbal; and, therefore, what they [Tartu-Moscow School] call “secondary” is actually 
a further, tertiary augmentation of the former” (Sebeok 1991: 333). 
 Here there is an echo of what Kristeva has defined as the difference between 
the semiotic and the symbolic. From the very beginning of a subject, the relations that 
may be represented as topological spaces that facilitate the world in which ‘things’ 
(and ‘non-things’) are connected via and in the zones of the fragmented body (my feet 
are not my hands etc.), “this type of relation makes it possible to specify the semiotic 
as a psychosomatic modality of the signifying process; in other words, not a symbolic 
modality but one articulating […] a continuum.” (Kristeva 1996b: 96) Though never 
very explicitly defined, the dynamic signifying process can be taken to mean “the 
ways in which bodily drives and energy are expressed, literally discharged through 
our use of language, and how our signifying practices shape our subjectivity and 
experience” (McAfee 2000: 14). 
 The semiotic as a part of the signifying process has its origins (in the human) 
in the body or, semiotic chora; a receptacle of sorts that is based on the rhythms of the 
body in the wide sense of the word. “The chora is not yet a position that represents 
something for someone (i.e. it is not a sign); nor is it a position that represents 
someone for another position (i.e. it is not yet a signifier either); it is, however, 
generated in order to attain to this signifying position” (Kristeva 1996b: 94). The 
chora, as it is, is a non-expressive, pre-verbal functional state governing the 
                                                
5 A modelling system is “a structure of elements and of rules for combining them that is in a state of 
fixed analogy to the entire sphere of an object of knowledge, insight or regulation.” (Lotman 1967 
quoted in: Sebeok 1991: 327) 
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connections between and in the body, the objects that surround it as well as others like 
it (we won’t dabble in the psychoanalytic notion of ‘family structure’ here). As such, 
the semiotic may be distinguished from the symbolic and symbolic operations offered 
primarily by language; primarily in the sense that all other (symbolic) systems are 
based on language one way or the other. “The kinetic functional stage of the semiotic 
precedes the establishment of the sign; it is not, therefore, cognitive in the sense of 
being assumed by a knowing, already constituted subject” (Ibid. 95). In this sense, the 
semiotic of each individual is as slightly different as are their chorae. 
 In addition, the semiotic chora may be likened to the situation that facilitates 
states of consciousness, the flesh and its world, Fleischwelt if one pleases. “I” am and 
am not my body but something beyond it at the same time; the chora is whence and 
where the subject is simultaneously generated and negated by way of a unity that 
succumbs the subject before the (symbolic, social) process(es) that produces the 
subject. The semiotic is “a distinctiveness admitting of an uncertain and indeterminate 
articulation because it does not yet refer or no longer refers to a signified object for a 
thetic consciousness” (Kristeva 1980: 133). The semiotic is then chronologically 
anterior to sign, syntax, denotation and signification, but it crosses them 
synchronically whereas the symbolic subsumes (in language) everything that belongs 
under sign. 
 “The symbolic, as opposed to the semiotic, is this inevitable attribute of 
meaning, sign, and the signified object for the consciousness of Husserl’s 
transcendental ego” (Ibid. 134)6. That is, the symbolic labels under itself syntax, 
signification and denotation; in a sense, all that is representational in language and art. 
Related mainly to poetic language (and art) on what comes to the distinction between 
the symbolic and semiotic, the former of which “designates language as it is defined 
by linguistics and its tradition, language in its normative usage” (Ponzio 2010: 250) 
whereas the latter “refers to primary processes and to the pulsions that enter into 
contradiction with the symbolic” (Ibid.) thereby constituting the signifying process; 
we nevertheless adapt this distinction which, by way of chorae and consciousnesses 
therein is ultimately of phylogenetic origin. 
 It must be noted that in the signifying process, by which meaning (and all) is 
generated, the semiotic and the symbolic are inseparable. The subject (of utterance) as 
                                                
6 We allow ourselves to presume that consciousness as defined in this thesis carries similar attributes as 
the transcendental ego in phenomenology. 
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well as all the signifying systems that have been produced by such subjects is always 
and simultaneously both semiotic and symbolic. There is no escaping neither, in all 
human signifying systems both are present and are always dominated by one of the 
two tendencies; in each signifying process the subject (or system) is always marked 
by an indebtness to both aspects. Thus, it is only in theory that such processes and 
relations may be situated “diachronically within the process of the constitution of the 
subject precisely because they function synchronically within the signifying process of 
the subject himself, i.e., the subject of cogitatio” (Kristeva 1996b: 96). 
 The body and its rhythms or the semiotic chora is a place of permanent 
scission, one which here may be likened to the situation of (an individual) 
consciousness in which the oscillation of states of consciousness happens that are, as 
such, non-signifying and/or empty by themselves. That is to say, the chora is in which 
and the ‘what’ that facilitates states of consciousness and in which structures of 
consciousness may (or may not) be abstracted from to enter and present themselves 
therein as either being or facilitating a content. The chora can be defined as the place 
where the subject is both generated and negated – in a much similar sense as Lacan 
presents to us the essence of doubt; there is no doubt beyond the real but only in 
dreams “I” is actual, precisely because it is not known of, not doubted in the same 
fashion as it is awake. 
 This is to point towards the possibility that despite the triadic sign being one 
basic tenet in semiotics, one should not grow too keen on it for it does its tricks 
mainly in and according to us and provided that other categories and/or definitions of 
sign or sign-ness apply, then the relations should also be reversable to an extent. That 
is, it pays to keep in mind that symbols are not signs but sign-like formations – an 
independent category beyond signs. Symbols exist both in the cultural system as well 
as with regard to consciousness and are in this sense somewhat inseparable – provided 
that culture has its origins in the doings of conscious humans. 
 Symbol as such and its functions, the way it relates to something defined in 
the contents of consciousness will be defined in accordance with Mamaradašvili and 
Pjatigorski (2011), and France and Piatigorsky (1976) whereas the semiotic structure 
and function of symbol in the cultural system will be taken from Lotman (1990). It 
must be noted that the authors’ definitions and understanding of symbol verge on each 
other; both of the more essential theorists – Pjatigorski and Lotman – were members 
of the Tartu-Moscow school (and allegedly got along very well) so it may be 
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presumed that they engaged in discussion over this theme. In addition, it is mentioned 
in the preface to the second edition of Simvol i soznanie that it is “factually a third 
edition, if taking into account the “conversational” version published by Juri Lotman 
in Tartu” (Mamardašvili, Pjatigorski 2011: 9).  
 Below are presented the properties of a symbol of consciousness that amount 
up to the postulates of symbolology as stated by Mamardašvili and Pjatigorski: 
 
 I. In its natural thingness, no symbol can directly relate with the concrete 
 contents (or structure) of consciousness; 
 II. When we say that we comprehend or do not comprehend an object in the 
 sense of knowing it, then this comprehension or non-comprehension depends 
 in some sense of us. But when we say that we do not comprehend or do 
 comprehend a symbol in its relation with the contents of consciousness, it 
 depends on the symbol itself; 
 III. When from the point of view of linguistics, a word is in an arbitrary 
 relation with what it signifies, then from the point of view of the metatheory of 
 consciousness, a symbol is absolutely non-arbitrary in relation to the structure 
 of consciousness to which it corresponds to; 
 IV. A symbol is a thing, which has the power to induce states of 
 consciousness, through which the psyche of the individual is conjoined to 
 certain contents (structures) of consciousness. Or: upon the accumulation of 
 states of consciousness on behalf of the psyche of an individual, a symbol 
 evinces the power to take the psyche into certain structures of consciousness. 
 (Mamardašvili, Pjatigorski 2011: 179-192) 
 
To avoid confusion it must be noted that ‘thing’ is used in a very broad sense by the 
authors and it is not preordained to be understood as a physical thing and 
ethologically speaking “both the ‘thingness’ and ‘non-thingness’ of symbols could 
exist in relation to me as to a psychical mechanism in quite an autonomous way” 
(France, Piatigorsky 1976: 150). In other words, in its natural thingness, a symbol is 
“a concrete thing, which concretely and appropriately relates with something defined 
in the contents of consciousness” (Mamardašvili, Piatigorski 2011: 163). In 
accordance with the above, the three functions of symbols with regard to 
consciousness may be presented: 
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 I. The ‘referential function’ of symbols, where a symbol represents something, 
 it expresses an idea, an experience, an individual, a proposition, another object 
 etc.; 
 II. The ‘existential function’, the communication of roles, attitudes and 
 personal identity which are ascribed to the individual who admits the symbol 
 into his field of attention evoking appropriate attitudes and behavior in the 
 perceiver; 
 III. The ‘dispositional function’ acting as a commentary on the other two and 
 could in that sense be said to be ‘metasymbolic’. It is the organization of 
 symbolic objects in a context, defining symbolic themes, relations and values, 
 giving prominence to some and evoking associations and contrast among  all. 
 (France, Piatigorsky 1976: 141–142) 
 
Above are presented the qualities of being a symbol, a ‘thing’ and ‘non-thing’ along 
with their functions with regard to consciousness. However, as mentioned, symbol of 
consciousness and symbol in the cultural system albeit belonging to different 
measures or dimensions (of consciousness) or modelling systems (man is not culture) 
are inseparable. Naturally, there may exist symbols that serve no (blatant) function 
nor play a distinct role in the cultural system but are essential to consciousness and 
vice versa. This presumption is afforded by the fact that regardless that the human 
intellect (in consciousness) is analogous by structure and function with culture, they 
are vastly different in their being. 
 That is, we are biological entities of fat, flesh, blood and bone swathed in skin 
whereas culture is a somewhat abstract mechanism that can not be said to possess 
acknowledged being at least through perception; nevertheless, culture(s) may become 
aware of themselves but the purely physical fact remains that due to the vast 
difference between the material beings of humans and cultures, parts of the semiotic 
in each is different. 
 Though a linguistic-semiotic theory, the argument afforded by the distinction 
between semiotic and symbolic still applies; there is a phylogenetic and by the same 
token an ontogenetic evolutionary continuum in the sophistication of what we call 
language and hence the more sophisticated modeling systems are beyond 
comprehension from so-to-say lower levels regardless that in the case of the human 
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intellect and culture they are analogous. We hardly understand eachother, let alone 
other beings. It is in a sense a similar incomprehensibility one may feel when far 
removed from home to another, alien culture; the distance between being of course of 
a more ‘vertical’ type (expand really). 
 That clarified, in general it may be said that “a symbol, being a finalized text, 
does not have to be included in a syntagmatic chain, and if it is included in one, it 
preserves its own semantic and structural independence” (Lotman 1990: 103 103). It 
may be noted that the origin of symbols goes back to archaic times and they “are as a 
rule elementary space-indicators” (Ibid.). In culture, these elementary space-indicators 
serve the function of encapsulating “the condensed mnemonic programmes for the 
texts and stories preserved in the community’s oral memory” (Ibid.). That is, they are 
places that often times are seen as being situated in the center of the world and “being 
an axis mundi, it is regarded as the meeting place of heaven, earth and hell” (Eliade 
1954: 12). A symbol is a finalized text both in its expression level and content level, 
“it has a single, self-contained meaning value and a clearly demarcated boundary 
which makes it possible to isolate it from the surrounding semiotic context” (Ibid.). 
 Regardless of the isolatability of symbols and their capability to not be 
included in a syntagmatic chain in order to be, the meaning of a symbol is never quite 
obvious due to its structure – it has “a content that in its turn serves as expression 
level for another content, one which is as a rule more highly valued” (Ibid.). A 
symbol as such, before it has been de-symbolized in this or that sign system, cannot 
directly relate with consciousness; hence its inavoidable transformation into signs to 
become representable as and by way of signs which reduces it into a pseudosymbol, 
the representation(s) of which are in accordance with the inner logic of the sign 
system in question. Nevertheless, it still carries the same content but it is susceptible 
to both commutation7 and permutation8 depending on the sign system as well as the 
interpretation(s) that it affords or calls forth. It must be noted, that due to the dual 
structural nature of symbols (primary expression-content/secondary expression-
                                                
7 “Commutation is simply the explicit form of the relation of solidarity between the expression plane 
and the content plane of a semiotic system, according to which a change of content must correspond to 
every change of expression, and inversely” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 40). 
8 “Permutation is a procedure comparable to that of commutation, except that the relation noted 
between the changes which occur on the two planes of language does not concern changes between 
paradigmatic terms but transpositions within syntagmas” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 229). 
 35 
content) the depth of commutation and/or permutation can never reach the symbol as 
such which remains unchanged. 
 A practical example of (cultural) de-symbolization would be a ritual – that is a 
finalized text – yielding its script for representing a culture’s beliefs and/or the 
established order from said culture’s myth(s) and often enough portray the re-
enactment of an episode, usually that of a new Creation or the repetition of the 
cosmogonic act; wherever the axis mundi is seen to be situated by way of an 
elementary space-indicator, it is “the zone of absolute reality” (Eliade: 17). Rituals are 
invariably founded by and handed down to mortals “by gods, civilizing heroes or 
mythical ancestors” (Ibid. 21). Moreover, all rituals may be seen as abstractions 
and/or transformations of “the single mythological invariant of ‘life – death – 
resurrection (renewal)’, or, on a more abstract level, ‘entry into a closed space – 
emergence from it’” (Lotman 1990: 160). Much like falling asleep and waking up. 
 Thus, all symbols are unobtainable without the interference of signs which 
transform them into pseudosymbols; regardless that they strive to convey the 
secondary content by way of primary expression, it never happens. Symbols are only 
sign-like and become distorted by any and all attempts to describe them. Also, 
symbols can not relate directly with consciousness or its contents but nevertheless, 
symbols as such are capable to relate with something defined in the contents of 
consciousness and may (or may not) be comprehended or pseudo-comprehended that 
depends on the symbol itself. Naturally, any and all attempts to think what it was that 
was or was not comprehended submits the symbol to the sign system afforded by 
thought – linguistic or not – and as a structure of consciousness, the whatever defined 
therein changes due to complementarity possibly leading one to become aware that 
there was a symbol; it does not relate to consciousness directly but may correspond in 
a non-arbitrary fashion to a given structure that may present itself as content, one that 
would – by necessity – be abstracted from a state of consciousness induced by the 
symbol itself.  By the same token, a symbol is ontologically and psychologically “by 
itself and in itself a significant thing with respect to consciousness, which means that 
it possesses, of its own essence, both significance as an especial thing and meaning in 
its reference to consciousness” (France, Piatigorsky 1976: 150 [emphasis original]). 
 Submitted to a sign system, reduced into signs to be decipherable and 
transformed into a pseudosymbol in order to become representable,  the (primary) 
expression of symbol varies, it belongs to the mundane domain of culture whereas the 
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(secondary) invariable content belongs to the sacred or esoteric domain which means 
that it is inexpressible as such; a symbol is not identical in each situation “but 
involves rather the presence in each semiotic system of a structural position, without 
which the system is incomplete because certain essential functions cannot be realized” 
(Lotman 1990: 102 [emphasis original]). In addition, from a temporal point of view, 
the unnecessity for a symbol to be included in a syntagmatic chain means that it 
“never belongs only to one synchronic section of a culture, it always cuts across that 
section vertically, coming from the past and passing on into the future” (Ibid. 103). In 
a sense a-temporal or eternal, symbols are one of the more stable elements of culture 
and hence the variance of its expression(s) and invariance of content in time that 
make a symbol “a kind of condenser of all the principles of sign-ness and at the same 
time goes beyond sign-ness” (Ibid. 111). That is, symbols are sign-like at best. 
 A symbol is then a certain something that has the capacity of being all and 
nothing simultaneously; a concrete and quite autonomous ‘thing’/’non-thing’ that can 
not directly relate to consciousness because consciousness also is and is not – we 
know it exists but are unaware of what it is exactly that exists – in a similar manner 
with the secondary content of symbol. The essence of symbol is to function as “a 
mediator between different spheres of semiosis, and also between semiotic and non-
semiotic reality” (Ibid.). Finally cutting to the chase and jumping the gun with regard 
to dreams and their function, “in general terms we can say that the structure of 
symbols of a particular culture shapes the system which is isomorphic and 
isofunctional to the genetic memory of an individual” (Ibid.). 
 That is, provided that symbols in culture as well as in other semiotic systems 
function as structural positions that enable certain essential functions and are 
structurally dual – the essence of which remains beyond – then it seems plausible that 
dreams would serve the same function for the human intellect. The manifestation of a 
dream (already distorted and transformed upon remembering) is structurally 
analogous to the varying primary expression that represents, has as its (primary) 
content say, a tree, which in its turn serves as a secondary expression for something 
beyond reach or, the secondary content. The secondary content is unobtainable both 
from the dream itself (even if “I” would be present) as well as from awake and in this 
sense, it may be collocated with the notion of symbol of consciousness as such. 
 From what has been stated, it may be inferred that taking dreams structured 
like symbols as defined above, they shape the mode of being of individual psyches by 
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way of the signifying process that consists both of the semiotic and the symbolic; the 
former based on the ‘shape’ of individual chorae functioning as pulsions introducing 
contradiction to the symbolic; the ordering of dream-imagery (which may be said to 
be symbolic) changes according to the rhythm of the semiotic that is considerably 
more rigid awake whereas asleep the chains of order are lifted allowing imagery we 
can only dream of to surface. It is in a similar manner that the secondary content of a 
symbol – though unobtainable as such – that ultimately relates (or motivates to relate) 
to consciousness by way of inducing this or that state of consciousness as a mediated 
‘non-thing’ to another by way of, and to a ‘thing.’ As has been noted, the same 
happens in culture and its (distorted and transformed) symbols as structural positions. 
 
1.3. Dream here and today 
First and foremost, to already emphasize the similarity of dreams and symbols, the 
aforementioned single mythological invariant as manifest in cultures echoes the claim 
that “dream is the elementary mystical experience binding us with another reality; the 
reality of asleep and the reality of awake are opposed in our consciousness one way or 
the other” (Uspenskij 2013: 46). Excluding the purely physical, neuro(-phenomeno-
)logical aspect – what materially goes on in the brain – then as of yet, there exists no 
satisfactory explanation as to why or how people dream. In general, dreaming may be 
defined as “the creation of percepts during sleep, in a format which the dreamer tends 
to experience as a participant rather than a mere observer” (Blom 2010: 157). The 
content of dreams is as multifarious as are the dreamers and their memories – the 
structures, contents and/or facts of consciousness afforded by them. Nevertheless, the 
content of dreams “tends to be primarily visual in nature […] although the other 
sensory modalities may be involved as well” (Ibid.). Regardless of the primarily 
visual nature of dreams, the Traumwelt9 is a polylingual semiotic space which is 
immutable by conscious action due to nescience of existence10 or, it is as mutable as 
mundane reality by will of thought. The dream “does not immerse us in visual, verbal, 
                                                
9 Traum + welt; from German traum ‘dream’; from German welt ‘world’. 
10 Occasions of lucid dreaming – a dream where one knows s/he is dreaming and can control their 
behavior and environment to an extent – are excluded here alongside hypnagogic/hypnopompic 
hallucinations. 
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musical and other spaces but rather in the space of their coalescence which is 
analogous to real space” (Lotman 2009: 145). 
 That is, the coalescence of representational categories that emerge as 
Traumwelten may be seen as the ways in which “dream images can stand for 
linguistic sounds and shapes (for example I = eye) and, conversely, linguistic sounds 
and shapes can stand for images (for example 0 = circle) etc.” (Bauer 1986: 774). 
Then duly in a dream, even more so than when awake, “the form of meaning 
articulates a substance which cannot be empirically observed” (Petitot 2004: 191). 
Naturally, the curiosity of science remains if there is a phenomenon lacking 
explanation, especially if the phenomenon is an unavoidable trait common to nigh all 
humans11 as well as other (‘higher’) mammals. 
 In general, we and other dreaming beings have three main behavioural states 
and the emergence of “wakefulness, quiet sleep and rapid eye movement (REM) sleep 
is one of the most significant aspects of brain maturation” (Mirmiran 1995: 13). It is 
interesting to note that REM sleep begins to appear both in prematurely born infants 
as well as fetuses in utero after around 30 weeks of postconceptional age. 
Approximately from thereon a preterm/term baby spends about 10 h in this state every 
day which points that REM sleep, i.e. dreaming serves an important function in the 
human among other animals. A function that might be fulfilled by “the endogenous 
activation of the brain to influence: (1) neuronal growth; (2) synaptic plasticity; (3) 
learning and unlearning; (4) genetic read-out and individual differences; and (5) 
cardiorespiratory and thermoregulatory centers” (Ibid. 20). Of what the unborn (and 
pre-born) infant dreams of remains unknown and by the same token lessens the 
necessity to consider dream imagery in detail. 
 Also, suggestions have been made with regards to the question why we dream 
and non-exhaustive answers have been provided, such as the ‘threat simulation thesis’ 
(TST) claiming that “dream consciousness is essentially an ancient biological defense 
mechanism, evolutionarily selected for its capacity to repeatedly simulate threatening 
events” (Valli et al. 2005: 188). The authors base their claim mainly on the content 
analysis of dreams of severely traumatized children, thus showing dreaming to serve a 
function as a coping mechanism with regards to previously experienced threatening 
                                                
11 There are people who cease to dream due to some brain-problems resulting from for example 
bilateral occipital infarction that causes what is known as the Charcot-Wilbrand syndrome (CWS) 
which is characterized by “visual agnosia (i.e. the inability to make sense of visual images and to 
revisualize images) and a reported global cessation of dreaming” (Blom 2010:92) 
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events in real life. This approach seems somewhat too specific and much too 
exclusive of dreams not containing life-threatening simulations and does not take into 
account pleasant dreams which more often than not would be the dreamer’s dream of 
choice as is evident in the proverb. 
 “The salience of dream emotions is evident to all dreamers; often after 
waking, the emotion of a dream is the only memorable detail” (MacDuffie, Mashour 
2010: 194). Hence, it may be deduced that dreams would rather simulate emotional 
than actual threats that is reflected in the intensity of the dream and its content 
regardless that the Traumwelt, the actants and actors therein may change rapidly and 
illogically, “the accompanying emotions usually follow a more predictable trajectory” 
(Ibid. 195). Consequently, dream emotion may then be argued to drive the dream 
“providing a link between experiences of the past and neural preparation for the 
future” (Ibid.). 
 Another popular approach stresses the strong (functional) relationship between 
dreams and memories as the underlying motivation for dreaming, and argue that 
“dream recall regards such peculiar form of episodic information as dream content, 
which is encoded in declarative memory during sleep” (Marzano et al. 2011: 6674). 
The authors found in their study certain electrophysiological mechanisms in the 
sleeping brain that are similar to the ones during wakefulness upon successful 
encoding of episodic information as well as a correlation of brain oscillations with 
regards to recalling of dreams upon awakening. This, then, strengthens or weakens 
memory/-ies during sleep. 
 Though “the influential notion that dreaming is virtually synonymous with 
REM sleep has dominated neuroimaging work for the past several decades” (Siclari et 
al. 2017: 5), recent study has shown that in humans, dreams occur both in REM and 
NREM sleep which points to the possibility that we would dream the whole night 
through instead of just a few hours. Considering the novelty of this discovery, it 
enables us to not pay that much notice to the neurophysiological aspects of the brain 
while dreaming, a field of study now in unsure turmoil. The study found that 
dreaming in both REM and NREM sleep “require a localized activation of a posterior 
hot zone, irrespective of the EEG in the rest of the cortex” (Ibid.). That is, whatever 
goes on in the brain physically during sleep and dreaming, dreams so-to-say gather in 
the back of the head. The study also showed a contrast between the absence of 
experiencing and remembering a dream, and experiencing a dream without recalling 
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any specific content; “this finding further suggests that the activation of this posterior 
hot zone was a marker of experiences themselves, rather than of the recall of 
experiences” (Ibid.). 
 With regard to the emotional link between body and language or the semiotic 
(chora) and the symbolic, i.e. the way emotions are felt in the body and expressed in 
language, it is interesting to note that “different emotional states are associated with 
topographically distinct and culturally universal bodily sensations” (Nummenamaa et 
al. 2014: 646). That is, both basic (anger, fear, disgust, happiness, sadness, surprise, 
neutral) and non-basic emotions (anxiety, love, depression, contempt, pride, shame, 
envy) are felt as bodily sensations topographically in the same areas irrespective of 
culture. This is noteworthy because it affords the presumption that dreaming or the 
posterior hot zone would share a a similar relation manifest in language; though 
dreams are not sensible, they are predominantly emotional and due to the absence of 
somatosensory experience proper, the topographical bodily sensation may be 
proposed to have lurched into language. In several languages12, the expression that 
one has a feeling or doubt or rage or thought (emotion nevertheless) “in the back of 
my head” is widespread. 
 With regards to temporality and the experiencing of time, it may also be noted 
that when dreaming, “the past, present, and future are no longer perceived as three 
discrete, easily separable dimensions” (MacDuffie, Mashour 2010: 190). In this sense, 
as opposed to awake reality where we are able to distinguish between the temporal 
dimensions, dreams are an a-temporal experiential state of consciousness wherein the 
merging of the three functions inevitably changes the organizing principles of one’s 
memory from whence a “virtual simulation of a world” (Siclari et al. 2017: 5) is 
derived. One main difference “between the two states is that only waking 
consciousness is modulated by external input” (MacDuffie, Mashour 2010: 190). 
When dreaming, we are unable to distinguish it as a dream but take it as real as reality 
because asleep “we process internally generated sensory stimuli free from the 
restrictions of endogenous cognitive control and exogenous sensory stimuli” (Ibid. 
192). 
 It must be specified with regard to presence of “I” as a structure of 
consciousness in dreams that we still experience the dream phenomenally and that 
                                                
12 Finnish, Estonian, English, Swedish, German to the knowledge of the present author. 
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there is also self-awareness present, i.e. the “active perception of external or internal 
environment [and] the knowledge of being oneself” (Ibid.) are present in the dream 
whereas the “third component of meta-awareness (awareness of being aware) is 
absent” (Ibid.). In general terms, dream is a temporal bridge across the three 
experiential dimensions of (awake) time in which the “experiencing the present, 
processing the past, and preparing for the future […] appear as overlapping windows, 
not as a continuous time line” (Ibid. 195). Accordingly, the authors suggest that the 
psychoanalytic as well as the AIM model13 theories of dreaming “are no longer 
competing for an explanation of a single dream function; they are simply focused on 
different temporal dimensions” (Ibid. 196). 
 Thus, it may be questioned whether remembered dreams actually were 
anything like they seem to be upon recall, which also places hitherto theories of 
dreams under question. That is, though impossible to prove as of yet, there is no 
reason not to suggest that dream-imagery would emerge only upon awakening 
whereas the whatever happening in the back of one’s head would have been utterly 
amorphous and incomprehensible – a similar (structural) relation as there is with 
symbols with regard to states and structures of consciousness, as well as with symbol 
in the cultural system with regard to their dual structure. 
 Besides this and the fact that other animals sleep and dream as well, it may be 
postulated that we are the sole beings who distinguish between the realms of dream 
and awake – or to say the least, we are able to discuss about both. The existence of 
(verbal, natural) language “transcending the individuals who use it” (Greimas, 
Courtés 1982: 169) thus freeing us from the immanent, noumenal world, carries with 
it the problem that “this freedom must adapt itself with each step of its realization to 
the communication of the preceding” (Rothschild 1962: 461). That is, there is an 
evolutionary continuum of sorts stretching from the primordial soup to the present 
and on the way, one of the more efficient ‘stops’ was the birth of language, laid on “a 
more archaic system” (Ibid. 460) – our (and everything else’s) material being. Or, in a 
                                                
13 Activation, Input Gating, and Modulation (AIM) model of dreaming highlights the uniqueness of the 
neurobiological environment of the dreaming brain identifying specific brain areas that are 
differentially modulated during REM sleep and also the deactivation of the prefrontal cortex that leads 
to decreased insight and judgment, self-awareness and working memory functions simultaneously 
activating the pontine tegmentum that accelerates the creation of pontine-geniculo-occipital waves, a 
hallmark of REM sleep. “The amygdala and paralimbic cortex are also activated, resulting in the 
increased emotional valence of dreams. Finally, the parietal operculum is activated, an area implicated 
in visuospatial imagery.” (MacDuffie, Mashour 2010: 191) 
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similar manner, it is a question of dominance between the semiotic and the symbolic 
as dictated and positioned in the chora. 
 For the time being, a fairly open suggestion of dreaming will suffice. As was 
noted, we reserve the right to call awake (states of) consciousness active and asleep 
ones passive. By this elementary distinction, it may be argued that irrespective of the 
manifestations or forms of dream-imagery, they sprout from the memory – in the 
wide sense of the term – of the dreamer. “Fragments of memories are retrieved and 
recombined in bizarre, illogical ways”(MacDuffie, Mashour 2010: 195). Whatever 
organized information the memory holds, it transgresses during the passive state of 
consciousness thereby reducing the orderliness or semiotic of one’s knowledge within 
the chora transforming the symbolic into “feasibly transformable, semantically 
polyvalent potential imagery that is able to associate, coalesce and intertwine in a 
variety of indeterminate ways” (Uspenskij 2013: 38). During a dream, the potential 
manifestations of this polyvalent imagery corresponds structurally to the secondary 
expression level of symbols (provided we take awake as reality) in that the 
unobtainable secondary content remains beyond reach in the dream and furthermore, 
is twice removed upon awakening and remembering the dream; the point when it is 
impossible to anymore discuss the dream but of dream due to it being subjected to 
thought and language, to a sign system. In such a “translation of a whole text by 
another whole text […] the act of translation is accompanied by a semantic reduction 
of the text” (Lotman 1976: 302). 
 The gist of the matter being that though even trees have circadian rhythms, i.e. 
they ‘sleep’ (cf. Puttonen et al. 2016) and ‘language’, i.e. communication or the 
exchange of information present in all life-forms – phytosemiotics, zoosemiotics – it 
does not necessarily entail the presence of ‘dream’ in two senses: i) dream supposedly 
requires a certain level of organismic sophistication, and ii) with no abstract language, 
other creatures may be quite unaware that there exists two (distinct) semiotic spaces. 
The former as the most original abstracted replica of the world, it is plausible that the 
appearance of dream (alongside speech) as distinct from the ‘real’ facilitated in 
consciousness the “temporary break between the receipt of information and reaction 
to it” (Lotman 2009: 142). Whereas the latter, with demur, may be due to animals’ 
incapacity to ‘neutral relations’ in the real as explicated by Uexküll (see below). 
 It has been argued (Lotman 2009) that “the moment a temporary space (the 
pause) between impulse and reaction appeared represented a turning point in the 
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history of consciousness” and that this new state of being “required the development 
and improvement of memory” which, in its turn brought forth “the transformation of 
the reaction to an immediate action into a sign” thus shifting the orientation to 
reaction from the basic biological schema ‘stimulus – response’ towards information, 
creating “an independent structure capable of assimilation into an ever more complex 
and self-developing mechanism” (Ibid. 142). Intuitively – consciousness as we (don’t) 
know it or, language as the primary modelling system. 
 Before language however, phylogenetically speaking, we had dreams and one 
“might say that dream is the father of semiotic processes” (Lotman 2009: 145). This 
on the basis that when discussing signs or representations of any sort, dream is by far 
the most comprehensive; dream consists of “signs in their pure form” (Ibid. 143), the 
meaning of which is indeterminate. “The dream itself has no prominent thirdness; it 
is, on the contrary, utterly irresponsible; it is whatever it pleases” (CP 1.342) and as 
such, require meaning to be endowed upon them, require interpretation. Furthermore, 
“the object of experience as a reality is a second. But the desire in seeking to attach 
the one to the other is a third, or medium” (Ibid.). In this sense, the evolving cleavage 
between dream and awake may be argued to have been a motivating factor with 
regard to our semiotic being. It is by this necessity that dream “is extremely well 
suited to the generation of new information” regardless that “the possibility of being 
interpreted precedes the concept of correct interpretation” (Lotman 2009: 144). We 
won’t tackle the various ways a dream may be interpreted and also leave the 
‘correctness’ of interpretations open. What is of interest, is the form of signs in 
dreams – signs in their pure form. 
  
1.4. Intimations of purity 
For Lotman (2009), dream is “a semiotic window” (Ibid. 142), a polylingual 
“psychological state where thoughts and behavior are inseparable […] a sphere where 
it would be impossible to break these down into independent, isolated experiences” 
(Ibid.). Consequently, the dream is a “semiotic mirror and each of us sees in it the 
reflection of our own language” (Ibid. 144). Language and the operations it affords is 
– in general terms – symbolic as noted above whereas the signifying process is always 
more heavily marked by the semiotic or symbolic, both of which are present in each 
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utterance or signifying process regardless whether we are discussing verbal or written 
language or the languages of art. In this sense, dreams are symbolic by their 
representative nature although distinctly semiotic in the sense that the existing, 
established order of things with regard to the subject’s memory and knowledge of the 
world becomes freer due to the passive state of consciousness and whatever the 
individual psyche holds within has the potential to coalesce in unpredictable, 
indeterminate ways. “A fundamental property of this language lies in its extreme 
unpredictability” (Ibid.). Hence, before the existence of language or in a sense 
consciousness, the dream, demanding to attach the one to the other as a third can be 
suggested to carry traces of the origins of birth of the symbolic in the human intellect 
by way of shifting the semiotic connections as opposed to their order in reality; the 
chora is not (yet) a sign nor signifier but only generated to attain this sort of a 
position. 
 Phylogenetically then, the chora is and remains a non-expressive kinetic 
functional stage of development where there are no subject-object relations (as there 
are none in consciousness) onto the contents of which symbols as elementary space-
indicators (whether geographical or of two distinct realities) are able to relate and 
induce states of consciousness before – in time – becoming de-symbolized by way of 
being subjected to a sign-system in the making. A sign-system of dreaming in which 
they become transmuted and distorted propagating an equal effect to be imposed to 
‘things’ and ‘non-things’ in the corporeal reality; by way of recollecting dreams, 
memory itself is improved and developed – “the transformation of the visual into 
narrative leads to an unavoidable increase in the degree of organisation” (Ibid. 36) 
which inevitably is reflected in the organization of awake reality. 
 As the potential ‘father of semiotic processes consisting of signs in their pure 
form,’ dream needs somehow to be distinguished from the awake reality to purify the 
sign and to eventually point to the similitude of dream and symbol as mediators 
between spheres of semiosis. First and foremost, semiosis as “that operation which, 
by setting up a relationship of reciprocal presupposition between the expression form 
and the content form […] produces signs” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 285) must be 
called out to play. Also, it needs to be treated as static (which it never is). For this, 
Piatigorsky’s (1974) view in that semiotics, instead of emphasizing ‘sign-system’ or 
‘sign,’ should rather concentrate on ‘sign-ness’ as its central concept is adopted: 
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But sign-ness is not the PRIMARY (or ELEMENTARY) concept of semiotics since it is the 
abstraction of a particular QUALITY, namely, to formulate it in the most general terms, the abstraction 
of THE QUALITY OF BEING A SIGN, or, in a more expanded formulation, of SOMETHING’S 
QUALITY OF BEING A SIGN OF SOMETHING FOR SOMEONE IN SOME PLACE. The semantic 
aspect of the problem is expressed in the words ‘to be a sign of something’, the pragmatic by ‘to be a 
sign for someone’, the communicative by ‘to be a sign somewhere’. (The syntactic aspect is not 
expressed here, since the concept ‘sign system’ is not being considered.) (Piatigorsky 1974: 185 
[emphasis original]) 
 
It is well known that intra- and interspecific boundaries as well as the boundaries of 
more abstract and/or concrete semiotic spaces can never be experientially 
transgressed, penetrated into and comprehended in their totality. Depending on the 
semiotic subject’s modalities and competence with regard to the meaning(s) of a 
given sign, “the relations […] are of a radically different eidetic type in the logical 
and the semiotic universes” (Petitot 2004: 210 [emphasis original]). That is, ‘sign-
ness’ in human Umwelten is not necessarily ‘sign-ness’ in nature or other semiotic 
spaces and vice versa. Hence, for one sign there must be different dimensions of 
semiosis. Disregarding the syntactic aspect, i.e. sign function and theorizing over a 
single sign by dissecting it onto four categories of existence, each will be shown to 
have its own peculiar semiosic modes or conditions for ‘sign-ness.’ Though 
completely irresponsible and without prominent thirdness, the dream has its way(s) of 
coming about along certain lines as will be shown. 
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2. ELEMENTARY SEMIOTIC MECHANISM OF DREAM FORMATION 
 
As has been noted with regard to (cultural) de-symbolization by way of myths and 
rituals, it is interesting that “it has been remarked often enough that dreams are, in a 
sense, individual myths, and myths collective dreams” (Kuper 1979: 645). 
Disregarding the narrative specifities, myths in a wide sense are texts that embody the 
cosmogony of culture(s) and provide explanation of the origin of everything and are 
well suited to be subjected to structural analysis which has also been deployed in the 
analysis of dreams for “there is a powerful psychological consensus that the dream 
code is in fact a medium of communication open to systematic analysis” (Ibid. 646). 
 In addition, as was noted above, dreams tend towards atemporality or the 
suspension of real time whereas mythological texts, by “their subjection to cyclical-
temporal motion” (Lévi-Strauss 1968 in: Lotman 1979: 161) also harbor very peculiar 
temporal relationships. Mythological texts or myths narrate “events which were 
timeless, endlessly reproduced and, in that sense, motionless” (Lotman 1979: 163). 
For the structuralist, myths and mythologies in (archaic) societies are “an instrument 
for the obliteration of time” (Lévi-Strauss 1969: 16). That is, time in myths is wholly 
cyclical and lacks the distinction of past, present and future available to us and in this 
sense, the time in myths is not time at all much in the same sense that in a dream there 
is no and simultaneously all time. The temporally cyclical world of myths also 
“creates a multi-layered mechanism with clearly manifested features of topological 
organization” (Lotman 1979: 162) the manifest forms of which in the narrative 
(night/winter/death; morning/spring/birth etc.) are “one and the same thing (or rather, 
transformations of one and the same thing)” (Ibid.). Much in the same sense as 
dreams as will shortly be presented. 
  In this light, dreams are not necessarily as ‘unsystematic’ (or can be treated as 
such in a structuralist approach) as they are usually considered to be “with the dream 
elements as transformations of elements of reality […] the processes of 
symbolisation, of condensation, displacement and representation, so central in the 
Freudian approach, are at this stage of marginal relevance” (Kuper 1979: 647). This 
thesis does not deal with the analysis of mythological texts nor with the 
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psychoanalytic processes. For us, the question whether dream elements are 
transformations of reality is insignificant; it does not actually matter considering that 
dream itself is a reality. Despite that our approach is not a strictly structuralist one, the 
aim to “reveal the internal unity of the dream and the existence of an underlying 
‘grammar or structure’ […] and that they are the same as the rules which have been 
found to generate the transformations which occur in and between myths” (Kuper 
1979: 647) is – if not the same – very similar at least from the point of view of 
symbolology. Though here we retain to state any specific narrative aspects, we must 
agree with the purely structuralist approach in that “in principle it should be possible 
to state the rules by which the transformation from one situation to another is 
effected” (Ibid.). It may also be noted that there is a distinction to be made between a 
dream dreamt and the retold version “which is a social rather than a psychological 
fact” and it may cautiously be argued “that ‘real’ dreams are social facts which exist 
in the context of language” (Ibid.). 
 Except recapitulation, dreams as such are hardly obtainable to anyone else 
except the dreamer and furthermore, they are known as dreams only from memory in 
the sense that it is often the case that the dreamer is not aware s/he is dreaming; save 
for instances of lucid dreams. Consequently, as a class of presumed entities with 
recognizable discrete units – here the dream and its trajectory that follow “are 
constructed semiotic beings and therefore no longer belong to the object semiotic 
system […] but to the descriptive metalanguage” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 356). That 
is to say, we deal here not with interpretation nor meaning of dreams but one potential 
way they come about and in the last leg, their effect on you and also, by way of the 
analogous structure and function of the human intellect and culture, were we to 
collocate a de-symbolized symbol, i.e. a symbol submitted to a given sign system, for 
example by way of myth and ritual, the generative structural equivalence between 
them with regard to the symbol’s secondary content and the nucleus of dream should 
become evident in what is to be presented. 
 In order to theorize over the possible course(s) a dream may manifest by, the 
semiotic existence of dreams as entities must be presumed. Entity designates “that 
“existant” the semiotic existence of which is presumed” (Ibid. 102). Entities may be 
classified depending on the necessity to study a given class of objects – glasses, pipes, 
literature and the like. Accordingly, dreams are an intuitively familiar phenomena to 
most people save for those who suffer from Charcot-Wilbrand syndrome. As such, 
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dreams may be postulated to be real albeit non-existant in the strict, Peircean sense 
and as recollections – depending on the dreams’ pertinence in memory and its 
recapitulatability (which as a rule effects the synopsis by way of translation 
accompanied by a semantic reduction of the text) – are present in a more or less 
whole narrative form. “When we recall dreams […] to our memory we almost always 
– unintentionally and without noticing the fact – fill in the gaps in the dream-images” 
(Freud 1965: 79). This narrative is in a sense pre-given – it comes to the dreamer 
upon awakening rather than in the dream itself where there is no “I” albeit this may 
also happen. 
 The presumption of dreams as entities possessing semiotic (pre-) existence as 
a class of ‘objects’, made prior to any analysis, will enable us to “recognize therein a 
discrete unit” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 102). The final form of this unit is naturally 
derived from the properties of the class of objects, each class restricted by the mode 
of being(s) of its objects whether physical – blood is thicker than water – or linguistic 
– better safe than sorry – or in more general – semiotic. There does not exist such a 
thing as ‘the’ dream – dreams are more often than not different from each other, it is 
unlikely to dream the exact same dream in an exactly same fashion than it is to have a 
recurring theme in dreams. Most dreams ‘take place’ in places, there are other actors 
and time is irresponsible. This does not of course mean that recurring dreams would 
never happen as in the case of repetitive dreams or nightmares but for the sake of 
convenience this option is excluded for now. 
 A common dream theme is for example falling in the wide sense of the word. 
It may be postulated that all people have an innate understanding of falling regardless 
whether they have ever fallen from any higher altitude. This is based on our basic 
spatial categories – up, down, left, right, back, forth and all in between – by which we 
comprehend ourselves as being positioned in this or that point; where the flesh 
containing the structure “I” is positioned and can not be positioned anywhere else 
simultaneously. That is, in addition to other rhythms derived from the body and 
instilled in the chora, the kinetic experience of vertical drop, in addition to being non-
expressive as such (not a sign nor signifier as of yet) tends more towards the semiotic 
than the symbolic as a non-individual structure of consciousness. In essence, falling is 
(a category of) an object of knowledge that can be described in formulated terms and 
by this it, among others, “constitute the bases for what can be called the pragmatic 
dimension” (Ibid. 167). 
 49 
 The pragmatic dimension serves as internal referent(s) for the cognitive 
dimension that is hierarchically superior to it. The pragmatic dimension corresponds 
“to the descriptions which are made there of signifying somatic behaviors, organized 
into programs and taken […] as “events” independently of their possible utilization at 
the level of knowing” (Ibid. 240). The articulation of these “events” belongs under the 
symbolic and is regulated as well as organized (into programs) by the semiotic, 
whereas (some of) them originate in the chora.  In practice, all our somatic behavior 
i.e. (potential) movements of the body – intentional or not – belong to the pragmatic 
dimension. Some have become ritualized (handshakes etc.) and some are or at least 
can be known or dreamt of, such as flying or its more plausible alternative on what 
comes to aerial verticality – falling. 
 It is only under the condition that the pragmatic dimension implies the 
cognitive dimension when the former may act as the latter’s internal referent whereas 
“the reciprocal is not true: the cognitive dimension, which can be defined as the 
taking in charge, by knowing, of pragmatic actions, presupposes them” (Ibid. 32). 
That is, we need to be aware of what the body can withstand, what can be done with it 
or what can it do, a process that takes place mainly during the time when one slowly 
but surely comes to the conclusion that s/he is separate from the world as the relations 
representable as topological spaces facilitating the world in which ‘things’ (and ‘non-
things’) are connected via and in the zones of the fragmented body clearly show. The 
limits of the human body have been tried time and again as is evident in several rites 
of passage in more archaic societies (which, incidentally are transformations of the 
single mythological invariant, the program(s) for which are derived from symbol(s) 
by way of de-symbolization and some may even become to serve as content(s) and/or 
structures of consciousness provided there be a (pseudo)symbol to induce appropriate 
state(s) of consciousness as there is during rituals), or in modern-day body-
modification practices. The cognitive dimension develops “in parallel fashion with the 
increase in knowing (as a cognitive activity) attributed to the subjects” (Ibid.). 
 Or, upon the constitution of the subject, the semiotic and symbolic function 
diachronically in the never-ending signifying process of the cogitatio in the making. 
The more gruesome and painful rites and hobbies dealing with the mutilation, 
suspension and in extreme cases amputation of (parts of) the body are a case in point. 
That aside, we know that it is rare for anyone to survive a fall high enough during 
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which the person would reach terminal velocity (ca. 55 m/s.) before hitting the 
ground. 
 Here, dreams involving falling will be taken as the discrete unit or, the class of 
dreams in which the dreamer (or why not ‘stuff’ too) is falling. To render this 
operational, the (dream) phenomena of falling will be treated as the invariable part of 
dream, or its nucleus that is “the minimal constitutive unit […] of the “primitive” 
parts making it up” (Ibid. 167). These primitive parts (what- and wherever may fall) 
are taken as belonging to the proprioceptive14 order, that is, knowledge of them is 
derived from the pragmatic dimension. As a sidenote, the proprioceptive order as 
opposed to exteroceptive 15  or interoceptive 16  properties of culture or individual 
humans are fairly similar as the distinction made between the chora (proprioceptive), 
the symbolic (exteroceptive) and the semiotic (interoceptive). This in the sense that 
the semiotic chora is indeed based on one’s body with regard to others and the things 
surrounding it; the symbolic, when taken either as language or social order is indeed 
imposed from the exterior world and exists before the subject, and; the semiotic, 
being merely the organizing principles for the subject are, as such, non-figurative. 
 
2.1. Ways to dream the nucleus on semiotic square 
To make our way towards a model of the (generative) trajectory of dreams of falling, 
the nucleus will be projected onto the semiotic square (Figure 1.) as presented by 
Greimas and Courtés (1982: 308–311). In order to do so, falling as the invariable part, 
as the nucleus must be defined within a network of relations as a term that is “an 
intersection point of the relations of contrariety, contradiction, and complementarity” 
(Ibid. 338) on the semiotic square, which enables the study of (or search for) “the 
elementary structure of meaning” (Ibid.). The square requires the presence of two 
                                                
14 “[…] to classify the set of semic categories which denotes the semanticism resulting from the 
perception which humans have of their own bodies” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 248) 
15 “[…] the classification of the semic categories which articulate the semantic universe considered as 
coextensive with a culture or with a given human being […] distinguishes exteroceptive properties, as 
coming from the exterior world, from interoceptive data which have no correspondence in that world 
and which are presupposed, on the contrary, by the perception of the former” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 
114) 
16 “The set of semic categories which articulates the semantic universe taken to be co-extensive with 
either a given culture or individual […] whether or not they have corresponding elements within the 
semiotic system of the natural world […] we propose to designate those categories as non-figurative 
(or abstract)” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 158) 
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contrary terms (S1 and S2) that characterize the paradigmatic axis and define the semic 
category (= semantic category) constituting the content plane. Essentially, falling (S1) 
will acquire as its contrary term rising (S2). The semic category on the axis of 
contraries then constitutes the (abstract) category of vertical movement by subsuming 
the two contrary terms and by this, it is “the minimal context necessary for 
establishing an isotopy” (Ibid. 163) that assures the homogeneity of a given 
trajectory’s final reading. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The term ‘falling’ as projected onto the semiotic square. In which: 
 : Relation of contrariety 
 : Relation of complementarity 
 : Relation of contradiction 
 
 
The category of vertical movement establishes a paradigm consisting of  an 
unspecified or variable number of terms “but it does not thereby allow for the 
distinction, within this paradigm, of semantic categories founded on the isotopy of 
distinctive relations which can be recognized therein” (Ibid. 308). That is, the 
established paradigm constituted on the axis of contraries would then afford only up-
and-down movement that is strictly vertical directed along a single pole like a 
firefighter. Consequently, the square alone seems somewhat insufficient to explain the 
generative trajectory of percepts conjured as a dream but the isotopies it gives rise to 
are sufficient to begin with. 
S1 
falling 
S2 
rising 
–S1 
non-falling 
–S2 
non-rising 
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 Isotopy as a general, operational concept designates the iterativity of 
classemes17 in a syntagmatic chain whereas iterativeness itself is “the reproduction 
along the syntagmatic axis of identical comparable entities” (Ibid. 166). The 
individual variance of dreams of falling is iterative in that each may be compared with 
one another as entities belonging to the same class constituting a unit treated as the 
nucleus. In other words, falling is “the isotopic but disseminated manifestation of a 
theme” (Ibid. 343) defining the thematic orientation of the generative trajectory. 
 All “four terms of the semiotic square are called isotopes” (Ibid. 163) and can 
give rise to different thematic trajectories accordingly. This said, it must be noted that 
the nucleus then covers all the isotopes and that the orientation of the trajectory is – 
for now – unpredefined. Technically, in addition to falling and rising, the dreams’ 
trajectory may also orientate its point of origin from and towards the axis of sub-
contraries in accordance with the terms non-falling (–S1) and non-rising (–S2), neither 
of which strictly belongs to the established paradigm constituted on the category of 
vertical movement. But this is due to the very nature of the semiotic square that 
presupposes the presence of two contrary terms on the axis of contraries which in its 
turn has as its counterpart the negation of both terms; this leads the terms S1 / –S1 and 
S2 / –S2 into a relation of contradiction, “the impossibility for [the] two terms to be 
present together” (Ibid. 309). 
 Regardless, the nucleus as projected onto the semiotic square brings about 
pluri-isotopy by potentially superposing the different isotopies in a given trajectory of 
dream by way of isotopic connectors or ‘shifters’ that introduce either a single or 
several different readings afforded by the terms. In essence, movement in any 
direction in accordance with the terms – instead of falling, the trajectory might 
orientate to rising, which may manifest as hovering, floating, flying etc. 
Notwithstanding the (emotional) experience of vertical dreams, there is also no reason 
why the thematics could not overlap in a given dream. In such a case, “it is the 
polysemic character of the discoursive unit functioning as connector which permits 
the superposition of different isotopies” (Ibid. 52). As knowledge has it, falling and 
the other isotopes in a dream may come about in several ways or in other words, the 
potential manifestations in the class of dreams of falling is polysemic by character. 
                                                
17 “[…] designates contextual semes as classemes, that is to say, those semes which are recurrent in the 
discourse and which guarantee its isotopy” (Ibid. 29–30) 
 53 
“Polysememy [trad. polysemy] exists however–excepting the case of pluri-isotopy–
only in a virtual state” (Ibid. 238). 
 It must be noted that the two contrary terms, when conjoined by a syntagm – 
as in a recollected dream – may also be treated as semic figures either of the 
expression or of the content: “the definition of figure can be made more precise, by 
reserving this term solely for the figures of the content which correspond to the 
figures of the expression plane” (Ibid. 120). This equals the innate knowledge of the 
existence of the vertical category and (possible) movement therein as content that 
facilitates the primarily visual expressing of it in a dream. 
 
2.2. Generative trajectory and Narrative 
Above are roughly the components that conjur up a dream and “since every semiotic 
object can be defined according to its mode of production […] the components that 
enter into this process are linked together along a “trajectory”” (Greimas, Courtés 
1982: 132) that goes from the most abstract to the most concrete in their generation. 
Any semiotic object may thus be defined18 by way of its generation that explains the 
way in which it is produced. In other words, it is the generative trajectory that 
designates “the general economy of a semiotic […] theory, that is, the way in which 
its components fit together” (Ibid.). To generalize, in order to attribute the property 
‘falling’ to “a limited number of entities […] to a whole class” (Ibid. 128), the class of 
dreams involving falling as their nucleus, we find that – in consciousness in general – 
each is a paraphrasing, a thematic repetition of a “unit which is semantically 
equivalent to another unit previously produced” (Ibid. 225). It may also be seen as the 
iterativity of such dreams throughout the history of dreaming consciousness, provided 
we allow our phylogenesis to be placed on the syntagmatic (that is, temporal) axis. 
This, of course holds true only in the deep semantic levels of dream or in general, 
discourse. 
 Paraphrasing enables us to go semantically deeper which is necessary in order 
to bypass the process of interpretation within the generative trajectory of dreams and 
venture to “the deepest generative domains [that] appear to be constituted by logico-
                                                
18 “Identified with paraphrasing, definition corresponds to a metalinguistic operation (or its result) 
which either passes from a term to its definition (in expansion) or passes from a syntagm (or atextual 
unit) to its name.” (Ibid. 70) 
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semantic forms (permitting the elimination of the concept of interpretation) which, 
once transformed, generate surface forms” (Ibid. 133). In other words, we are dealing 
with semio-narrative structures constituting “the most abstract level, the starting point 
of the generative trajectory” (Ibid. 133) consisting in general of two components, the 
syntactic and semantic, both endowed with two levels of depth; the fundamental on 
the deep level, and narrative on the surface level. However, though slightly in 
contradiction with the distinction between semiotic/symbolic, it must be noted that 
“all categories, even the most abstract (including syntactic structures), are semantic in 
nature and thereby are signifying” (Ibid. 133). It is the semantic signification, the 
generative semantics in “the cognitive dimension, which can be defined as the taking 
in charge, by knowing, of pragmatic actions” (Ibid. 32) that is sought after, not the 
syntactic aspect of dreams. 
 As a recollection, a dream is always in the form of a narrative one way or the 
other and as such, it has had its starting point somewhere on the semio-narrative level. 
In order to become narratable, the dream needs to consist of narrative programs 
constituting a narrative trajectory – the synopsis of which is recalled awake. The 
narrative trajectory is “a hypotactic series of either simple or complex narrative 
programs (abbreviated NP), that is, a logical chain in which each NP is presupposed 
by another, presupposing NP” (Ibid. 207). Though the dream is endowed with 
logicality only afterwards, it nevertheless is, or becomes a logical chain of events. The 
narrative program(s) (NP) in its turn is “an elementary syntagm of the surface 
narrative syntax, composed of an utterance of doing governing an utterance of state” 
(Ibid. 245). 
 For example, at the supposed outset of a dream that ends up in or has as its 
climax falling, the figurativization process would go somewhat in the fashion that the 
subject –  dream‘I’ – is separate from the object that is the obtainable goal: SU0. (S: 
subject; U: separate; 0: object). The object – whence the falling happens – is (or will 
be) only a syntactic position (in the final reading) that stands invested with a value – 
“falling”: SU0v (: falling). It is from this sorts of basic positions that the dream may 
become what it may by way of fulfilling a “narrative program [that] consists in 
joining the subject with the value it seeks” (Ibid. 118). The problem is, of course, that 
such a dream may be dreamt in a myriad of ways. 
 It is “at the moment when the syntactic object (0) receives a semantic 
investment which will permit the enunciatee to recognize it as a figure” (Ibid.), as a 
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mile-high platform, a tree, a cliff or the like. The dream that expresses falling from a 
given figure in its discourse is recognized in (awake) memory through general 
knowledge of the vertical category which enabled it to be manifested and is a 
figurative discourse. 
 
2.3. Figurativization and Onomastics 
It is the thematic nucleus’ pluri-isotopical nature that virtually poses “several 
figurative trajectories [that] can give rise to different and simultaneous readings, on 
the condition, however, that the figurative units, at the level of manifestation, be not 
contradictory” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 236). That is, falling in a dream is unlikely 
expressed as ‘anti-gravitational’ i.e. feeling falling upwards (which would still be 
falling) and yet, the contrary term of falling – rising – facilitates upward movement 
which may be experienced as if falling; as vertical, unnatural impossible movement. 
“It is not until we try to reproduce a dream that we introduce order of any kind into its 
loosely associated elements” (Freud 1965: 80). 
 Due to dreams being more or less asyntactic, the aspect of grammatical 
isotopy is somewhat neglected here and more attention is paid to the semantic isotopy 
“which makes possible a uniform reading of the discourse as it results from the partial 
readings of the utterances making it up and from the resolution of their ambiguities 
which is guided by the search for a single reading” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 164). 
However, as dreams are known and despite their sometimes odd synopses that are 
remembered, they are single in their being (provided nothing is added or removed, 
which is often not the case) and as a reading, they are “first and foremost a semiosis, 
primordial activity the effect of which is to correlate a content with a given expression 
and to transform a chain of the expression into a syntagmatic system of signs” (Ibid. 
254). 
 Whatever the reason is for dreaming, a dream requires to be remembered so 
that it may be seen as a reading. Before this, however, a dream needs to be dreamt, it 
needs to become a narratable discourse and as such, will be made subject to 
figurativization. In general, all discourses are divisible into two classes – figurative 
and non-figurative (or abstract) ones. By way of figurativization, it is possible to 
construct a model of dream-discourse production – a preliminary generative trajectory 
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– affording to constitute “a general framework within which one can seek to inscribe, 
in an operational and tentative manner, subject to invalidations and reconstructions, 
the figurativization procedures of a discourse posed first as neutral and abstract” (Ibid. 
118). 
 For this, our dream to become must be treated as the final reading of a 
discourse, a concept identifiable “with that of semiotic process. In this way the totality 
of semiotic facts […] located on the syntagmatic axis of language are viewed as 
belonging to the theory of discourse” (Ibid. 81). Moreover, to nudge the terminology 
closer to cultural semiotics, it must be noted that “text and discourse may be 
indifferently applied to designate the syntagmatic axis of non-linguistic semiotic 
systems” (Ibid. 340). In our case, the non-linguistic semiotic system is the system of 
dreams treated as text(s). 
 Considering the dream as a text which is the outcome of unvolitional, 
progressive production of meaning(s) that at every moment had the potential to 
diverge from the ‘final’ form of manifestation, during “the course of which structures 
and semiotic figures come into place, detail by detail” (Ibid. 119) it is useful to divide 
the figurativization procedure into two levels, figuration and iconization. The former 
is “the setting up of semiotic figures” whereas the latter “aims at decking out the 
figures exhaustively so as to produce the referential illusion which would transform 
them into images of the world” (Ibid.). The referential illusion in its turn creates the 
meaning effect “reality” which from the generative point of view has no a priori 
referents unlike objects of the “real” or “imaginary” worlds. 
 But meaning effect remains incomplete or unreal without the onomastic sub-
component that characterizes the figurativization of a narrative by specifying and 
particularizing the abstract discourse of dream “insofar as it is grasped in its deep 
structures, and by the introduction of anthroponyms, of toponyms, and of chrononyms 
[…] going from the generic to the specific” (Ibid. 119). By way of anthroponyms, 
toponyms and chrononyms, the onomastic sub-component presents the required 
degree of reproduction of that which is real by permitting “a historical anchoring, the 
effect of which is to form the simulacrum of an external referent and to produce the 
meaning effect “reality” (Ibid. 219). 
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2.4. Semeion purus or, the fourway triadic sign 
Having intimated the pure sign in dreams, or a sign without established meaning, then 
it must somehow differ from the everyday sign(s) by which we go about and which go 
about in and around us; when we are awake, when we are alive (irrespective that 
biosemiosis does not cease within the deceased) and when we are about. But what of 
the sign when we are asleep and not aware there are such things as ‘signs’ or better 
yet, such a thing as “I” – we know dreams are real but only when they have ended. 
Hence, the sign must have different relations depending on its dimension. 
 This will be clarified with the aid of the semiotic square that is fit for 
establishing a preliminary typology of relations necessary “to distinguish intrinsic 
features, those which constitute the category, from those that are foreign to it” 
(Greimas, Courtés 1982: 308) with regards to major semiosic dimensions. As one 
may note, Piatigorsky’s definition of ‘sign-ness’ echoes Peirce’s definition of a sign: 
“[A] sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something 
in some respect or capacity” (CP 2.228 [emphasis original]). In addition to this 
similarity, the triadic sign at its simplest definition is commonplace in semiotics, and 
duly its elements – representamen (R), object (O) and interpretant (I) – are used also 
in this thesis. 
 In general, object is anything we can think or talk about. It pays to notice that 
objects do not need to be physical and that the lack of an object would deprive the 
sign of its being a sign, i.e. representamen at all: “it is a vehicle conveying into the 
mind something from without. That for which it stands is called its object; that which 
it conveys, its meaning; and the idea to which it gives rise its interpretant” (CP 1.339 
[emphasis original]). 
 Signs – according to semiotics – are very real and responsible for reality itself; 
they make their way so that “the interpretant is nothing but another representation to 
which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretation 
again” (CP 1.339). The infamous infinite series created in this fashion is halted via 
‘ontologization’ of the semiotic square and hence, on the axis of sub-contraries, 
instead of calling (Ī) non-interpretant and (Ō) non-object which would be in 
accordance with the inner logic and terminology of the semiotic square, we designate 
(Ī) to point to the absence of interpretation under will and (Ō) to the absence of 
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knowledge of objects, though at points the prefix ‘non-‘ is used. However 
unorthodox, the triadic sign is projected onto the semiotic square. 
 The diagram (Figure 2.) below is an adaptation of the semiotic square as 
presented by Greimas and Courtés (1982: 308–311). In the diagram, representamen 
(R), or ‘sign-ness’ is placed in the middle for the following reasons: 
 
i) we and according to us all other beings have no access to anything without it being 
(an interpretation of) a representation, i.e. a sign, and; 
ii) by extension this argument applies both to nature and culture. 
 
A 
 
 
O   I 
 
N   R   C 
 
Ī   Ō 
 
 
Z 
 
Figure 2. Relations of (R) representing triadic ‘sign-ness’ in four dimensions as 
projected onto the semiotic square. In which: 
 
: Relation of contrariety      R: Representamen 
        O: Object 
: Relation of complementarity  I: Interpretant 
  N: Nature 
: Relation of contradiction  C: Culture 
        A: Awake 
: Relation of simple presupposition    Z: Asleep  
      
: Relation of reciprocal presupposition 
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The first point concerns the elementary proposition of (anthropo-) semiotics and the 
minimal requirement for something to be interpreted or function as a sign. Here 
however, there is no function. The representamen and its constituents irrespective of 
the dimension discussed are treated as static. The second point is that the use of the 
same mark for representamen (R) and ‘sign-ness’ is applicable in all aspects. The 
relations, albeit iconically depicted with dissimilar placement of the arrows from 
those of the original, remain the same as those shown on the diagram’s legend. There 
are, however, some alterations. 
 First of all, this is not “the visual representation of the logical articulation of 
any semantic category” (Ibid. 308) nor exactly does it concern “the elementary 
structure of signification, when defined […] as a relation between at least two terms 
[which] rests only on a distinction of opposition which characterizes the paradigmatic 
axis of language” (Ibid.). The latter definition is somewhat closer to what is being 
done here; to distinguish ‘dimensions’ of semiosis as understood by human cognition, 
i.e. the elementary mechanisms and functional principles of distinct semiotic spaces 
where we consider signs to be the elements that enable activity. 
 On the axis of contraries, object (O) and interpretant (I) are in opposition – 
were it possible to distinguish a single semiosis in actuality, then strictly speaking the 
interpretant is never the object. However, they are both presupposed and “can be 
present concomitantly […] they are said to enter into a relation of reciprocal 
presupposition or which comes to the same thing, a relation of contrariety” (Ibid., 
309). In other words, were there no (representations of) objects, the interpretations (of 
representations) would not exist either although in cases their categorial positions are 
interchangeable. 
 Including from the middle representamen (R) we find the traditional triad ‘R–
O–I’ forming a sign, i.e. the utmost minimal requirement for constituting (conscious, 
cognitive) semiosis in the human mind.  For a person to receive a representation of an 
object, s/he needs to be awake (A) for interpretation (I). “In order that an interpretant 
might emerge, it must enter into interaction with some interpreter” (merrell 2013: 28). 
That is, were I unconscious, I would not know I (can) think. Thus, by incorporating 
the awake state (A) we end up with the quadruple ‘R–O–I–A‘, which may be said to 
be our basic dimension of acknowledged being, the existential whereabouts and 
semiotic elements by which I know “I” am when awake. 
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 On the positive deixis, there is in addition to the representamen (R), an object 
(O) but there is no interpretant (Ī) in the human sense. As one may infer, the semiotic 
dimension of the positive deixis is that of nature (N). The lack of freedom for abstract 
endowment of meaning and/or arbitrary interpretation in nature is based on Uexküll’s 
(1982: 28) claim that “because no animal ever plays the role of an observer, one may 
assert that they never enter into relationships with neutral objects.” This is adopted to 
apply to all of nature; it is only in the human semiotic that “[Through] every 
relationship the neutral object is transformed into a meaning-carrier, the meaning of 
which is imprinted upon it by a subject” (Ibid.). It may be said that in nature, the 
objects’ relations to subjects are limited by their physical being – there are no 
immaterial or imaginary objects in nature. This is not to say that nature (N) would 
totally lack interpretations, but that it is considerably more narrow and restricted on 
what comes to creating new information in this way. Or rather, it is slow to happen 
within aeons unobservable for the human intellect. Allowing this, it may be said that 
the quadruple ‘R–O–Ī–N’ forms the semiotic dimension of beasts and organic matter, 
including our bodies. 
 On the negative deixis, we find as proper only interpretation (I) of 
representation (R) but no object (Ō). This is based on the presumption that culture (C) 
– whether seen as a semiospheric phenomenon of a mnemonic mechanism or as any 
other terminological construct – cannot with certainty be said to be conscious of its 
(physical) self through senses in order to receive information via or of objects but 
only their representations interpreted: “The history of culture is reflected as an 
evolution of interpreting culture – on one side by its contemporary auditorium, on the 
other by next generations, including the scientific tradition of interpretation” (Lotman 
1999: 39 [my translation]). 
 Culture is to itself simultaneously a subject and an object, neither of which 
overlaps the other in a single semiosis. For the sake of argument, physical objects 
with regard to ‘sign-ness’ in culture are treated as elements that from the point of 
view of culture are not bearers of meaning, as it were do not exist. “The fact of their 
actual existence recedes to the background in face of their irrelevance in the given 
modelling system. Though existing, they as it were cease to exist in the system of 
culture” (Lotman 1990: 58). Excluding the overlapping boundaries and the typology 
of culture for the sake of convenience, culture’s elementary functional mechanism can 
be said to be interpreting itself through representations (of non-objects) within itself, 
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constituting the semiotic dimension of culture ‘R–Ō–I–C’; a supra-individual monad 
of its own rank. 
 On the axis of subcontraries, there is no object (Ō) nor an interpretant (Ī) 
proper but only a representation (R) in and of a physically unreal dimension – dream 
(Z)19. Analogous to real space, dream may be said to form for us a second(ary) sphere 
of semiotic existence ‘R–Ō–Ī–Z’ in which we are incapable of action and not aware 
that “I” exists or to say the least, the ‘am’ of “I” is different due to different 
surroundings in a different setting experientially wholly as real. “I” is not a sign, fact 
nor content or structure of consciousness in the Traumwelt. Yet, interestingly enough, 
the dream becomes known – for “I” – in retrospect in the awake dimension where it 
intrudes as a memory of and in itself. 
 The absence of the “I” as an acknowledged structure of consciousness is based 
on the fact that “any act of semiotic recognition must involve the separation of 
significant elements from insignificant ones in surrounding reality” (Lotman 1990: 
58). There is no distinction between ‘things’ in dreams, there are no subject-object 
relations – much like as was postulated with regard to the general metatheoretical 
framework of this thesis – the structure of the “I” is inseparable from the surrounding 
elements and thus can not be recognized therein. The Traumwelt is both form and 
content displaying ‘sign-ness’ before it becomes a memory of triadic signs; it is in this 
sense that the dream as structure(s) of consciousness abstracted from the state of 
consciousness can be seen as signs in their pure form; there is nothing to distinguish 
beyond representation alone due to the absence of “I.” 
 However, provided that “we only know dreams from our memory of them 
after we are awake” (Freud 1965: 76), then through recollection, despite the 
randomness and different order of things than in the accustomed to awake 
surroundings, the bygone experiencing yet unacknowledged “I” of Traumwelt was by 
force of circumstance the exact same as the one you think you are best acquainted 
with daily, only existing in a different reminiscential world than that of awake. The 
dream as structure of consciousness is an agglomerate of form and content manifested 
as pure signs before “I” becomes aware of it awake transmuting their indeterminacy 
which makes it “necessary to establish a meaning for them” (Lotman 2009: 143). That 
                                                
19 There are two reasons why the term dream is marked with (Z). Firstly, it is presumed that in a dream 
everything may represent something else and secondly, it is visually customary to use (Z) to point out 
that someone is sleeping which is the minimal requirement for dreaming proper. 
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is, what is remembered of the Traumwelt is mediated to the awake “I” in a condensed 
form from a different sphere of semiosis, or even – due to the indistinguishable being 
of elements in a dream – from a non-semiotic reality to a semiotic reality; in a similar 
way as symbols function. 
 And so, we have at least four separate20 semiosic dimensions for ‘sign-ness’ 
according to some very general principles and as was proposed, the ‘something’s 
quality of being a sign of something for someone in some place’ within each domain 
is unbreachable as the exact same sign from one dimension to the other due to the 
specific qualities of the dimensions. The four in essence: 
 
that of awake (R–O–I–A), in which conscious (anthropo-)  semiosis occurs; 
that of nature (R–O–Ī–N), in which organic (bio-) semiosis occurs; 
that of culture (R–Ō–I–C), in which inorganic (cultural) semiosis occurs; 
that of dream (R–Ō–Ī–Z), in which unaware (oneiric) semiosis occurs. 
 
So far it has been presumed that the presence of elements of a given sign oscillate 
according to ‘sign-ness’ in each of the four dimensions. However, this is not the case 
in the strict sense – especially what comes to the lack of interpretation in nature and 
lack of object in culture. It would be somewhat absurd to claim that the triadic sign 
would retain its ‘sign-ness’ or enable semiosis if crippled into a twopartite triadic 
sign. Indeed, were it the case that interpretation did not exist in nature, and object in 
culture, evolution in both would be excluded. 
 Hence for the sake of clarity, the sign so far has been treated as static and the 
proposed lack is not an unconditional one but a purely theoretical one that serves to 
point to the dominant element of semiosis in each dimension. “The dominant may be 
defined as the focusing component […] it rules, determines, and transforms the 
remaining components” (Jakobson 1981: 751). More generally in tetralemmic terms, 
in nature the object either is or is not (affirmation / negation) for a given subject 
whereas in culture the object is and is not (equivalence); in dream the object neither is 
nor is not (neither) whereas awake the object’s mode of being depends on the 
contextual situation of a given sign – a discussion which we will not enter here. 
                                                
20 Granted, nature and culture are interdependent and all dimensions are interconnected in human 
existence, but here they are viewed as distinct for the sake of argument. 
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 Based on the subject’s overall knowledge, an individual’s Umwelt and 
Lebenswelt forms a Traumwelt of which we are aware as well as of the other 
dimensions only by default of our own peculiar semiotic mode. It must be noted that 
in addition to their separate natures, all four dimensions are embodied by the human 
essence; the body is of nature, mind of awake, the dream an intersection and culture 
an extension. It is also worth noting that remembered dreams are sometimes puzzling 
and may show “an extraordinary persistence in memory” (Freud 1965: 76). 
Suggestively speaking, a core phylogenetic function of this mnemonic translatory 
cycle may have been to bridge the gap between ens realis (body) and (pre-) archaic 
ens rationis (mind), sealing the structure of the “I” as a structure of consciousness. 
 In light of the above and general knowledge of semiotics, it may be said that 
what is received of a sign by a semiotic entity is its representamen (R). Granted, the 
way the semiotic square has been used so far, it remains a first generation square 
regardless that the positioning of the dimensions is visually similar to the second 
generation of terms as in the original. Albeit omnipresent, the dimensions belong to 
different semantic and overall semiotic categories. Strictly, (A) and (Z) are two main 
states of consciousness available and comprehensible to all but, as is obvious, the 
majority of people are part nature (N) part culture (C) and thus, however semiosis 
occurs in either or both, it is applicable to the human and its intellect in 
consciousness. 
 Moreover, it may be argued that nature (N) and culture (C) are in a relation of 
simple presupposition – the relation between the presupposing term and the 
presupposed term: “By presupposed term is understood that term, the presence of 
which is the necessary condition for the presence of the presupposing term, while the 
presence of the presupposing term is not the necessary condition for the presupposed 
term” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 243). Chronologically speaking, culture (C) could not 
have evolved were there no nature (N), whereas nature does not require the presence 
of culture (C) in order to exist. 
 Awake (A) and dream (Z) on the other hand are in a relation of reciprocal 
presupposition, both terms (or dimensions) being simultaneously presupposing and 
presupposed. The relation between them as states of consciousness and semioses 
therein is predominantly “either that of combination, on the syntagmatic axis, or that 
of opposition, on the paradigmatic axis” (Ibid.) emphasized according to the potential 
assortment of facilitatory forms of meaning or structures of consciousness. 
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 It may also be noted that there is no reason why the above diagram could not 
be viewed as a diagram of the signifying process. By replacing (Z) with the semiotic 
and (A) with the symbolic in a situation where a given natural-cultural (N/C) subject 
receives a representamen (R) constituting a signifying process. This in the sense that 
dreams – remembered or not – do or have had an effect on the subject, the way its 
identity has come to be by way of strengthening or weakening memory; that is, dream 
as function in the mnemonic mechanism partaking in the constituting of a subject is 
omnipresent albeit unnoticed in the being of all subjects, much like the semiotic is 
omnipresent as “the extra-verbal way in which bodily energy and affects make their 
way into language” (McAfee 2005: 17). whereas only awake are we aware of the 
existence of signs and capable of using them according to our (linguistic) competence 
much like the symbolic “is a mode of signifying in which speaking beings attempt to 
express meaning with as little ambiguity as possible” (Ibid.). 
 In essence, the way dreaming as a function has moulded the being’s identity 
does not disappear or cease to do so awake but is as present as the real world in 
dream-imagery – the effects of both dimensions in each are inseparable though 
usually either dominates in one.  
 It may also be noted that all this can be viewed as structure(s) of 
consciousness as well which, as a rule are non-individual. We all gather the same sign 
or representamen but what we make of it, their individual interpretations vary. These 
varying interpretations then become this or that content(s) of consciousness sharing 
similarities across individual psyches and yet, they all share the same foundation and 
basis as afforded by the sign itself. However, this is not the case with symbols of 
consciousness – all symbols are what they are and cannot be anything else but it is a 
question of comprehending (or pseudocomprehending) the symbol, which depends on 
the symbol itself and by way of (pseudo-)comprehension of this or that symbol, it 
becomes subjected to a sign system and by the same token, becomes de-symbolized. 
 This is to say that although dreams are predominantly symbolic when recalled, 
they are largely semiotic by function, i.e. rather non-expressive during the dream 
itself due to the absence of the “I” which makes them ‘pure signs’ without meaning; 
when recalled, they need to have meaning endowed upon them or, the predominance 
of the non-expressive semiotic within the passive consciousness inflicted by 
symbol(s) of consciousness becomes – by way of de-symbolization due to being 
subjected to a sign system in the awake – symbolic by expression. 
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 As the agglomerate of content and form or a world of ‘pure signs,’ the dream 
resembles reality in which there is no particular reason to doubt its truthfulness 
though some people are curious as to what is this thing called ‘existence’ or ‘being’ – 
what is the meaning of life etc. That is, the real world has meaning as it is whether 
one ponders it or not. The problem is that “the concept of meaning is undefinable” 
(Greimas, Courtés 1982: 187). Reality in itself is produced by our senses when they 
(we) are in contact with meaning and it may be said that “the world of common sense 
is the meaning effect produced by the encounter of the human subject and the world 
as object” (Ibid.). 
 “Meaning effect is the impression of “reality” produced by our senses when 
confronted with meaning […] with an underlying semiotic system” (Greimas, Courtés 
1982: 187). The problem with “reality” and especially meaning by which it becomes 
known to us is that although meaning exists, nothing can be said about it and thus 
meaning must be taken as ““meaning effect,” which is the only reality that can be 
grasped, but which cannot be directly apprehended” (Ibid. 97). 
 For example, provided that our vision is one of the more predominant senses 
when it comes to orienting and positioning ourselves in the world and acquiring 
information from it and that the content of dreams being primarily but not solely 
visual; the Traumwelt is “analogous to real space” (Lotman 2009: 145) then by the 
same token, the (cognitive) boundary that makes their separate modes of existence 
explicit (awake) may be even more diminished by calling to play the meaning effect 
experienced in dreams, created by the referential illusion therein. By way of iconizing 
the origin of the content of dreams they become decked out “exhaustively so as to 
produce the referential illusion which would transform them into images of the 
world” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 119). The referential illusion in its turn creates the 
aforementioned meaning effect ‘reality’ which from the generative point of view has 
no a priori referents unlike objects of the ‘real’ or ‘imaginary’ worlds. The lack of 
pre-given referents may be emphasized by pointing to the absence of prominent 
thirdness and the purity of signs in dreams. The meaning effect ‘reality’ of dream 
while dreaming is, then, equivalent to that of everyday reality. Except that there is no 
One there. 
 Besides historical anchoring that set up the spatio-temporal indices in 
figurativization, the term anchoring itself may also be used to designate “the 
establishment of relation(s) among semiotic entities belonging either to two different 
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semiotic systems […] or to two distinct discoursive phenomena” (Greimas, Courtés 
1982: 13). In addition to dreams being presupposed entities, we may agree that the 
real world, regardless of its mode or of the ways it is understood as a “reality” 
constitutes another dimension (class?) of entities. “The effect of anchoring is to 
transform one of the entities into a contextual reference, thus allowing the second to 
be disambiguated” (Ibid.). 
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3. DREAM AND “I” 
 
In the part that follows, the basic communicational scheme is introduced and 
compared with that of autocommunication in order to lay out the distinction between 
these two distinct albeit similar modes of communion. Also, the purity of dreams 
as/with potential sign-ness will be explicated. The similitude of dream and symbol, 
both being finalized texts will be made evident. Before the finalization, the dream 
must first be shown to be possible to be treated as a text; after which it will be shown 
to be structurally similar with symbol. By sieving dream through autocommunication, 
the inescapability of narrativizing and the introducing of order upon its elements will 
be shown in order to beg the question of the inavoidable syntagmatization of dreams 
upon remembering inevitably leading to narrative structures at large thus hoping to 
shed some light in the role and relation of dreams to consciousness with regards to the 
restructuring of the actual “I” itself. Also, functions of language upon reflection of a 
dream will be taken into account. 
 By establishing a hypothetical dream, the manifest imagery of which is here 
left for the reader to concoct in their mind, and view it as the (de-symbolized) primary 
expression level which somehow due to its imaginary representation for 
consciousness requires meaning to be allotted upon it. Expressing the expression (its 
mechanism) affords a preliminary outline to approach the dream as an (open) text or 
generator of meaning – a symbol functioning as a void, i.e. pure sign – through the 
autocommunicative interpretation of which the imagery is endowed with a relation to 
whatever happens to correspond to it in the something defined in the contents of 
consciousness. However, before being able to treat a (remembered) dream as text, its 
relating to consciousness as de-symbolized sign(s) requires a theoretical form that we 
will abstract from the phenomenological presuppositions of semiotic theory with 
regard to sign-ness. “Things, usable by living beings as signs, objectively present the 
possibility of such usage as a result of the fact that they possess the qualities of 
duality, position, and projection” (Pjatigorsky 1974: 186–187). 
 In the light of our nucleus, the interpretations of such dreams is fairly 
subjective and somewhat culture-specific guarded by the spread of knowledge 
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afforded by one’s surroundings (despite today’s widespread visuality in culture due to 
the internet etc.). The spectrum of potential manifestations of dream imagery 
originates from their polyvalence that varies according to subjects in the sense that 
one falls off a tree, the other from a skyscraper whereas the essence, the nucleus is 
shared knowledge by way of semiotic chorae and also in part derived from a given 
culture; both of which are subjectively comprehended. There is consensus that 
experiencing consciousness is subjective in the sense that we can never know others 
in their totality but it does not mean that we couldn’t agree that the manifestations of 
our dreams share similarities derived from reality. 
 The meaning effect reality is equal in both, the dream imagery is the result of 
semantic polyvalence as afforded by the knowledge of the subject in the general 
frame of the nucleus whereas this knowledge is derived from the real of awake; 
hence, in an abstract sense, there are realZ and realA. Or, as a symbol of consciousness 
subjected to either sign system – that of dream (Z) or that of awake (A) – in its 
potential sign-ness the dream possesses duality that is “the quality ‘of being at any 
moment one and another’, i.e., the quality of being TWO different things […] only by 
being two things at once can it appear as itself” (Piatigorski 1974: 186). The dream 
was a duplication of reality and its ‘itself’ exists only in relation to the dreamer, its 
manifest imagery is not real but dreamt from the real to where it is brought back to. 
 Yielding from its duality is the dream’s quality of position, the imaginability 
of the thing used as a sign “outside its locus (and in abstraction from spatio) [which] 
may be interpreted as its simultaneous being in a series of concrete SITUATIONS or 
POSITIONS (positio) which change in accordance with the movements of the subject 
using this thing” (Ibid.). The situations or positions that amount up to the dream as 
sign’s quality of position derives from the very fact that the concept total of dream, 
i.e. both the realZ and realA can be imagined “outside the place (locus) it occupies, 
although the very CONCEPT of that thing presupposes its specific spatial 
characteristics (coordinates, measurements, and so on, which can be summarily 
designated as spatio)” (Ibid.). The concept of dream as distinct from the awake reality 
indeed presupposes sleep. The potential to imagine it outside said place (locus) may 
come about as reminiscing of a dream, suspicion whether experiencing something in 
reality might be a dream or by way of something causing the subject to recall a dream 
for no apparent reason, etc. 
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 For example, as a mnemonic mechanism the dream effects memory and by 
extension learning and forgetting (regardless of the manifest content); as such it 
always belongs to the past – like a symbol – but may resurface either as it was 
remembered or by way of effecting the form and mode of one’s behavior in reality via 
memory. Thus the dream possesses “the capacity of a thing ‘to be included’, at any 
given moment, in the actual situation of the subject using it, as a FACT known to have 
existed before this (or any imaginable) situation” (Ibid.). That is, both 
phylogenetically and ontogenetically dreams are primary abstractions of the world, 
the effect of which, regardless whether remembered, is a fact that allows them to be 
included in any situation or, more precisely, it is wholly impossible to completely 
exclude them from one’s existence. It is by this very fact of the fixation of the thing in 
time that “presupposes both the possibility of its being ‘thrown forward’ (projectio), 
the possibility of its future situational use, and its assimilation by the subject in a 
series of concrete situations […] designated as THE QUALITY OF PROJECTION” (Ibid.). 
The throwing forward may be done by volition or by way of this or that concept 
lodged in memory; also, as others have argued, one function of dreams is to simulate 
real-life threats in order to avoid them in the future. 
 Accordingly, dreams possess the possibility or potential of becoming signs but 
this does not by default entail that this or that dream would be used or would become 
a sign or acquire meaning upon it eventually lodged in the subject’s psyche; “they are 
merely ‘pure possibilities’ of sign-ness, possibilities which are converted by the 
psychic and behavioural mechanism of living beings (subjects) into sign reality in acts 
of communication and autocommunication” (Ibid. 187). 
 
3.1. Autocommunication and dominance 
This section is the closest to traditional or psychoanalytic interpretations of dreams. 
Note however, that because this thesis has no actual dreams – that by way of 
translation would become semantically reduced and distorted – to analyze, the 
replacing of true connections between latent dream-thoughts by false connections on 
the manifest level, i.e. secondary revision is not taken into account. That would lead 
to interpretations of dreams which is not our aim; our aim is rather more simple, just 
to point to the necessity and inescapability of what Kristeva would call transposition, 
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the signifying process’ passing from one sign system to another – intersemiotic 
translation in other words. 
 To avoid subjecting the dream possessing the nucleus ‘falling’ to a wholly 
different sign system of natural language by which it then would be retellable to 
others in order to be fitted in for example an analyst’s metamodel. We will merely 
bring out the main aspects concerning the passing from a passive state of 
consciousness to an active state of consciousness, from asleep to awake by which the 
dream as symbol of consciousness becomes de-symbolized by being subjected to 
another sign system in which it is endowed with a (new) more clear syntax; one which 
in reality may be fairly indifferent whether it corresponds to whatever was dreamt of. 
This is clear in the fact that what is remembered of dreams changes in time and it may 
be argued that it is possible to remember a dream one has never dreamt as it is 
possible to not remember a dream dreamt. “The transfer of the sphere of dreams into 
an area of consciousness itself entails a fundamental realignment of its nature” 
(Lotman 2009: 35). 
 As has been noted, the Traumwelt is a space analogous to real space and one 
of its special features “lies in the fact that the categories of speech are transferred into 
visual space” (Ibid.). In essence, a (remembered) dream affords manifestations only in 
accordance with one’s language; this is clearly a reciprocal relation in that depending 
on the subject’s linguistic competence depends also the amount of narrative detail that 
may be invested in the retelling of the dream. It must be noted that “in the recounting 
of a dream, an obvious increase in the degree of organisation occurs; a narrative 
structure is imposed on speech” (Ibid.). That is, again, we must remain sceptic on 
what comes to retold dreams and the trustworthiness of the tale. Hence the 
unnecessity for secondary revision. 
 Regardless of the correspondence of a remembered dream to what was dreamt, 
all such synopses may be viewed in the light of communication despite the fact that 
communication in the strict sense is not present in a dream; any dream is nevertheless 
new information generated unknowingly within the sleeping mind’s eye provided it is 
a dream one has never dreamt before. As such, all dreams may be placed on the 
communicational model. The basic communication model as presented by Roman 
Jakobson consists of six components, each of which has its specific function that may 
play the part of dominant in the communication act, the dominant defined as the 
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focusing component that rules, determines, and transforms the remaining components. 
The model with its functions looks like this: 
 
CONTEXT 
(referential) 
MESSAGE 
(poetic) 
 
ADDRESSER ===================================== ADDRESSEE 
(emotive)         (conative) 
CONTACT 
(phatic) 
CODE 
(metalingual) 
 
In which the emotive function expresses the feelings, emotions and/or attitudes of the 
Addresser, his/her take on the message and characterizes him/her as well as tries to 
call forth emotions in the receiver of the message, the Addressee; it is then the 
conative function that (possibly) influences the behaviour of the Addressee. Naturally, 
to facilitate any communication, the two require to be able to be in Contact one way 
or the other – the phatic function emphasizes Contact itself and ‘checks’ whether the 
channel of communication works or not. It also enables the participants to engage in 
communication, to lengthen or shorten it for example by way of ritualized forms, as in 
some dialogues; non-linguistic signs also play an essential part. 
 In addition to being in contact, for the Addresser and Addressee to 
communicate and exchange information, they need to share a Code – a common 
language, terminology etc. – which refers to the nature of interaction for example by 
genre. The metalingual function, then, focuses on the Code itself which may at times 
become ambiguous like: ‘You didn’t just use that expression.’ The (textual) features 
of the Message itself are foregrounded by the poetic function, that places the Message 
in focus in the act of communication. Whereas the referential function, oriented 
towards Context, imparts information; for a Message to be operational, it requires a 
referential Context that is understandable for the Addressee in addition that the 
Message be verbal or verbalizable (or, in our case, narratable which is roughly the 
same thing). This would mean language in the most general sense, not concrete, 
natural language for then it would belong under the metalingual function. 
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 In general terms, all five functions are more or less present in the referential 
function and, although we distinguish six basic aspects of language, it is nigh 
impossible to find (verbal) messages that would fulfill only one function. In this basic 
model there are no ‘arrows’ pointing the direction of communication, it is only to 
show the essential components present in an act of communication that takes place 
between subjects and thus it may be said that the conveyed information is transferred 
in space between the subjects rather than in time. 
 Communication is an (acknowledged) act between a subject ‘I’ and object 
‘s/he’ or then it is autocommunicative within ‘I.’ Thus there are two directions in 
transmitting the message, the ‘I–s/he’ in which “it is assumed that before the act of 
communication there was a message known to ‘me’ and not known to ‘him/her’.” 
(Lotman 1990: 21). Whereas in the ‘I–I’ situation, it is the case of “a subject 
transmitting a message to him/herself, i.e. to a person who knows it already [which] 
appears paradoxical” (Ibid.). 
 In autocommunication, as opposed to communication between Addresser and 
Addressee, the information is “transferred in time” (Ibid.) rather than in space. The 
main difference between the ‘I–s/he’ communication system in comparison to the ‘I–
I’ system is that in the former the positions of the framing elements – addresser and 
addressee – may be changed while at the same time the code and the message remain 
invariable. “The message and the information contained in it are constants, while the 
bearer of the information may alter” (Ibid. 22). As for the latter, the bearer of 
information is constantly the same and despite the functional similitude of the 
processes, the message itself is reformulated in the autocommunication process thus 
acquiring new meaning(s). “This is the result of introducing a supplementary, second, 
code; the original message is recoded into elements of its structure and thereby 
acquires features of a new message” (Ibid.). Below is the diagram for 
autocommunication: 
 
  context     shift of context 
  message 1 ======================>  message 2 
 I => ……………………………………………………………… =>  I’ 
  Code 1      Code 2 
  (Lotman 1990: 22) 
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“The ‘I–s/he’ system allows one merely to transmit a constant quantity of 
information, whereas the ‘I–I’ system qualitatively transforms the information, and 
this leads to a restructuring of the actual ‘I’ itself” (Ibid. 22). As has been postulated, 
during a dream there is no cognizing subject in the same sense as there is awake and 
by this, communication as an act nor autocommunication can be said to be present in 
the strict sense. Before tackling the specifities of the source(s) for dreams, we’ll sieve 
our constructed dream through the process of autocommunication upon awakening. 
 Despite that “dreams are in most cases lacking intelligibility and orderliness” 
(Freud 1965: 77), remembered dreams are most often endowed with some sort of 
syntactic order regardless of how odd a dream might have been. Even inexplicable 
sudden changes of scenery (toponyms), familiar strangers or strange familiars 
(anthroponyms) and changes in the ‘time of day’ (chrononyms) in dreams are 
accepted both in the dream as well as awake; these are of course often questioned due 
to their potentially uncanny nature, but only when awake. This naturally changes the 
dream because when we “recall dreams to our memory we almost always – 
unintentionally and without noticing the fact – fill in the gaps in the dream-images” 
(Ibid. 79). By filling in the gaps, parts of the dream become substituted by other, 
supposedly similar parts. From the point of view of figurativization this poses no 
problem as long as the figurative units, at the level of manifestation, be not 
contradictory. 
 Reflecting upon a dream the subject simultaneously transforms it by 
introducing “supplementary codes from outside, and by external stimuli which alter 
the contextual situation” (Lotman 1990: 22). The dream is segmented into the 
(dominant) elements making up its structure (the selection of which is in part done 
upon autocommunication). As proposed, we have a dream that either ends up in or 
has falling as its climax in accordance with the above figurativization, parts of which 
are more essential than others, depending on the dreamer’s take. In 
autocommunication “the addresser inwardly reconstructs his/her essence, since the 
essence of a personality may be thought of as an individual set of socially significant 
codes, and this set changes during the act of communication” (Lotman 1990:22). 
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3.2. Dream and symbol 
Theoretically similar with the discrete unit in a class of semantically and structurally 
independent entities, and never belonging to one synchronic section of a culture, the 
secondary content of symbol may be functionally and structurally collocated with the 
nucleus of a dream as symbol of consciousness. The isotopes upon which the nucleus 
is constituted are rigidly organized (albeit their positions may be changed in the 
semiotic square) and never, as such, offer a clear, indistinct meaning but provide the 
possibility for generating different readings, all of which generate from one semic 
(semantic) category. The outcome of any final reading of the nucleus is similar to the 
being of symbol in that “the content of a symbol irrationally glimmers through the 
expression level” (Lotman 1990: 102). The variance of the primary expression level 
of a symbol with regard to the invariable secondary content is then analogous 
(iterative) with dreamt dreams with regard to //originating from// the nucleus. 
 Much like our dream theme that has several ways to manifest (and several 
ways to be remembered and forgotten) as iterative paraphrasings in all consciousness, 
the symbol “actively correlates with its cultural context, transforms it and is 
transformed by it” (Ibid. 104). Our nucleus also correlates with the contexts of 
individuals or, the structures abstracted from individuals’ states of consciousness 
facilitate the nucleus in a myriad of ways. To enable the collocation of dream and 
symbol (in the cultural system) even further, dream needs firstly to be defined as a 
text. Text is a fairly open term in cultural semiotics but in very general terms it may 
be said to be the entire sum of the structural relations that found expression. 
 To narrow this down a bit, text may also be defined “by pointing to a concrete 
object having its own internal features which cannot be deduced from anything else 
apart from itself” (Lotman, Piatigorsky 1978: 232). It must be postulated that a dream 
can not become anywhere except for in a sleeping consciousness, it can not be 
daydreamt for then it is no longer a dream but musing. Each dream is individual and 
subjective in each consciousness and has its individual and subjective internal features 
– an illocution ‘dream of this’ is not effective or at least it requires some effort. The 
internal features of a dream in addition to the semio-narrative nucleus revolve around 
the figurativized semic figures in accordance with the thematic, narrative trajectory 
generated and cannot be deduced from anything else; this inavoidably creates a 
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structure of some sort, regardless whether we are talking about the organization of the 
initial semantic values of a dream or of its re-syntagmatization upon awakening. 
 A text requires to be coded (at least) twice and in order to dream, it must be 
presumed that the individual psyche needs to be in possession of knowledge21 upon 
which the pragmatic dimension as the internal referent for the cognitive dimension is 
based. This knowledge can be said to ‘exist’ in consciousness – where there is always 
memory – as a whole and during sleep it regresses so that its internal relations 
defining its structural and organizational character become freer, as is evident in the 
polylingualism of the Traumwelt where the form/content of representational 
categories is pragmatically indifferent and semantically polyvalent without a 
predestined trajectory to the extent afforded by the nucleus’ trajectories. 
 In other words, dream has potential ability to transform and conjoin any 
knowledge into any imagery by breaching the rift ‘whence-to-where’ according to 
certain rules which in their turn orientate the precession of imagery in the same sense 
that (poetic) text has “potential ability to transfer any word from the reserve of 
semantic capacity (h1) to the subset that determines the flexibility of the language (h2) 
and vice versa” (Lotman 1977: 78). The vice versa naturally applies to recalled 
dreams as well, especially if we take dream to be “fundamentally, a “language for one 
person”” (Lotman 2009: 146). It is this freedom of association in dream-as-text and 
dream-as-language that facilitates the translation of knowledge of ‘who-knew-what’ 
into the secondary code or language of dream as schematizable ‘signs-in-their-pure-
form’ and by extension, propagates the creation of (primordial) text, the meaning of 
which is established awake and which may or may not be dreamt of. 
 “We should note that the properties of structure and demarcation are 
interrelated” (Lotman 1977: 53). As distinct semiotic spaces, the boundary between 
dream and reality is – at least today – clearly demarcated. This is quite obvious even 
phylogenetically in that dream binds us with another reality; the reality of asleep and 
the reality of awake that are opposed in our consciousness one way or the other. 
Besides this, dream – like text – opposes “signs not entering into its composition, in 
                                                
21 “Communication may be considered, from a certain point of view, as the transmission of knowledge 
from one domain of enunciation to  the other. Such a transfer of knowledge (about which little can be 
said, except that it may be intuitively compared to the concept of signification) first presents itself as a 
transitive structure: it is always knowledge about something, it is inconceivable without the object of 
knowledge.” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 167–168) 
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accord with the principle of inclusion–exclusion” (Lotman 1977: 52). That is to say, 
the potentially generated thematically oriented (figurative) trajectories afforded by the 
nucleus oppose, at the level of manifestation, all contradictory figurative units. 
 On the other hand, text also “resists all structures not marked by a boundary” 
(Ibid. 52), meaning that the figurative units must by default arise from somewhere 
else than the dream itself, from the subject’s knowledge, from the nucleus; the 
(a)syntactic organization of imagery being in accordance with the NP’s hypotactic 
relation(s) – “the hierarchical relation linking two terms situated at two different 
stages of derivation” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 145). By distancing from the nucleus, 
the majority of imagery in the final reading of a dream most often does not 
(iconically, experientially) correspond solely to the initial starting point for then it 
would be only one term on the square; nor does it (always) correspond to reality for 
that matter albeit it affords the same meaning effect ‘reality’. – a synopsis is required 
 As text, the dream does not accommodate structures from within its 
unpredestined ‘self,’ from its trajectory that is syntagmatically (re-)organized upon 
awakening. As a dynamic symbol – ‘thing’ – a remembered dream can not directly 
relate with the concrete contents (or structure) of consciousness; whereas as a ‘non-
thing’ it ‘concretely and appropriately relates with something defined in the contents 
of consciousness’ (from or by which it supposedly came) – or, backtracking from the 
final, single reading of dream, it ultimately relates to the nucleus as defined in 
consciousness. Which is an analogous structural position as that of symbol’s in the 
cultural system. Moreover, with regard to the ‘something defined’ in consciousness, 
dream (and symbol) as “a text possesses an indivisible textual meaning, and in this 
respect can be viewed as an integral signal unit” (Lotman 1977: 52). That is, as far as 
the figurative units are not in contradiction with the nucleus (or any of its isotopes) on 
the level of their manifestation, they need not be in a relation of (iconic) 
correspondence with regards to the secondary content as defined in the contents of 
consciousness. 
 A text’s boundaries are irregularly distributed over different semiotic levels or 
across different points in the semiosphere and the same applies to dreams which have 
the meaning effect “reality” although the Traumwelt consists of imagery drawn from 
the ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ by way of transference of significant features with regard to the 
nucleus. It is their irregularity that necessitates typologies of texts in order to decipher 
the content (of text) in an adequate fashion.  
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 As has been postulated, “I” can hardly be considered to be a structure, fact or 
content of consciousness in dream – “I” is not a distinguishable sign in a space 
consisting only of signs within the subject (‘I’) itself. By the same token, the primary 
‘supplementary code’ that alters the contextual situation boils down to the resurgence 
of “I” as a structured fact of consciousness, as an active sign to which the world is 
sieved. It is then first and foremost the “I” of dream that is transformed into the “I” of 
awake, the former’s experiences still echoing in the latter and this echo has the effect 
to restructure. 
 
3.3. Dream restructuring “I” 
Provided that the syntagmatic principles applied to the remembered dream that is 
slowly vanishing are taken as asemantic (though ‘all categories including syntactic 
structures are semantic in nature’) they can be treated as external codes, the effect(s) 
of which is to restructure the message, i.e. dream as text. “However, for the system to 
work there has to be a confrontation and interaction between two different principles: 
a message in some semantic language and the intrusion of a purely syntagmatic, 
supplementary code” (Lotman 1990: 25). 
 The nucleus of our dream as a semio-narrative structure on the fundamental 
semantic level whence the generative trajectory originated is wholly indifferent on 
what comes to its form of manifestation and yet, provides us with a message in some 
semantic language, the dream-text; the final reading of which depends wholly on the 
subject. It is by way of the syntagmatic code introduced upon the initial structure that 
the nucleus becomes narratable to others and one’s self, even if the falling would have 
been vertical, it still felt like rapid, horizontal movement. In general, taking the class 
of dreams of falling, it can not be said that the nucleus would somehow automatically 
acquire the position of dominance in all such dreams remembered. Granted, it most 
always would play an essential part but for a given subject, other aspects of the dream 
may play a more prominent role depending on the figurativization. 
 A dream is a purely semantic language, it consisting solely of signs in their 
pure form. Upon the recollection that revolves around the nucleus a “purely formal 
organization” (Ibid. 28) is introduced as a supplementary code that is a syntagmatic 
construction thus shifting the onomastic sub-components of the ‘original’ dream 
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along with the anchoring effect (meaning ‘reality’?) Provided that ‘falling’ and its 
usual repercussions – injury, death – is a fact of consciousness or more specifically, it 
is an object of knowledge in the cognitive dimension that has its internal referent 
derived from the pragmatic dimension, then the puzzlement called out by this absence 
of injury or death upon falling may be treated as another primary factor introducing 
new, formal organization onto the recollected dream. 
 But this confusion disappears swiftly due to the pressing of awake/active 
consciousness that acknowledges being in another dimension. Similarly, the parcels 
of dreams that do not disappear instantaneously but remain lodged into memory, 
become dislodged from the original dream-narrative. Or rather, they or some parts 
hold their ground in memory whereas the other parts vanish which alters the 
wholeness of the dream synopsis. This newly introduced construction caused partially 
by the incompatibility of the internal referent ‘falling’ in the pragmatic dimension and 
the (awake) cognitive dimension was “either totally without semantic value or tending 
to be without it” (Ibid. 29). The effect itself of surprise means nothing. This ‘reality 
shift’, albeit unvolitional and taken as a given, may be seen as cognitive doing, which 
“corresponds to a transformation which modifies the relation of a subject with the 
known object” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 33) calling forth a change in the subject’s 
cognitive state by introducing “a break, [that] is the locus of transformation” (Ibid. 
311). 
 By cognitive doing, the onomastic components and semic figures of the dream 
are shifted (by way of isotopic connectors) in accordance with awake “reality,” and 
the junction22 between subject (dreamer) and object (dream) is modified along with 
the positioning of (historical) anchoring in/from memory. By the relational ambiguity 
between the internal referent in the pragmatic dimension with regard to the cognitive 
dimension, the reproduction of ‘that which is real’ in and from the dream acquires 
either a different external referent – a simulacrum formed by historical anchoring – or 
it refers to it in a different fashion. That is, the meaning effect “reality” created in the 
dream by the referential illusion that transformed the semiotic (semio-narrative?) 
figures into images of the world via historical anchoring is shifted in accordance with 
the (cognitive dissonance of the?) newly introduced external code (ultimately ‘I’) to 
correspond to something in “reality.” Or, ‘falling’ in the pragmatic dimension as 
                                                
22 “Junction is defined as that relation which joins the subject with object. It is the constitutive function 
of utterances of state” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 166). 
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internal referent  with regard to the cognitive dimension is distorted/expanded by the 
former’s intrusion to the latter; the semiotic’s pulsation to the symbolic. 
 The new syntagmatic construction creates a certain tension between the 
original dream and the secondary code: “the effect of this tension is the tendency to 
interpret the semantic elements of the text as if they were included in the 
supplementary syntagmatic construction and have thereby acquired new, relationary 
meanings from this interaction” (Lotman 1990: 28). That is, the nucleus’ elementary 
signification seems somehow derived from the order of things in reality, now based 
on the outside world, or pragmatic dimension in the strict sense. Hence the necessity 
to interpret dreams. They are ‘as if’ real due to the Traumwelt and everything therein 
being analogous to real space so the two must be interconnected somehow – for 
example symbolically – and if they are, then whatever was experienced in a dream, 
must have its counterpart in reality one way or the other. 
 Provided that the separate semiotic existence of the two spaces is recognized 
and a dream re-syntagmatized, this “secondary code aims to liberate the primary 
signifying elements from their normal semantic values” (Ibid. 28). This, however, 
does not happen. The secondary code of “reality,” though having reassured that no 
actual falling took place is unable to efface the primary signifying elements from 
memory. Moreover, the elements were originally generated from the nucleus (or one 
of the isotopes) and manifested as the final reading, the ‘normal semantic values’ of 
which were by necessity in accordance with the generative/narrative trajectory. 
Ultimately, the ‘normal semantic values’ as such were normal only in the Traumwelt 
(except for the nucleus as constituted in the (experiential) pragmatic dimension) and 
so, to erase or lose a memory is one thing and can be done by the human intellect in 
several ways but the root, the semio-narrative structure whence it arose is 
ineradicable. 
 By way of (re-)narratization, the “growth of the syntagmatic connections 
within the message stifles the primary semantic connections and, at a certain level of 
perception, the text may behave like a complex a-semantic message” (Ibid. 28). The 
syntagmatic growth creates firstly confusion – the abstract category of vertical 
movement figurativized already as a dream becomes a re-interpretation of an 
interpretation which in its turn is again translated back to language. “The translation 
of the dream into the languages of human communication is accompanied by a 
decrease in the level of uncertainty and by an increase in the level of 
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communicability” (Lotman 2009: 145). It may seem that the dream-narrative makes 
no sense whatsoever and by this the primary semantic connections generated from the 
nucleus and presented in the dream become stifled and insignificant; in a word, 
become a-semantic and disappear – melt away. All dreams are memories – nothing 
more, nothing less. That is the issue; when dreaming, it’s a real world you’re in. And 
suddenly it vanishes without you actually knowing or rather, noticing. 
 What is left of the dream in memory must (should) be somewhat deeply 
connected with the nucleus, regardless whether the dreamt images (semic figures) 
correspond to it or not. That is to say, even if all semic figures corresponding to 
falling were to become a-semantic and forgotten, the semio-narrative structure, the 
nucleus, remains invariable. Thus it may be proposed that the nuclei remain/are 
deposited in memory as (objects of) knowledge, quite regardless whether they are 
acknowledged or not. In other words, the symbol’s secondary content remains beyond 
reach and comprehension lest it be subjected to a sign system and de-symbolized. 
 Indeed, besides language they can not be formulated elsewhere than in a 
dream and in this sense they, as structures as for example on the semiotic square 
above, may be said to be rigid to the utmost; they also serve as the bases for the 
elementary structure of signification(s). In this sense, as semio-narrative structures 
projected onto the semiotic square, they are formal structures (the four isotopes can be 
said to be syntagmatically organized to the highest degree) and yet lack a uniform 
meaning. “But a-semantic texts, with a high degree of syntagmatic organization, tend 
to become organizers of our associations” (Lotman 1990: 28). 
 As was noted, meaning effect is the only reality that can be grasped but not 
directly apprehended and as has been pointed out, remembered dreams are practically 
invariably endowed with supplementary syntagmatic construction – if in no other 
sense, then in the sense that a dream is never remembered in its totality as it happened 
(like everything else, save for eidetic memory). The recognition of two distinct 
analogous spaces brings about a reciprocal effect upon the organization as perceived 
by consciousness in both spaces, shifting the impression of “reality” as it is produced 
by our senses when confronted with meaning by way of dynamic onomastics between 
dreams and the real. “The more the syntagmatic organization is stressed, the freer and 
more associative will be our semantic connections” (Ibid. 28). That is, the more notice 
is payed to dreams, the elements that constitute “reality” become freer and more 
associative. 
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4. DREAM AND SYMBOL IN THE CULTURAL SYSTEM 
 
The fourth part concentrates on the proposition of the isomorphic and isofunctional 
relation of the cultural system and the individual genetic memory and their relation as 
constituted by and in their respective symbols. The cultural system is shaped by the 
structure of symbols in a given culture and consequently, the genetic memory of an 
individual should also be susceptible to change according to the structure (and 
organizing principles) of its symbols. Dreams, fairly irrespective of their 
manifestations, along with dreaming itself serve an essential function in the 
development and maturation of the brain in all mammals. It is especially for the 
human being that dreams are of utmost importance by effecting memory and by the 
same token identity; the elementary semiotic mechanism of which is describable in 
theory. 
 Whether dreams propagated consciousness and language is one thing but their 
function serving as structural positions by way of primordial symbols (of 
consciousness and culture) that can be collocated with the concept of nucleus seems 
undeniable. As was mentioned, we spend our time in REM sleep even before we are 
born; more so than other mammals with comparable brains. This is again another 
reason to look by the psychoanalytic tradition for it may be argued that before being 
born, there is no psyche to analyze nor is there one in culture; also, as has been 
pointed out, the nuances in recounted dreams depend heavily on the subject’s 
linguistic competence and the models to which these tales are then subjected to. 
 As is well-known, the cerebral cortex supposedly plays an important role in 
consciousness and is also responsible for our ‘higher’ cognitive actions – imagination, 
language etc. Accordingly, it may be inferred that what goes on in one’s mind (rather, 
consciousness) especially in the back of one’s head, in the posterior hot zone of 
dreaming, can have effect on the physical nuances of the cerebral cortex (and the 
brain in general) by way of neuronal growth and synaptic plasticity that in their turn 
effect learning and unlearning or memory where the structure of consciousness “I” is 
in constant yet subtle turmoil. The outcomes manifest in personalities, identities and 
behaviour, how each individual subject constituted in their respective chorae 
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comprehends things (slightly) differently from others. For argument’s sake, dreams, 
translations therein and their recollections may be proposed to have accelerated 
different aspects of consciousness which is physically reflected by the complexity of 
our cerebral cortex in comparison to other mammals’. 
 A sidenote in passing may be made with regard to the structure and common 
core of the vertebrate brain. Ours, consisting of two hemispheres upon both of which 
there is a pair on the other side (at present, nothing will be said of the processes 
happening therein) in a similar manner with all vertebrae; except for the pineal gland 
which is the only azygous, i.e. unpaired or singular organ in the brain. Though there is 
“a high degree of morphological variability in mammalian pineal organs, both across 
and within species” (Macchi, Bruce 2004: 178), practically all vertebrae brains harbor 
the pineal gland and one of its main functions is to produce melatonin and by that 
regulate sleep patterns. In pseudo-science, it is also referred to as ‘the third eye’ and 
due to its singularity and central location in the human brain along with its extensive 
vascularization gave way to “the foundation of René Descartes’ conceptualization of 
the pineal as the ‘seat of the soul,’ or as the organ coordinating psychophysiological 
functions” (Ibid.). That is, besides the utter complexity and sophistication of our 
brain, our sleep nevertheless shares a common root with others. Also, the pineal gland 
may become calcified resulting in ‘brain sand’ (cf. Baconnier et al. 2002). 
 Regardless, this is not to say that homo sapiens sapiens would be a figment of 
imagination, at least on what comes to its flesh, but as is obvious, we live in a world 
regulated by non-existence, by the socio-symbolic which can hardly be said to be 
graspable as pointed out also in the psychoanalytic tradition’s impenetrability through 
the symbolic order into the real. We do not contend ourselves to anything but only 
point towards the intuition that dreams – phylogenetically preceding language as the 
primordial unacknowledged modelling system in want of prominent thirdness striving 
to attach the one to the other as a third – due to their nature and function as well as 
their structure of primary expression/content serving as secondary expression for a 
more highly valued content would be a key element, a doorstep even to explicate “the 
hidden power, concealed in the mysterious depths, which controls man” (Lotman 
2009: 146). 
 As has been noted, dream becomes acknowledged only upon awakening when 
we regain meta-awareness. It is in this sense that the isomorphism and 
isofunctionality becomes evident between dream as symbol of consciousness and 
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symbol in the cultural system; both of which (as (finalized) texts) during their process 
of creation, that is a suggestive mnemonic mechanism, are “perceived by the reader as 
a reminiscence, since the processes of creating and of perceiving move in opposite 
directions: to the creative process the final text is a summation, to the perceiving 
process it is a point of departure” (Lotman 1990: 105–106). 
 Text fulfills a twofold function in culture, it conveys and generates meaning, 
information. In order to convey or transmit information as unchanged as possible 
from one semiotic entity to another, the text needs to be as univocal as possible and 
coded in such a language that it coincides between addresser and addressee. Dream is 
not included in a syntagmatic chain in the strict sense, there is no continuance; due to 
the lack of meta-awareness and by extension absence of anthroposemiotic sign-ness 
proper, there is no strict organization in dream before it is recalled; i.e. it is asyntactic 
and does not ‘belong’ anywhere much like consciousness and even when recalled, 
dreams preserve (or acquire) their independent structure and meaning to the extent 
that affecting them can be avoided by the awake mentation. Though a distortion of 
reality based upon knowledge from reality, dream is, in a sense, completely univocal 
(addresser is addressee despite that dream cannot be said to be auto- or any 
communication) and when viewed as de-symbolized symbolic representations of 
something (else), dreams are absolutely non-arbitrary in relation to their content in 
that they originate from the secondary content of symbol(s), or the nucleus (or in 
psychoanalysis, the navel). Note that this does not necessitate that the content of a 
dream represented symbolically would have a presupposed relation to its 
manifestation. 
 Whereas the latter function of text as generating new information is better off 
when the code is not (completely) shared but requires some amount of translation 
resulting from the distortion of the text’s content. As was mentioned, the ‘real’ and 
‘unreal’ of Traumwelt comes from the dislocating of the inner relations of knowledge 
as a whole giving rise to semantic polyvalence of dream-imagery – the semiotic in its 
relating to the symbolic posing contradiction therein is granted a wider scope thus 
generating imagery anew – a reciprocal relation with the ‘real’ for that – it is 
functionally analogous with “one of the essential methods [of text] for forming new 
meanings [...] transferring a feature to another text” (Lotman 1977: 52). A text 
fulfilling the function (or having it as dominant characteristic) of generating meaning, 
should be internally heterogeneous and should exist in a continuum of heterogeneous 
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semiotic spaces enabling the interaction between the structures of both the text itself 
and the semiotic space surrounding it. 
 By virtue of its predominantly asyntactic nature, the semiotic space of dream 
is heterogeneous and provided that the recurrence of ‘sleep-awake’ can be viewed as 
two discrete spaces forming a continuum (of (a) life), it becomes inevitable that their 
respective structures are bound to interact – on the level of language at least. It is hard 
to imagine someone having a dream without any knowledge and it is as hard to 
imagine someone to not have the faintest recollection of a dream or of ever having 
dreamt; though the latter is, of course, more likely. The Traumwelt is internally 
heterogeneous (if not chaotic) by structure and organization whereas a recalled dream, 
as was mentioned, behaves in a similar manner as symbol, as a finalized text. 
Depending on the classificatory feature(s) “distinguishing text from nontext, it should 
be remembered that these concepts may be reversible as far as the limit in each given 
case is concerned” (Lotman 1977: 235). 
 Broadly speaking, whether (or to what extent) one (person, community or 
culture) regards the world as text/non-text or the dream as text/non-text is derived on 
the basis of their respective functions in a given world-view, “the mutual relationship 
among the system, its realization, and the addresser-addressee of the text” (Ibid. 233). 
Taking dream as a text on what has been presented, a noteworthy sidenote from the 
point-of-view of expression is in order; from the point of view of expression, a text 
always consists of sign(s) and “expression, in contrast to non-expression, forces us to 
view a text as the realization of a system, as its material embodiment” (Lotman 1977: 
52). That is, dream as radix of afflatus – a source of inspiration on what to make of 
the world. 
 
4.1. Dream from Antiquity – in place of secondary revision 
Albeit today the question of addresser/addressee with regards to dream is largely 
unquestioned [sic], in ancient times, “in more developed mythological structures, the 
dream is identified with the alien’s prophetic voice, i.e., represents the turning of 
her/him to me” (Lotman 2009: 143). Here is offered a short case study as an example 
that the symbolologic model-in-the-making as presented in this thesis is indeed 
applicable on what comes to dreams and their effect on subjects, at least in retrospect. 
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Alas, the thematic of this dream is not in accordance with the nucleus ‘falling’ as has 
been presented here but it should not matter, for the dream in question serves as a 
prime example to tie it all together due to its effect on the dreamer and his effect on 
culture. 
 Quintus Ennius (239 B.C. – 169 B.C.) was one of the more renowned poets of 
his time in Rome, where he was brought to as a slave by Marcus Porcius Cato around 
204 B.C.; he lived a humble life teaching and writing and was very much liked by 
several influential senior citizens of Rome such as Scipio Africanus, Scipio Nasica 
and Marcus Fulvius Nobilor; of whom the last Ennius accompanied on a war 
campaign to Aetolia and later eulogized him as conqueror of Ambracia in the 
praetexta Ambracial. With the aid of his supporters, Ennius acclaimed the rights of 
Roman citizenship. 
 His most renowned work are the Annales or, ‘Yearly books’ which deal with 
the history of Rome presented in hexameter. Ennius replaced the Roman saturnian 
verse with the (Greek) hexameter, which required great mastering of the Latin verse-
structure and subsequently, by his superb use of Homeric formulaics and epithets, the 
created Latin hexameter became the official verse to be used in the Roman epic. 
 The Annales begins with a description of a dream in which Homer appears to 
Ennius – a brief synopsis: Ennius, having been taken to the Hill of Muses is 
confronted by Homer, who speaks of pythagorean metempsychosis alongside a tale of 
the fate of his own soul, which now rested itself in Ennius’ body. 
 Whether the introduction is to be seen as poetic fable orienting the reader 
towards what is to come or as a factual description of Ennius’ dream is a question of 
choice – either way, as one of the more widespread fragments of what’s left of the 
Annals it is better known than the work itself, which also had quite the impact on 
literature. Here, this occurrence will be associatively overviewed in a cursory manner 
under the terminology and framework provided above. 
 Allowing that there exist an idea, a notion of quality of superb authorship as 
such – the smallest (or largest) common denominator shared among all authors which 
can be said to be distributed unevenly among them and this is reflected in Ennius’ 
appreciation of their work. The intrinsic meaning of whatever notion of quality 
according to which Ennius defined good or bad authorship is known to him as a 
relation of ‘SOMETHING’S QUALITY OF BEING A SIGN OF SOMETHING FOR SOMEONE 
IN SOME PLACE’. 
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 Excluding the necessity of syntax, or the ‘putting-into-words’ of this attribute 
by way of the given definition of sign and provided that this whatever notion of 
superb authorship (henceforth marked by (X)) was (an object of) knowledge 
acknowledged by Ennius; (X), then (as dreamt of by Ennius), it can be said to be a 
symbol or a finalized text and as such does not have to be included in a syntagmatic 
chain, and if it is included in one, it preserves its own semantic and structural 
independence in the sense that the stable meaning of (X) is quite indifferent on what 
comes to its expressions. 
 It has a single, self-contained meaning value and a clearly demarcated 
boundary which makes it possible to isolate it from the surrounding semiotic context 
in the sense that where the (X) of authorship is not under consideration, the necessity 
and intensity of its invariable meaning which ultimately relates to consciousness 
lessens or disappears wholly. Homer, as the epicentre of excellence in authorship, 
both historically and supposedly personally adored by Ennius as well was, as such, a 
significant thing with respect to consciousness that exists in relation to me as to a 
psychical mechanism in quite an autonomous way and thus can be said to possess 
both significance as an especial thing and meaning in its reference to consciousness. 
 To specify, the (secondary) meaning of (X) is and remains unable to relate to 
consciousness or its contents (or structure) directly, but as a concrete thing, i.e. the 
sign-ness of the knowledge of (the works of) Homer as symbol enables it to relate to 
consciousness. A content – Homer’s authorship (I ignore here how it was grasped by 
Ennius on the primary expression level) which in its turn serves as expression level 
for another content – the (X) of authorship which concretely and appropriately relates 
with something defined in the contents of consciousness – the desired criterion with 
regard to authorship for Ennius as it came to him in a dream in the form of Homer. 
We here point out the structure of the main aspects of Ennius’ dream consisting of 
Homer as primary expression; Hill of Muses (Homer’s legacy sensu lato) as primary 
content/secondary expression as the (X) of authorship for Ennius. The last is that 
which, by being a symbol’s meaning proper, relates to the (X’) defined in the contents 
of consciousness and it is also that which ultimately propagates the threefold function 
of said symbol. 
 Including the short dream-narrative’s eventuations, it can be said that it 
represented something individual (referential function) as embodied by Homer 
(primary expression/content), expressing the idea of (X) of authorship as represented 
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by the Hill of Muses (secondary expression/content); the tale of Homer’s 
metempsychosis in the dream as symbol communicated a role, an attitude and an 
addition to the personal identity of Ennius (existential function), evoking appropriate 
attitudes and behavior in him (dispositional function), that became consolidated as a 
type of thinking by way of restructuring the “I” when he awoke (and indeed, became 
realized as the measure-of-verse in the future of Roman epic).  
 The last, dispositional or metasymbolic function, can intuitively be said to 
have ‘come-to’ or have effect only in the awake mind of Ennius. Acting as 
commentary on the other two as the organization of symbolic objects in a context, i.e. 
defining the parameters of understanding the dream, upon awake it defined and 
positioned for Ennius the symbolic themes, relations and values of the dream, giving 
prominence to some as the metempsychosis of Homer to Ennius shows and evoking 
associations and contrast among all. It was surely a pleasurable albeit not an easy task 
to accept that thou art Homer. 
 This is possibly what or how it was for Ennius Quintus as experienced 
subjectively; his dream in total was – as all recalled dreams – a text and in addition, 
unlike the layman’s dreams usually, was weaved into a textual form and propagated 
the generation of not just new information with regards to Ennius’ personality but also 
a new language were we to take the otherwise nigh inexplicable shift in Roman 
literature from the saturnian verse to hexameter as language in the wide sense of the 
word. Generalizing, it can be said that Ennius’ dream as text was a hypertext for 
Ennius subjectively – dream is in a sense, the generation of random associations of 
knowledge – whereas on the level of (Roman) culture as a whole, it was and served as 
the basis of intertextuality by virtue of motivating Ennius to apply hexameter in Latin, 
a strategic and intentional means of association as intended by the author. 
 Ennius’ dream is a text in both senses of the word and as a finalized text 
originating from the knowledge of Ennius in accordance with what has been 
suggested, it possesses an indivisible textual meaning – the (X) of authorship 
manifested as a dream – which, at least in retrospect, had definite internal features not 
deducible from anything else apart from itself due to its subjectivity; and as intertext 
functioning on the level of culture, it is reducible only if at all to the one-person-
language or dream of Ennius. Whether a true account or made-up fable, as a text the 
dream was doubly coded and as such, clearly demarcated – as a dream it is not a part 
of the historical account of the Annales and as a (made-up) text, it is not part of dream 
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irrespective of whether it is viewed in accordance with the aspect of truthfulness of 
text. Whether either or, the introduction to the Annales presents itself as text to the 
reader being in opposition to signs not entering into its composition, in accord with 
the principle of inclusion–exclusion. 
 By resisting all structures not marked by a boundary, the dream-fable acquires 
its meaning, its authority to be voiced and leave a mark in history from beyond; it was 
Homer himself who delegated the authority (of himself) to Ennius to apply the Greek 
verse as means of expression and their syntagmatics to the Latin language. Provided 
that dream and reality can be said to be two different semiotic spaces or semiospheres 
in both of which the boundaries of (X) as represented symbolically by Homer are 
irregularly distributed upon different points, it may be noted that the authority of (X) 
as Homer as presented by Ennius in the introduction is an outcome of transferring a 
feature to another text thus motivating and propagating the use of hexameter. 
 In spite of all this, what is presented in the introduction by Ennius – regardless 
whether as a dream or a text – it has an innate quality of truthfulness in the full sense 
of the word; the work as a whole reversed the positioning of the concepts ‘text’/’non-
text’ and  transformed (or regressed) Latin verse as a whole by creating a new text 
point-of-view in the metric sense, a position from which the truth is known and from 
which falsehood is impossible, thus legitimizing the use of hexameter and by the 
same token contributing to its truthfulness on the level of culture by opposing itself to 
non-text, written in saturnian verse. 
 Other similar incidents are abound also in more recent history, one of the most 
notable ones being the case of Dmitri Mendeleev, to whom the solution on how to 
finalize the periodic table of elements came in a dream (cf. Kedrov 1967) or the case 
of Otto Loewi, to whom the correct form of a hypothesis with regard to chemical 
transmission of nerve impulses – which landed him the Nobel prize for medicine in 
1936 – came in a dream, though with an incubation period of seventeen years 
(Valenstein 2005: 57–58). Unfortunately, due to inaccessibility to proper literature at 
present, other similar occasions with regard to science, history, religion, literature and 
music cannot be pointed to. 
 Regardless, it stands that the recollection of a dream-text – structurally 
analogous to symbol – has usually at best only its primary content distorted upon 
translation from a subjective point-of-view and thus can be said to be the generator of 
information whereas the secondary content may remain unknown or latent (hard to 
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say whether it is obtainable in cases). From this, it follows that irrespective of 
differing imagery, the Traum-an-sich may still be the same, indivisible meaning 
striving towards unification of different levels into a single, comprehensible whole 
able to relate with something defined in the contents of consciousness and as a 
mechanism, the above echoes the two mutually opposed mechanisms of culture: 
 
 (a) The tendency toward diversity – toward an increase in differently 
 organized semiotic languages, the “polyglotism” of culture. 
 (b) The tendency toward uniformity – the attempt to interpret itself or other 
 cultures as uniform, rigidly organized languages. 
 (Lotman et al. 1973: 76) 
 
4.2. Chora for Culture 
As has been mentioned, asleep and dreaming, whilst consciousness is passive, the 
rigid organization of an individual’s knowledge i.e. memory become freer which 
gives rise to semantic polyvalence of (potential) imagery therein; so much so that 
even the “I” is no longer a rigid structure or, the “I” of Traumwelt acquires different 
existential relations with regard to its surroundings that it itself is or generates; 
simultaneously being deprived of meta-awareness. Regardless whether we take 
dreams to be signs – symbolic or any other – and not specifying the way they have 
come about, their general structure nevertheless adheres to the general structure of 
symbol in the cultural system in that both have a primary expression and content; the 
latter of which serves as secondary expression to something inexpressible by any 
means, the symbol as such. 
 As in our example of ‘falling’ above, the feeling of falling is of proprioceptive 
origin and as such falls under the semiotic by way of chora instead of the symbolic 
and due to its origin, is non-expressive in the same manner as a state of consciousness 
that would facilitate the abstraction of the structure ‘falling’ within it. It remains true 
(?) however, that dreams – especially remembered ones – are indeed symbolic by 
their representation, sometimes overwhelmingly so, but the central idea here is 
exactly that the passivity of consciousness loosens the organization and structure of 
memory, and simultaneously grants the semiotic more leeway with regard to the (re-) 
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organizing of the semantically polyvalent potential that in its turn accelerates the 
symbolic aspect of dream imagery in the signifying process thereby shaping the 
dreamer’s subjectivity and experience. 
 Considering that there are two modes of signification operating in each 
signifying process; one “an expression of clear and orderly meaning” and the other 
“an evocation of feeling […] a discharge of the subject’s energy and drives” (McAfee 
2000: 16) or, the symbolic and semiotic respectively, then it may be argued that the 
dimensions of awake (A) and dream (Z) as explicated above may be likened to these 
two modes by way of analogy with our primary modelling system – natural language. 
That is, in a similar manner as in average everyday (verbal) language use, we are 
happily unaware of any grammar or rules (lest they be broken), unaware of the 
specificities of langue during parole if one pleases and yet both are present. Provided 
we dream, irrespective whether dreams are remembered or not, and that conscious 
language use is not the sole thing present in the consciousness of the speaker, it may 
be allowed in accordance with “the fact, observed by linguists, that the conscious and 
unconscious factors form a constant bond in verbal experience” (Jakobson 1985: 160) 
– knowledge as a whole, i.e. memory in addition to talk – that any given 
representamen abide to and “are organised in patterned sets so as to incorporate coded 
information in a manner analogous to the sounds and words and sentences of a natural 
language” (Leach 1989: 10). In psychoanalysis, this constant bond would be a part 
forming the gap i.e. unconscious manifesting as vacillation – lapsus and the like. 
 Tautological to an extent but the point remains; in a similar manner as dreams 
may be subjected to structural analysis only to reveal similarities with mythological 
texts which in their turn are narrative manifestations of de-symbolized symbols of 
consciousness. As such manifestations, myths may be likened to the primary 
expression and content although as is obvious, they cannot be said to be symbols for 
they are myths; specific sign-systems that distort and narrate the symbol. Therefore, 
as knowledge has it, humans have (had) the tendency to create fetishes of all sorts on 
the basis of myths (ultimately, on the basis of symbols) by way of 
metaphoric/metonymic ritual condensation, “the material representation of abstract 
ideas through the symbolisation of metaphysical entities that started out as inchoate 
concepts in the mind” (Ibid. 37). 
 It may be noted in passing with regard to ritual condensation and the constant 
bond between conscious and unconscious in verbal experience that a (linguistic) 
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metaphor does not state a direct comparison but uses a different word or expression to 
denote another term on the same paradigm by way of substitution whereas metonymy 
is “the use of a term for one thing applied to something else with which it is usually 
associated” (Homer 2005: 43). That is, metaphor – whether linguistic or any other – is 
an act of substitution corresponding to the paradigmatic axis whereas metonymy, also 
regardless of the sign system in question, is a relation of contiguity that corresponds 
to the syntagmatic axis. In psychoanalysis, these correspond to the formation(s) of 
dreams as condensation – “the process whereby two or more signs or images in a 
dream are combined to form a composite image that is then invested with the meaning 
of both its constitutive elements” (Ibid.) – and displacement as “the process through 
which meaning is transferred from one sign to another” (Ibid.). This is just to show, 
once again, the analogous nature of the human intellect and culture. 
 Thus we have a somewhat clear picture of the similarities between the two, the 
structure of their (respective) symbols, their signifying processes and the semiotic and 
symbolic aspects in each. What is lacking, however, is culture’s analogue for the 
semiotic chora. Granted, as has been mentioned, culture does not feel nor does it 
succumb to the ways that the chora is formed. Hence the overlooking of 
psychoanalysis as such, culture does not have a psyche to analyse. What may be done 
however, is to bring about the notion of cultural models: “the descriptions of cultural 
texts which are constructed with the help of methods of spatial modeling, and in 
particular, topological ones” (Lotman 1975: 103). That is, the descriptions of cultural 
texts that are constructed according to the evaluative (spatial, structural, organisatory, 
linguistic, etc.) semantics as defined in the cultural model, the structure and 
organization of which depends on the universal space based on abstract (topological) 
categories orientating the culture in its evolution. 
 In very general terms, each culture has its definition of the universal space that 
it ‘occupies’ in accordance with types of fragmentation of said universal space, its 
dimension(s) and by the same token, orientation therein. These as well as the cultural 
model are constructed on the basis of cultural texts. The cultural text by default 
possesses an “elevated degree of textual significance [which] is interpreted as a 
guarantee of truth” (Lotman, Piatigorsky 1978: 237) regardless whether one is 
discussing paradigmatic or syntagmatic expressions, or semantic or syntactic (types 
of) cultures. Depending on the classificatory feature(s) “distinguishing text from 
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nontext, it should be remembered that these concepts may be reversible as far as the 
limit in each given case is concerned” (Ibid. 235). 
 To answer questions like ‘How is it constructed?’ with regard to world-order 
(natural, social, religious, ethical, etc.) or ‘What happened and how?’ set forth (?) by a 
community or culture, the cultural text is divided into two types of sub-texts: “Those 
characterizing the structure of the world […] Those characterizing the place, 
disposition and activity of man in the surrounding world” (Lotman 1975: 102). In the 
light of analogy with regard to the human chora, our emphasis lie with the former 
because of its immobility and discreteness of space, and its enantiomorphic potential. 
The sub-texts of this type, “if they reproduce a dynamic view of the world, then this is 
an immanent change according to the system: universal set A is transformed into 
universal set B” (Ibid. 102). 
 With regard to rituals as sign systems that have de-symbolized this or that 
symbol by reducing an elementary space-indicator into an axis mundi by way of 
enantiomorphic transformation, i.e. “that” world into “this” world – provided it 
“reproduces a scheme of the structure of the world” (Lotman 1975: 102) – allows us 
to axiologically deduce that accordingly, the gods and others beyond behave in the 
same manner as we because the decree for our way-of-life was handed down to us 
from them; this as well as other similar events is then re-enacted in various ways. This 
vertical positioning of peoples-and-gods (manifest in sub-text characterizing the 
place, disposition and activity of man in the world) already contains a hierarchy, a 
given structure of the world (yielding from sub-texts characterizing the structure of 
the world). 
 Allowing that the vertical axis as such (and objects of the natural world 
thereupon) is part of a universal cultural model, the orientation of which (direct, 
inverse, twofold) is derived in accordance to the  point-of-view of a given cultural text 
and that this axis facilitates the level(s) of content acting as the plane of expression in 
relation to other (inner orientations of) models; it alludes to an a priori vertical 
dispositioning of value in a homeomorphic world. Or, a structurally similar position 
with the relations represented as topological spaces facilitating the world and 
generating means for pulsation and rhythm as afforded by the chora in the human 
subject. 
 To emphasize, the cultural text is also based on abstract topological categories 
functioning as the orienting aspect in relation to the culture’s worldview; it’s inner 
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organizing principles serve as the basis for the principal mode of (structure(s) of) 
thinking as expressed in the culture’s language(s) via the investments of semantic 
values onto the axes of spatial categories (among others). This spatial model functions 
as a metalanguage, whereas the spatial structure itself functions as a text. These 
spatial characteristics become the “level of the content of a universal cultural model 
which acts as the plane of expression in relation to others” (Lotman 1975: 101–102). 
Or, in which direction is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ and why; how are they expressed; these 
spatial characteristics are or have the potentiality to be enantiomorphic with regards to 
evaluations due to the heterogeneity and asymmetry of the(ir) semiotic space(s) i.e. 
something ‘bad’ may also exist on the plane of ‘good’, ‘good’ can become ‘bad’ etc. 
 Redundant as it is, the spatial model functions as a metalanguage, (for 
example is up is good) whereas the spatial structure itself (s/he(ro) go underworld 
sky) functions as a text – both manifest in myth, the chronotopic mapping of which 
would give a more general idea of a culture’s values (a more in-depth analysis might 
show other things as well). The cultural model on the other hand defines how the 
universal space of a culture is divided, what and where exists and which directions are 
possible to take – abstract or concrete (which in cases overlap). In other, more general 
words, “a semantic interpretation of a cultural model consists in establishing the 
correspondences of its elements […] to phenomena in the objective world” (Ibid. 
104). 
 On what comes to the cultural type, it is defined by the nature of spatial 
characteristics of the cultural model, the points of correlation (of/in the universal 
space) between what’s Internal and what’s External from the culture’s point-of-view – 
“the position from which the truth is known and from which falsehood is impossible” 
(Lotman, Piatigorsky 1978: 236). The truthfulness of this position yields from its 
textual expression and, being Internal resists what’s External in the same fashion as 
the parallel opposition of ‘text – non-text’ and ‘truth’ – ‘non-truth’, the latter two 
creating a ‘text point-of-view’ by which “in determining the simple correspondence 
between any points of one space and the points of another, we can easily model the 
relations of meaning as spatial relations” (Lotman 1975: 115). 
 What is the level of content, what is the plane of expression for and in the 
culture at hand and how did they come to be such. Though strictly speaking, this 
would fall under the symbolic. By allowing that a culture locates some semantic value 
upon the vertical axis as defined in its cultural text, it may be said that the 
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organizational principles of the semantic values abide to the evaluative structures 
upon the vertical axis among others; in parallel, as has been postulated, there does not 
exist a human being who has never fallen, i.e. there does not exist a chora, the 
semiotic of which would not be affected by the vertical axis. 
 The semantic significance and effect of the vertical axis becomes clear in 
mythological texts as well as in language itself. The all too familiar proverbial fall 
from grace, or paradise lost may serve as an example. Back in the day, according to 
the Old Testament, the first (man) and second (woman) human beings were banished 
from Paradise by the furious Semitic God for they were persuaded to eat the 
forbidden fruit from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil by the infamous 
Serpent; caught wearing leaves, the Almighty sent them away and never to return. 
Though on the level of narrative characterizing the place, disposition and activity, the 
events take place horizontally; on the level characterizing the sudden change in the 
structure of the world, the human being is cast vertically downward (though still atop 
of all beasts and land). An opposite example of such text: storming the Heavens to 
overthrow the Almighty, Lucifer was cast down (hence He is the Lord of this world). 
Similar examples drawing on the semantic value of the vertical axis are found 
practically in every culture’s mythological texts which, by extension and analogy may 
be argued to serve the function of structural position as de-symbolized symbols as 
finalized texts forming the system as dreams of culture. 
 
4.3. Types of Culture and Traditional Thinking passed on 
In the light of cultural typology, some very general assumptions can be made with 
regard to the isomorphism and isofunctionality of the human intellect and culture. As 
has been noted above, both entities possess their respective semiotic chorae; in the 
human it originates and is based on the fragmented body, its motions and rhythms 
whereas in culture it comes about by the definitions of the fragmentation of the 
universal space. In the former, the semiotic regulates the symbolic whereas in the 
latter, the  symbolic of culture is manifest in myths, outcomes of the desperate need to 
locate and define the human’s position in the world. 
 This may be carried further by resorting to cultural typology as presented by 
Lotman (2010) whose typology is as follows: 
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1. I (+) II (-) 2. I (-) II (+) 
 
3. I (-) II (-) 4. I (+) II (+) 
 
 
In which: 
I = Semantic meaning; II = Syntactic meaning. 
 
1. – Cultural code is organised purely according to semantics; 
2. – Cultural code is organised purely according to syntactics; 
3. – Cultural code is the denial of both, and thus the denial of signs in general; 
4. – Cultural code is a synthesis of both organisational forms. 
(Lotman 2010: 39 [my translations]) 
 
“The idea of the world as being an order of real facts which are the expression of the 
spirit’s fervent motion duplicates the meaning endowed upon each event: semantic – 
the connection of physical life-phenomena with their hidden meanings – and, 
syntactic – their connection with the historical whole” (Ibid. 58). With regard to 
human’s position and status in the cosmological order, depending on the culture’s text 
and model, it is often either predominantly syntactic on the basis “that something 
exists, because it is a part of something more important than it is itself” (Ibid. 38) or 
predominantly semantic on the basis that “something exists, because it substitutes 
something more important than it is itself” (Ibid.). Based on the analogous structure 
and function of the human intellect and culture, it may be argued that a similar 
division exists in the subjects’ minds. 
 From the viewpoint of semantic dominance, the “most highly valued sign is 
the one with zero-expression – a non-spoken word” ((Lotman 2010: 45). In the 
semantic type, the meaning of a given sign is created on the basis of hierarchy, one 
and the same expression may be endowed with a different content on different levels. 
“This is why movement towards the truth is not a transition from one sign to the other 
but a deepening into the sign” (Ibid. 46). Whereas the syntactic type discards 
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symbolic meanings which propagates a mentality that sets “for themselves realistic, 
achievable goals and never sacrifices the practical interests for – from their point-of-
view – putative, symbolic interests” (Ibid. 47). 
 There is an intuitive resonance between the types of culture and what has been 
stated above with regard to sign-ness originating from symbols (of consciousness), 
the signifying process along with the semiotic/symbolic divide as well as with the 
chorae of the intellectual objects natural human consciousness and culture as 
collective intellect. In order to propose a way to amplify this resonance for a larger 
auditorium than the present author’s person, it may be suggested that in order to be 
able to show the connection (or the lack of it for that matter), the “three-dimensional 
understanding of what culture is, how it is possible, and why it is inevitable from a 
particular point of thinking” (Zilberman 1988: 305) could perchance be used to bridge 
this gap. 
 The notion that the typology into which a given text belongs to is intuitively 
present as an essential element of the code in the consciousness of both addresser and 
addressee becomes somewhat intriguing raising potential questions of the origin of 
dream in both the human being and by extension, the system of culture. According to 
the type a culture belongs to, this question could be further researched by way of 
“types of traditional thinking, according to the possible combinations in modal 
transitions” (Ibid. 1988: 309). There are three types of modalities which subsume all 
other possible modalities or, “the rest can presumably be reduced to the three 
mentioned” (Ibid. 311). Before explicating these modalities, we will have a short 
overview of the typology of understanding i.e. the way(s) a thing can be thought of, 
grasped and comprehended in various cultural traditions that consists of three levels 
of modal reality: 
 
 A) the level of absolute reality, or the metaphysics of tradition; 
 B) the level of phenomenation, or the phenomenation of tradition i.e. culture; 
 C) the level of absolute irreality, or the non-thinking of tradition i.e. intra-
 cultural absurdity. 
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That is, what there is or can be, how is it manifested and what there is not; or in other 
words, whether a culture is more bent towards semantics or syntactics, their synthesis 
or toward denial of signs in general. The modalities in their turn may be projected 
onto a scheme: 
 
     (A) B   
         C 
In which: 
A = Apodictic or Deontic or Hypothetic; 
B = Apodictic or Deontic or Hypothetic; 
C = Apodictic or Deontic or Hypothetic. 
 
What comes to modal denotation, the apodictic modality denotes “the understanding 
of cultural ideas – since every scheme of discourse […] can be constructed only in 
this modality, so that we are able to make the ‘knowables’ apparent and identifiable 
with specific objects of knowing” (Zilberman 1988: 311) That is, it is the modality in 
which understanding in the last leg ‘takes place’ whereas the deontic modality is 
“reserved for a denotation of the understanding of the cultural norm, since the effect 
of normativeness can be comprehended only under the condition of its obligatory […] 
realization” (Ibid. 310). Lastly, the hypothetic modality denotes “a ‘striving’ for 
understanding cultural values – since only value can be identified through the implied 
[…] aspiration for possessing it” (Ibid.). That is, by applying modal methodology, the 
central premise of which is “that any fixable modal relation may be denoted by 
symbols but that in no case should it be understood as a sign of something” (Ibid. 
307) we arrive at modal semiotics. With regard to the triadic sign, “the very way of 
constructing the triangle implies a dogmatic belief in ‘existent’ or ‘real’ things, 
language and thinking” (Ibid. 313) which become dispensable in modal semiotics; the 
elements of the triadic sign or “significance, signification and meaning may be treated 
as separable” (Ibid.). At present there is no reason for captiousness with regard to 
terms used to denote the elements of sign. 
 Furthermore, from the subjective point of view, since occurrence in the 
apodictic modality “indicates the object as subversive to both action and the subject 
performing it” (Ibid. 313) which presents the real structure of knowledge, it also 
denotes the meaning of action. Also subjectively, the deontic modality “denotes the 
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significance of action completely devoid of any signability” (Ibid. 312) whereas the 
hypothetic modality – due to for example the conventionality of signs that renders the 
signs insignificant by themselves – “subjectively denotes the significations of action” 
(Ibid. 312–313). From the schema above, a sixfold typology of philosophical 
identities, i.e. types of thinking is yielded: the methodological; the conceptual; the 
projective; the phenomenological; the axiomatic, and; the axiological. 
 The line of thought is then carried over to identify six basic types of cultural 
tradition by way of collocating the modalities of thinking with mental behaviours. The 
apodictic modality in which the understanding of cultural ideas and (subjective) 
meaning or knowledge occurs with the notion of interest of mental behaviour; interest 
is “a mental behavioral correlate of ‘discursion’, as its enactment leads to a change of 
the ‘inertial frame of reference’ by inducing presentations of modalities in various 
traditions, in some cognitive sense” (Ibid. 316). 
 The deontic modality in its turn along with the understanding of cultural 
norms and (subjective) significance will have as its correlate the temperament of 
mental behaviour; temperament should be understood via its etymological meaning as 
“something similar to ‘natural composition’, ‘structure’, or ‘pure’ functioning […] 
‘temperation’ precludes any thought of development but allows change, for example, 
in the natural-genetic order” (Ibid.). 
 Lastly, the hypothetic modality striving for understanding of cultural values 
(which, when obtained, is removed, i.e. dissolves) and (subjective) significations 
corresponds to the character of mental behaviour; also approached etymologically by 
way of Greek and Sanskrit, “i.e., ‘scraping, furrowing’, ‘specification’ or 
‘characterization’ and ‘individuation’ (are presumed the qualifying marks of a 
temperament by the manner of its manifestation)” (Ibid.). That is, were we to 
manufacture for example a seal, the process would be “the ‘temperation’ of its 
material as a matrix, while putting signs on things with the former is the 
‘characterization’ of the latter” (Ibid.). 
 These nine denominations may then be presented as a table and projected onto 
the scheme in a similar manner as the modalities above. The denominations: 
 
 I = Idea, Interest, Meaning or Knowledge 
 N = Norm, Temperament, Significance 
 V = Value, Character, Signification 
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From which six basic types of cultural tradition are yielded. Namely: 
Indian-Methodological; Tibetan-Conceptual; Chinese-Projective; Japanese-
Phenomenological; Hellenic-Axiomatic; Western-Axiological. 
 
From hereon, were one to merge the cultural typology as presented by Lotman with 
modal semiotics (which in a sense verges symbolology as presented by Mamardašvili 
and Piatigorski), the present author’s bones feel a premonition of potentiality for 
advancement in the fields of science. The question is then, how to bridge the gap? 
 By collocating the fourway triadic sign as presented above with the semiotic 
and symbolic thus viewing the diagram as signifying process (or semiosis), there 
technically seems to be little obstacles to place the scheme of modalities upon the 
diagram, divided and placed as follows: (A) = object (O), B = interpretant (I) and C = 
dream (Z). This in the sense that in the light of dreams’ mnemonic function 
restructuring the “I” (taken as the non-expressive semiotic) that to an extent defines 
the possible expressions in awake thought (A); then by extension and analogy the 
same should apply to signifying processes in culture as well. In other words, there is 
no reason not to suggest that what the semiotic and symbolic is to the human, the 
syntactic and semantic are their equivalent in culture; this suggestion is afforded by 
the establishment of chora both in the human subject and its analogue in culture, 
based on the parameters of its universal space. 
 That is, the level of absolute reality or the metaphysics of tradition require to 
be objects, either physical or metaphysical, stones or gods; the level of 
phenomenation of tradition or culture is indeed a chain of interpretations as postulated 
above. What comes to the level of absolute irreality or non-thinking of tradition, i.e. 
intra-cultural absurdity, it need not even be argued that dreams are irreal – at least 
physically from the point of view of awake – and as such, the function they serve, 
whether as unobtainable albeit de-symbolized symbols or as semiotic (re-) organizing 
principles of the mnemonic “I”, the function of which in itself is non-expressive 
amounts up to also being non-thinking. Though it can only be said not to exist. Hence 
the necessity of modal semiotics which allows a closer look at thought. 
 Alas, at present this inkling may be said to hint only towards the possibility of 
conjoining the fourfold diagram with types of traditional thinking but, as has been 
shown, culture and your intellect are not that different by structure and function and, 
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in cases, the elements effecting them are the same. Hence, there may be presumed to 
be a way – in theory – to push further this line of thought in theory. Unfortunately, 
due to lack of space and time, the present author must abstain from venturing any 
further and leave the reader – along with the author – dissatisfied. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the introduction, after having postulated the premises of analogy, a short overview 
of the psychoanalytic understanding of (un-, sub-) conscious was given along with 
some main aspects of hitherto work done with regard to dreams in said field. 
However, psychoanalysis was deemed illfit due to its complexity and inner imbalance 
(which may be just subjective views) along with the present author’s insufficient 
knowledge on how to apply it in a scientific manner; its overt dependence on verbal, 
second-hand accounts of dreams and its subject-centerdness distancing it from 
objectivity and potential all-penetrability afforded by the more strictly semiotic 
terminology. In addition, were psychoanalysis taken into more thorough use in this 
thesis, it would have just added to the potential confusion of terminology as is; 
psychoanalysis’ terminology being omnifariously tainted with sexual connotations – 
the present author wishes not to taunt the reader with more awkward words than 
absolutely necessary. Next, an overview of the philosophy of mind and 
phenomenology was provided – both of which were also excluded, partially because 
in the past 2400 years approximately (that is, taking into account only western 
philosophies), the former has not, in a sense, made very much progress  with regard to 
consciousness nor has the latter during its 200-odd years of existence. It may be noted 
again that this thesis did not contend to do so either. 
 Hence, a slightly different approach in the guise of the metatheory of 
consciousness was applied. In the first chapter, an overview of consciousness as such 
and as a symbolic apparatus, its sphere, states and structures was provided. In essence, 
all consciousness – including the psychoanalytic and other conceptions of the sub-, or 
unconscious – exists within the sphere of consciousness which does not harbor a 
spatial nor temporal existence. Irrespective whether consciousness is reserved to be 
viewed as a solely human trait which often happens when confusing it with self-
consciousness or meta-awareness expressable in the natural human language; on what 
comes to the human being, states of consciousness oscillate in their psyches and are 
mainly empty in themselves. State of consciousness remain empty lest a structure of 
consciousness – which either is or may facilitate a content or fact of consciousness 
 102 
that is an agglomerate of form and content – that are as a rule non-individual, is 
abstracted from therein one way or the other. Accordingly, to suit the needs of the 
present thesis, the structure “I” was taken into use. Though both states and structures 
of consciousness can be said to exist independently, they nevertheless are closely knit. 
States of consciousness may become evoked by way of symbols of consciousness that 
have the potential to conjoin the individual psyche with a given structure of 
consciousness abstracted from the state of consciousness. 
 Symbols are sign-like formations existing outside the realm obtainable by way 
of signs. However, symbols may be subjected to this or that sign system in which they 
become distorted and transformed into signs or pseudosymbols. Though 
simultaneously the symbol becomes de-symbolized propelling its way towards a dual 
structure of primary expression/content that serves as secondary expression for a more 
highly valued content in said sign system, for example culture at large, where the 
secondary expression – symbol (of consciousness) proper – serves the function of a 
structural position manifesting itself as finalized text(s) leading a life of its own. A 
coarse oversimplification would be to postulate that all philosophy in the proper sense 
of the word hold the same secondary content that to date remains incomprehensible 
regardless of millennia of effort. 
 This part also contained the explication of the semiotic chora originating from 
the subject’s fragmented body, the space it occupies, its reach and functions and what 
it can withstand also including and affected by what the space (symbolic, social etc.) 
it occupies contains. The chora is not yet a sign nor signifier – it is non-expressive – it 
is the ‘what’ that enables the subject to attain to a signifying position, to the 
signifying process(es). A distinction was made between the semiotic that precedes the 
establishment of the sign as the (kinetic) functional stage protruding its rhythms and 
pulsions to the symbolic, that in its turn is the attributed meaning, sign and 
signifcation; both together found the signifying process in which bodily drives and 
energy are discharged through the use of language. 
 In addition to their dual structure, on what comes to symbols and their 
threefold function – referential, existential, dispositional – with regard to 
consciousness as well as the properties of symbol were explicated. As was noted, no 
symbol, due to it being a thing and non-thing (like consciousness) can relate to 
consciousness directly but can relate only to something defined in the contents of 
consciousness and as such, symbols display the power to take the psyche into this or 
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that structure of consciousness. However, whether the symbol is comprehended or not 
does not depend on the subject but of the symbol itself; by the same token, symbol is 
absolutely non-arbitrary in relation to the structure of consciousness it corresponds to. 
In this sense and as the most archaic condensed mnemonic programmes of culture, it 
may be suggested that further research would contribute to the generating of a 
classification of cultures – by way of cultural typology – proper. 
 In addition to more subtle states of consciousness, we resorted in focusing our 
attention on the two most clearly distinguishable, even categorial ones – awake or 
active consciousness that facilitates meta-awareness, intentionality, agency, will and 
the like, and asleep or passive consciousness during which one is not aware of being 
aware which rules out intentionality, volition etc. However, the latter facilitates the 
peculiar phenomenon of dream. The dream is the elementary mystic experience that 
affords the recurring and inescapable experiencing of another reality – despite that the 
human being dreams before s/he is born – the Traumwelt therein is a polylingual 
space characterized by the transference23 of the categories of natural language into 
visual space. Though the exact reason or purpose why or how we dream remains 
unanswered, by way of REM sleep being closely connected to the maturation and 
development of the mammal brain and the functional relationship between dreams 
and memory allowed dreaming to be postulated as a mnemonic mechanism. 
 It may be noted that dreaming occurs also during NREM sleep; during both of 
which the activity in the posterior hot zone of the brain is highlighted. With respect to 
the chora it may also be noted that emotions are salient in dreams; furthermore, the 
topography of emotional bodily sensations is culturally universal. Love is in the same 
place everywhere (as are hate, disgust, pride, anxiety etc.). The temporal aspect of 
dreams was shown to be an amalgamation of past, present and future i.e. achronic (or 
panchronic, doesn’t really matter), the correspondence of which is manifest in myths 
and mythological texts more general; neither in dreams nor in mythological texts is 
there linear time. 
 Consequently, in addition to absence of meta-awareness and three-
dimensional time, knowledge as a whole of/in a given subject was defined to become 
freer in its organization by way of passive consciousness lifting the proverbial chains 
of knowledge allowing (visual) semantic polyvalence more leeway to associate and 
                                                
23 Transference is not meant here in the psychoanalytic sense where emotions originally felt in 
childhood are redirected to a substitute in the ‘transference neurosis’ phase of the analysis. 
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coalesce in most unimaginable ways and – since the dream harbors no prominent 
thirdness but upon awakening seeks to attach the one to the other – by this dreams 
were pointed to be well suited for generating new information regardless whether one 
is or ever becomes aware of it. Consisting of pure signs, i.e. due to the absence of “I” 
and prominent thirdness, with regard to their mnemonic function as well as their 
discrete semiotic spaces, dream was proposed to be the origin of anthroposemiotic 
processes proper by resorting to the concept of sign-ness. A thought elaborated in 
more depth in the end of the second chapter. 
 Yielding partially from atemporality, the second chapter pointed out the 
structural similarity between dream and myth in the sense that there is no reason why 
– instead of the psychoanalytic approach – say for example a more rigid structuralist 
approach could not be applied to dreams and the way(s) they come about. Dreams 
were postulated as presumed semiotic entities and as such, they fell into category of 
descriptive metalanguages. The difference between the pragmatic dimension where 
our somatic experience occurs and the cognitive dimension that has as its internal 
referent the former was explicated and collocated by way of proprioceptivity with the 
semiotic chora. Based on the semiotic chora as defined in the previous chapter and to 
acquire as premiss something intuitively familiar (whether in dreams or reality) to all 
readers, the term ‘falling’ was chosen as an operational term. It may also be noted that 
the vertical axis in the existence of both humans and cultures is significant. 
 ‘Falling’ was treated as the nucleus, i.e. the minimal constitutive unit of a 
hypothetical dream by projecting it onto the semiotic square in search for the 
elementary structure of meaning by way of defining the semic (semantic) category on 
the basis of distinction of opposition characterizing the paradigmatic axis of language. 
Consequently, this created isotopy which designates the iterativity or ‘recurrence’ of 
comparable entities on the syntagmatic axis; or the individual variance of dreams of 
‘falling’ and in accordance with the inner logic of the semiotic square – all terms upon 
which are isotopes – this gave rise to pluri-isotopy. In short, dreams in possession of 
the nucleus ‘falling’ also facilitate dream-themes of its opposite ‘rising’ and by the 
same token, dreams of ‘non-falling’ and ‘non-rising’ – the vertical axis of dreams and 
movement therein may thus be deduced to share the same nucleus irrespective of the 
dream-imagery. This was due to the polysememic (trad. polysemic) character of pluri-
isotopy which then leaves the manifestations of vertical dream-imagery for the 
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dreamer to dream. It may be noted that this is, in essence, the same thing as semantic 
polyvalence afforded by the passive consciousness. 
 All vertical dreams dreamt throughout the ages within consciousness are in 
theory analyzable according to their mode of production or, their respective 
generative trajectories from the most abstract to the most concrete, from the 
polyvalence of the nucleus to each individual vertical dream-image. That is, each such 
dream is a paraphrasing of the other; paraphrasing enables the elimination of 
interpretation (along with secondary revision) because of its being located on the 
deepest generative domain. Due to the exclusion of interpretation, the trajectory is 
freer in generating surface forms from semio-narrative structures, that hold both the 
syntactic and semantic components, each harboring the fundamental or deep level and 
the narrative or surface level. The dream then, may be said to consist of a series of 
narrative programs organized in accordance with the narrative trajectory (the 
orientation of which was left unspecified) in a hypotactic series; moreover, their 
relation is reciprocal in that each narrative program is presupposed by another, 
presupposing narrative program, all of which are elementary syntagms of the surface 
narrative syntax. 
 But dreams wouldn’t be so enticing were they not filled with all sorts of actors 
and actants in somewhat odd sets and settings where there is no sense of time nor 
meta-awareness. Hence, the concept of figurativization which can be used to analyze 
said dream-components was introduced albeit not extensively elaborated – that would 
have required we have a dream involving falling and unfortunately none such was 
available from reliable sources at the time of the writing of this thesis; in addition, it 
would have nevertheless fallen prey to the original dreamer’s linguistic competence 
and by extension faltered toward the psychoanalytic method. It may be mentioned that 
for the present author, what is interesting about dreams is in the dream, not in its 
recollection regardless that it remains beyond reach of the aware consciousness. 
Figurativization in dreams takes place by way of onomastics as the sub-component 
characterizing the figurativization, specifying, particularizing and introducing 
anthroponyms, toponyms and chrononyms of the dream. By way of figuration, these 
figures are put to place in a dream whereas on the other hand iconization makes them 
seem so real as to create a referential illusion transforming them into images of the 
world. This then calls forth the meaning effect reality and as is known, dreams 
possess a sufficient amount of reproduction of the real which permits a historical 
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anchoring forming a simulacrum of an external referent rendering the dream as real as 
reality itself seems to be. 
 In order to show the purity of signs in dream, their lack of meaning and 
signification within the dream due to absence of meta-awareness by and in the 
structure of consciousness “I”, the semiotic square was taken into further use along 
with the triadic sign which was projected onto the slightly adapted square. By 
postulating four separate dimensions for sign-action or semiosis – nature, culture, 
dream and awake – embodied in the human, it became possible to dissect sign-ness 
according to the logic of the semiotic square by way of resorting to other major 
theorists in semiotics; most notably Uexküll – which afforded the presumption that in 
nature there is no interpretation proper but that semiosis is dominated by face-value of 
objects therein. In culture, semiosis is predominantly interpretative according to 
Lotman and hence the essentiality of object therein was lessened. On what comes to 
our active and passive states of consciousness of awake and dream, it was shown that 
in the former semiosis is restricted solely according to the wholeness of signs therein. 
That is, we are free to see things as we please and think of them as something else if 
necessary to the extent of sign-ness in the anthroposemiotic being. Whereas in dreams 
it was postulated that due to the lack of “I” there can not be neither interpretation nor 
object in the Traumwelt, which is an agglomerate of content and form (like the 
symbol) leaving the (recollection of) representation of dream open to signification and 
meaning-making at large. The signs are pure only within the dream because they are 
not recognized nor is there any doubt of anything therein. Naturally, the 
representations of dreams become corrupted upon recall and tainted by mind. That is, 
the purity of signs is based on the absence of a cognizing subject proper in the 
signifying processes that occur during sleep. 
 In addition to this, it was proposed that the two states of consciousness – 
which can be present concomitantly – were somewhat equivalent to the distinction 
between the semiotic and the symbolic. This also enabled to suggest that the diagram 
presented may also be viewed in the light of the signifying process. Due to the dream 
being analogous to real space both visually and experientially (save for meta-
awareness), it was further bolstered that the meaning effect ‘reality’ is as efficacious 
in both dimensions thus affording anchoring which allows the experienced reality of 
either of the two dimensions become disambiguated. Consequently, as there is no “I” 
in dream, the reality of awake can not be questioned from therein then logically, it 
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must be the other way around. This constitutes doubt also awake and as far as the 
present author is aware, it is only the human being that questions the reality of the 
world and itself. Hence, the dream may indeed be said to be the origin of our peculiar 
semiotic processes tainted by signs and their systems. 
 The third chapter concentrated on the autocommunicative aspects of (recalled) 
dream further emphasizing their purity. Though there was no actual dream-narrative 
presented, the author relies on the reader’s ability to having been able to conjur that in 
their mind. Also, by way of explicating the postulates of sign-ness, the equivalence of 
reality in both dimensions was made evident as well as the possible functional 
concomitance, especially what comes to dream effecting awake reality as experienced 
and/or interpreted by a given subject which further supported the claim that dreams 
and dreaming would have played an essential part in forging the anthroposemiotic 
during our species’ phylogenesis. It may be noted that in order to effect the subject 
and its mind or awareness, there is no reason why a dream should be remembered or 
acknowledged; in a similar sense as the semiotic goes about pulsating into the 
symbolic acknowledged within a given chora or, as the sub-/unconscious does its 
tricks according to psychoanalysis. Dream is just a possibility. 
 Excluding secondary revision, a hypothetical dream ‘falling’ was sieved 
through the autocommunicative process which occurs in time rather than in space and 
which inevitably restructures the “I” – it may be noted that the process of recalling 
and especially recapitulating dreams is fairly dependent on the subject’s linguistic 
competence. The other way around, because in dreams the categories of natural 
language are transferred into visual space, then whether the ambit of dream-imagery 
is somehow restricted or defined according to linguistic competence was not 
considered. Regardless, the autocommunicative process of recalling a dream imposes 
a narrative structure upon it which increases its degree of organization and by the 
same token, its allowed effect upon the subject. 
 The similitude of dream and symbol was elaborated on the basis of the 
structural similarity between nucleus => manifest dream and the dual structure of 
symbol after which the dream was shown to possess also textual features in accord 
with the textuality of symbol, i.e. both are finalized texts with internal features that 
cannot be deduced from anything else apart from themselves and both are doubly 
coded. Dream was also shown to behave in a similar manner as text (rather the other 
way around chronologically), both possessing an indivisible meaning and potential to 
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transfer the expressions afforded by their respective semantic capacities into the sub-
set defining the flexibility of their respective languages. Accordingly, the dream 
and/as text are analogous. 
 On what comes to the restructuring of the “I” proper, it was shown to be based 
on the structure and organization of dream taken to be given in a more or less purely 
semantic language; as recollection it is restructured by the intrusion of a purely 
syntagmatic, supplementary code – whether the sign-system of awake language or 
just that of awake cognition. In this sense, transposition is a one-way process, at least 
when it is acknowledged. In essence, the “I” is restructured because of its resurgence 
into existence from another reality. Whether it is emotionally experienced as death in 
the back of one’s head is a question not asked here. The intrusion of the secondary 
code leads to the interpreting of the semantic elements of the dream-text as if they 
were included in the anewed syntagmatic organization and by this, the meanings of 
the semantic elements become endowed with new, relationary ones. The re-
syntagmatization may go so far as to render the dream to be seen as an asemantic text 
and interestingly, such texts tend to organize our associations; build-up of identity via 
the mnemonic effect of dream is susceptible to alterations and by emphasizing the 
syntagmatic order (how things are in the world), the semantic (what things are in the 
world) acquires associational leeway. 
 The fourth chapter concentrated on the proposition of the isomorphism and 
isofunctionality of the human intellect and culture, both shaped according to the 
structure of their respective symbols which in the former was suggested to be carried 
out by dreams by way of their mnemonic function whereas in the latter it takes place 
according to a given culture’s symbols; both of which are of dual structure. Symbols 
in culture are archaic in a similar manner as dreams are phylogenetically anterior to 
language; from the point of view of their final reading, the processes of creating both 
move in opposite directions as well, hence their collocation. 
 A case study of sorts was provided in order to show the applicability of 
symbolology in analysing dreams. Unfortunately, at the time of writing the author 
was not able to locate a dream ‘falling’ that would have had as severe repercussions in 
reality as did Quintus Ennius’ dream; the effect of which – both on the individual 
level and on the level of culture – was stupefying. The usefulness of symbolology was 
shown by way of analysing the dream that made Ennius consider himself as Homer, 
whose primary expression in the dream had as its secondary content literary 
 109 
authorship par excellence as defined in the contents of Ennius’ consciousness. In 
addition to that, such an attribute may be said to exist quite independently as well as a 
structure, fact, or content of consciousness. Taken as a symbol of consciousness, it 
then induced within the passive state of consciousness a suitable state by whatever 
means from which said structure was abstracted and changed his and his 
contemporary culture’s essence. It may be noted that the dream was taken by Ennius 
at face value, without secondary revision or doubt of its truthfulness. In this sense, the 
dream was more real than the real for Ennius, who incidentally altered the way of the 
real real by accepting the fact that he indeed is Homer. Also as was mentioned, 
similar events are several in the history of mankind when a subject’s dream provides a 
solution, an epiphany or inspiration etc. that have had their effect on the surrounding 
world, the mortal flesh functioning as merely an instrument in realizing the dream. 
From this, it was proposed that the two mutually opposed mechanisms of culture – 
tendency toward diversity and tendency toward uniformity – echo the mechanism of 
dream. 
 So far, the human intellect and culture were discovered to harbor similar 
semiotic traits and attributes but what was lacking, was the equivalent of the semiotic 
chora for culture. Consequently, it was shown that the way a culture comes to be in 
accordance with the universal space in cultural models, i.e. with the descriptions of 
cultural texts based on spatio-topological modelling. Cultural texts in general possess 
an elevated degree of textual significance attributing to them the position of a text’s 
point of view that guarantees their truthfulness and from which the truth is known and 
falsehood is impossible. With regard to ‘falling,’ in order to grant the vertical axis to 
have semantic valence in culture generated by way of the universal space as defined 
by the semantic interpretation of the cultural model, it became clear that in general, all 
cultural types are defined partially by the semantic axis and by the same token, the 
horizontal as well; the analogy between the human intellect and culture was shown by 
indicating to the fact that no chora can be said not to have been effected by the 
vertical axis. Also, having established dream as text with similar temporal 
characteristics to mythological texts, it was possible to propose that the latter are the 
analogue of the former; that is, mythological texts may be viewed as dreams of 
culture. 
 In the last part, some possible future elaborations of what has been done so far 
were proposed in accordance with cultural typologies and modal semiotics, that could 
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quite possibly be merged applying the central diagram depicting the fourfold 
dimensions of sign-ness; the gap could in theory be breached by comparing the 
distinction between the semiotic and the symbolic in the human with the distinction 
between syntactic and semantic in culture – both of which possess their respective 
chorae. Before that however, some elaboration on what comes to modal semiotics 
would be necessary. Modal semiotics enables a three-dimensional understanding of 
culture by way of types of traditional thinking that can be abstracted in accordance 
with the threefold level of modal reality which is then tripled into nine denominations 
of said modalities hoisting the researcher beyond traditional semiotics. It is the central 
premiss of modal semiotics that any relation may be denoted by signs but it should in 
no case to be understood as a sign of something. Consequently, the present author’s 
intuition is that modal semiotics and symbolology could indeed be merged and this 
could deepen and widen our understanding of the three intellectual objects human 
intellect, text and culture. 
 Conclusion is “the end or finish of an event, process, or text; the summing-up 
of an argument or text; the formal and final arrangement of an agreement; a 
judgement or decision reached by reasoning; [logic] a proposition that is reached from 
given premises” (ODE sub conclusion) In some sense, this thesis will not have a 
conclusion proper. Taking this as an event (whether the writing or reading of it), it 
will indeed end but as an outcome of a process ending up on paper or screen, finding 
its way about and out of the present author’s consciousness will not cease. Whether 
for good or for ill, and mayhap this writing has made its way to the reader’s 
consciousness provided a suitable structure was forged therein in the process of 
reading the text. As such, it should carry on doing whatever it is that text does – 
convey and create information. 
 On what comes to the summing-up of the main argument in this text, it can be 
found on the first page where it holds the place of the first sentence of this work – in 
summation, the analogous structure and function of the human intellect and the 
cultural system along with the isomorphism and isofunctionality between the cultural 
system and individual genetic memory as shaped by the structure of their respective 
symbols. Taking the first sentence as argument, as an agreement put forth by other 
minds into the present author’s, then from thereon to the last word is its formal and 
final arrangement – at least for the time being – along with the judgement reached by 
reasoning. We overlook [logic] because as is well-known, nothing new can be said 
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within it. In essence, what was strived towards in this thesis was to point out the 
obvious in the first sentence by using dream as an example and in this sense, the 
thesis had nothing to do with dreams proper but it only proposed some of their effects 
and outcomes both in you and your whereabouts. 
 All things considered, myths share temporal aspects with the ones present in 
dreams, and they need not follow any logic besides their own and as far as the basic 
ones as cultural texts go, they are structurally similar and share the same structural 
position as symbols of consciousness with the human and its dreams. Provided that 
symbols in the cultural system indeed are its most archaic elements which one way or 
the other propagated or motivated mythological texts, myths alongside rituals that 
orientate the way the human world lies, in light of what has been presented, then from 
the point of view of semeioneirology to come it may be argued that (parts of) culture 
are dream-like in their function; culture is partially a dream come true. By the same 
token, it seems plausible to suggest that consciousness as such should not necessarily 
be confined to the human flesh alone. 
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RESÜMEE 
Semeioneiron – unenäo ja sümboli sarnasusest kultuuri süsteemis 
 
Selle magistritöö eesmärgiks on konstateerida ja selgitada kultuurisemiootika teesi 
kolme intellektuaalsete objektide klassi – inimteadvus individuaalteadvuse mõttes, 
tekst ning kultuur kui kollektiivintellekt – analoogiat nii oma struktuurilt kui 
funktsioneerimisprintsiibilt. 
 Sissejuhatuses antakse ülevaade varasematest psühhoanalüütilistest teooriatest 
seoses unenägude uurimisega ning samuti visatakse pilk teadvuse uurimise ajalukku 
nii vaimufilosoofias kui ka fenomenoloogias. Kõik kolm teooriat välistatakse sellest 
tööst intentsionaalselt. 
 Oma eesmärkide täitmiseks võtab autor kasutusele teadvuse metateooria 
sellisena nagu see on esitatud Merab Mamardašvili ja Aleksandr Piatigorski poolt. 
Arvestades sellega, et nende järgi on teadvus sümboliline aparaat, selgitatakse 
teadvuse sümboli olemust koos tema funktsioonidega ning kõrvutatakse see kultuuri 
sümboli struktuuri ning mõistega, mis omakorda pärinevad Juri Lotmani teooriast. 
Lisaks antakse põhjalik ülevaade unenäost kui sellisest, selle (mnemoonilisest) 
funktsioonist ning selle seosest sümboli mõiste(te)ga. Julia Kristeva poolt loodud 
eristus semiootilise ja sümboolse vahel aitab avada uusi võimalusi püstitatud 
probleemide lahendamisel, eriti tähtis ära märkida semiootilise chora olulisus 
inimolemuses ja inimteadvuses. Antakse eelvaade unenäos esinevate märkide 
puhtusele, nii nagu see on välja pakutud Juri Lotmani poolt. 
 Tuginedes Algirdas Greimasi teooriale, toob autor välja unenäo moodustumise 
elementaarsed semiootilised mehhanismid koos koostisosadega, millest nad tolle 
teooria raames moodustuksid. Kajastades hüpoteetilise unenäo üdi ‘kukkuma’ 
semiootilise ruudu peal, tuuakse välja vertikaalse telje olulisus nii unenägudes kui ka 
reaalsuses ning selgitatakse selle manfestatsioonide potentsiaalsed ulatuvused. 
Peatutakse põhjalikumalt unenäo moodustumise generatiivsel trajektooril ning 
narratiivsusel (ja vihjatakse juba selle vältimatusele); unenäo trajektoori ning 
narratiivi moodustumist täpsustatakse figurativisatsiooni ja onomastika läbi, mis 
garanteerivad unenäo reaalsusefekti teoorias. 
 118 
 Näidatakse et unenägu on sama reaalne kui ärkvel kogetav reaalsus. Sama 
teooria raames pakub autor välja triaadilise märgi neljamõõtmelise olemuse 
määratluse, mille abil on võimalik väita, et unenäod tõesti koosnevad puhastest 
märkidest ilma tähenduseta ning on sellistena andnud oma panuse inimteadvuse 
tekkele läbi unenägude mnemoonilise funktsiooni. 
 Kolmas peatükk keskendub autokommunikatsiooni mõistele, läbi mille 
inimese “mina” saab restruktureeritud; samuti näidatakse narrativiseerimise 
vältimatust inimteadvuses, kasutades näitena unenägu. Selleks et unenägu sümboliga 
tihedamalt omavahel siduda, näidatakse unenägusid olevat (lõpetatud) tekstid, mis ei 
kuulu ühtegi süntagmaatilisse ahelasse. Unenäo mäletamise kaudu võib see muutuda 
asemantiliseks tekstiks ärkveloleku süntagmaatilise koodi tõttu ning hakkab subjekti 
assotsiatsioone organiseerima. 
 Neljandas peatükis antakse ülevaade kultuuri ja inimese olemuste sarnasusest 
tuginedes eelmainitud semiootilise chora mõistele – inimesel pärineb see kehast, 
kultuuril tema universaalse ruumi jaotustest. Autor esitab ka ajaloolise case study, et 
näidata kokkuvõtvalt unenägude (potentsiaalset) mõju nii üksikindiviidi kui ka – 
mõningatel juhtudel – terve kultuurikorra jaoks. Viimasena pakub autor välja 
mõningaid võimalusi antud raamistiku edasiarendamiseks läbi Juri Lotmani 
kultuuritüpoloogiate ning David Zilbermani modaal-semiootika, mida on teoreetiliselt 
võimalik omavahel ühildada töös esitatud raamistikus triaadilise märgi 
neljamõõtmelise olemuse kaudu. 
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